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ABSTRACT
The study was designed to analyze state trading in
an attempt to determine its economic and non-economic
nature and content; to examine those instances in which the
comparative cost doctrine lacked the necessary ingredients
to explain exchange; and to explore the applicability of
game theory to the possible indeterminant regions of
bilateral monopoly.
In accomplishing these tasks, the background and
types of state trading were first explored.

The periods

examined ranged from the early Middle Ages to today's
present epoch.

At this point the general objectives and

consequences of state trading were examined.

Included were

such objectives as domestic protection, disposal of surplus
commodities, and price discrimination.

The consequences,

however, were limited to production and/or consumption
effects and factor movements.
Next, the study explored the applicability of
international trade theory to the cited situations.

Theo

rists for decades have modified and added to the original
forms of comparative advantage or cost doctrine hoping to
find the "one11 theory to explain exchange among nations.
However in their search, various hypotheses were developed
viii

to justify trade under different situations.

Hence,, it was

necessary to identify that "interpretation" which best
described the various cases of state trading.
As a consequence of the above "interpretation," it
became apparent that in many situations state trading could
not be rationalized by the comparative cost doctrine.
Rather, through the use of "offer curves," a zone of inde
terminacy was revealed wherein bargaining strengths and
tactics determined the outcome.

To explain exchange under

such conditions, game theory was used.
As a result of the inquiry, several seldom-stressed
matters with regard to state trading were revealed.

First,

the investigation suggested that government exchange is
subject to somewhat of a frustrating pattern.

Secondly,

the theory of comparative cost was found to be insufficient
when applied to many state trading cases.

Thirdly, it was

shown to be analytically possible (as seen in two analyzed
cases— wheat and oil) to apply various game theory models
to the state trading phenomenon and glean important insights
in the process.

ix

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The passage of the Trade Expansion Act in 1962
represented a bold American initiative looking
toward a new era of expanding trade and economic
cohesiveness among the nations of the free world.
Today the exuberant hope for building a Grand
Design of unity has been chilled by a gradual
resurgence of economic and political nationalism.
The free world community now stands at a cross
road. It may move forward to a more open inter
national economy— with all free nations enjoying
the fruits of closer economic ties— or it could
move backward to a world marked by narrow and
destructive economic nationalism.1
Prom the above passage by the joint Economic Com
mittee, one may conclude that in the mid sixties the world
was indeed at a crossroad.

Since that time, the inter

national economy has see-sawed toward greater freedom in
some respects, and toward more restraints in others.

It is

possible, for example, to argue that the rise of state
trading has operated to divide the world during the 1960's
and 1970's while simultaneously the movement toward economic
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Off Dead Center; Some Proposals to Strengthen Free World
Economic Cooperation. Report of the Joint Economic Com
mittee, 89th Congress, 1st Session, December, 1965,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 1.
1

2
integration has been further advanced.

This study is aimed

primarily at the first phenomenon— state trading.
Loosely speaking, state trading occurs when govern
ments or their representatives engage in international
2
trade on government account.
It may be found in many forms
such as commodity agreements, offshore procurements, or in
the activities of government corporations or other government
middleman agencies.

In many instances the ultimate motivat

ing force for exchange of commodities may not even be
3

strictly economic.

When this is so, the traditional tools

of economic analysis (emphasizing comparative costs as the
basis for exchange) tend to break down into the indeterminate
world of bilateral monopoly.

As so aptly stated by Jacob

Viner:
When governments are also conductors of economic
enterprise in the international field, what results
is a pattern or intergovernmental relationship in
which economic, political, and military bilateralmonopoly plus duopoly are all wrapped up in one
package of international dynamite.^
P

As will be presented later, a more detailed
explanation will indicate that state trading exists when
national governments or their agents take part in inter
national commerce for varied objectives and under varied
conditions and forms to secure imports or sell exports
the title which lies with the government or is secured by
the government.
■^For example, it may be military or political.
^Jacob Viner, "International Relations Between
State-Controlled National Economics," American Economic
Review. XXXIV (March, 1 9 W , 317.

3
Of course, many government or state trading
activities are not covered entirely by the Viner descrip
tion.

There are numerous cases in which governments do

conform to the motivating forces (basically profit subject
to various constraints) found within private international
trade.

However, there are enough exceptions to warrant

investigation into those cases not fully explained by
traditional theory.
Purpose and Nature of Study
It is the purpose of this study to analyze state
trading in an attempt to determine its economic (and
non-economic) nature and content, to examine those
instances in which the comparative costs doctrine lacks the
necessary ingredients to explain exchange, and to explore
the applicability of game theory to the state trading
situation.

It is a study that needs to be made, for state

trading appears to be growing in relative importance,
leaving less and less to be explained by the "traditional"
theory of comparative costs, which is most applicable to
international exchange through free markets.

To date, very

little has been done to really get at the nature of the
process (it is both economic and political).

There have

been few systematic attempts to apply traditional economic
theory to the state trading case, and no one has apparently
attempted to employ game theory (or game-theory-based

bargaining models) to state trading as yet.

This last in

particular appears to be a rather peculiar oversight, for
game theory was developed precisely in order to sharpen the
decision-making process under conflict conditions.
To begin to accomplish these tasks, the background
and types of state trading are first explored.

For pur

poses of comparison, a brief historical sketch is presented
in which "contemporary" governmental trading methods are
contrasted with older forms of state trading.

Rather than

examine minute details, this section will be limited to a
broad view in order to emphasize certain fluctuating
patterns found within government commerce.

Also included

in this section is an analysis of the development of the
non-market system which has become of critical importance
today.
The general objectives and consequences of state
trading are examined next.

Obviously, state trading can

have some far-reaching effects (both political and economic)
resulting from government attempts to secure certain state
trading goals.

Such goals may include:

domestic protec

tion, disposal of surplus commodities, securing of strategic
materials, political assistance or warfare, and possible
price discrimination.

Quite obviously, not all of the

possible direct and indirect economic impacts can be
explored, so this section centers on the most visible or

5
apparent production and/or consumption effects and factor
movements.
Naturally, the impact of state trading depends very
much on the particular type of state trading that is being
practiced, and this is considered next.

At one point in

time a government may be an exporter of goods and at another
an importer.

In each situation the state trader may attempt

(depending on its objectives) to sell or buy commodities at
the market price, above the market price, or below the
market price.

Hence, depending on market conditions (and

other factors), the government trader may practice price
discrimination.
At this point the study explores the applicability
of international trade theory to the presented cases.
Theorists for decades have modified and added to the
original forms of comparative advantage or costs doctrine
hoping to find the "one" theory to explain exchange among
nations.

However, in their search, various hypotheses were

developed to justify trade under different assumptions and
in different situations.

Hence, it is necessary to find

that (if any) interpretation which best describes the
various cases of state trading.

Moreover, the actual

question of the applicability of comparative costs is
investigated in some depth.
As a result of the above, it becomes apparent that
in some cases the doctrine of comparative costs does not

apply to state trading.

Instead, the use of "offer curves"

indicates that there exists an indeterminate region of
trade— *a zone where bargaining strength and tactics
determine the outcome.
Hence, game theory, an approach uniquely suited to
bargaining, is explored as a possible device for explain
ing state trading actions— especially those of a bilateral
monopoly nature.

At first a matrix is developed and then

modified to show the need for power relationships.

At this

point, that "power" model (basically Zeuthen, Nash, and
others), which is felt to be most capable of application to
state trading, is modified and applied to the presented
data.
As a final task, two real world state trading cases
are examined in some detail.

First the controversial

American-Soviet wheat deal is analyzed in terms of the
reasons for its origination and from the position of its
costs and benefits.

In addition, the presented game theory

is used to reveal (from a rather unique view) the actions
of the participants.

Secondly, the OPEC (Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries) is examined; and as with the
wheat deal, game theory is used to more fully disclose the
activities of the "players."
As to the question of a theory to explain state
trading, this paper makes several implicit hypotheses.
First, in many instances state trading does not conform to
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the comparative cost doctrine.

Secondly, state traders do

not necessarily exchange goods and services for profit
only.

Thirdly, there does not exist "a" theory of state

trading.

Game theory, although used extensively is not in

itself a theory of government exchange.

Rather it is a

device or tool heretofore not used in the examination of
state trading.

Prom its use, particular insights are

possible— insights not readily found when "attempting” to
use traditional theory to explain the trading process.
In conclusion, this dissertation attempts to explore
certain economic and non-economic aspects of state trading;
it analyzes the lack of applicability of comparative cost
doctrine to governmental trade; and as an alternative view
examines the possibility of using game theory as a means
of explaining or rationalizing prices, directions, and
patterns of exchange.

This study is viewed as very timely

and significant as a result of the recent thaws in U. S.
relations with Red China and the Soviet Union— and because
of the oil shortage "crisis" in the United States (and the
world) much of which finds in origin in the power tactics
of the OPEC nations.

CHAPTER II
PAST AND PRESENT STATE TRADING
In order to fully comprehend the nature and prob
lems of state trading, a general knowledge of its evolution
and current forms is necessary.

This chapter presents a

brief historical perspective of state trading from its
Middle Ages origin to its present day status.

Rather than

examine minute details, certain cyclical patterns found
within the history of government commerce will be presented.
Five chronological time periods are utilized:

(1) the early

gestation period of the late Middle Ages, (2) the Mercantile
period, (3) the Classical era, (4) the early twentieth
century, and (5) the modern present-day epoch.

The chapter

concludes with analysis (post hoc) of state trading.1
The Earlv Period
From the earliest records of international commerce,
government involvement in the exchange of goods and services
has ranged from sporadic and piecemeal to complete domina
tion of trade.

State trading appears to have been only one

■*-As may be pointed out, not all historians agree to
the exact starting point of state trading. Quite obviously,
limited forms existed before the Middle Ages. Additionally,
events in history (economic) are examined along with various
views on the history of economic thought.
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facet in the spectrum of control, but a significant one
whose origin dates back to the Middle Ages.

2

During this

period, "international" trade was common simply because
there were so many "national" borders that had to be crossed
in shipping goods even short distances.

"State trading"

occurred (depending on how liberal an interpretation is
given to the term), naturally, as the lords of the many
independent manors took part in buying and selling com
modities to other similar lords and their entities.^

The

city-states of Italy were the most notable cases in point.
However, since economic self-sufficiency was the rule
rather than the exception, this crude form of state trading
was necessarily quite limited.
As time passed, state trading began to take on new
dimensions.

Gradually, the economic and political organ

izations that characterized near self-sufficiency weakened
with the beginnings of new town urbanization, religious
"liberation," and the colonization of newly discovered
lands.

The "new" states taxed, designated regions of trade,

and eventually established trading monopolies.

It was

during this era of the emergence of the national state that
^John N. Hazard, "State Trading in History and
Theory," Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer, 1959),

2^3 -4 5 .
■^By state trading, the author is implying that the
manor lords were the "governments" of the many small
entities.
^Hazard, loc. cit.
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most economic historians felt the gestation period for state
trading was completed.

In essence, those elements needed

for government commerce (or any form of trade) had been
established.

Population density had increased; town

urbanization had occurred; population quality had begun a
slow upward grading with the assistance of the printing
press; and beginnings of technological change were present.
These elements combined with growing power within many
national governments allowed for the firm establishment of
exchange between nations on government account.

5

The Mercantile Period
Prom the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries,
state trading appeared in form and structure similar to
that of the twentieth century.

That is, national economic

and political power was the keynote of this era of
Mercantilism— a fact of supreme importance to government
trading activities.
Mercantilism varied from nation to nation and from
time to time, but its common theme was the importance of
the state in political and economic affairs.

Most

Mercantilists stressed regulation of activities to further
the goals of increased wealth and power.

In many instances

^Por an interesting sociological approach emphasiz
ing these ingredients see: Werner J. Cahnman, "Toennies
and Social Change," Social Forces. XL (December, 1968),

136-1^.
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precious metals were valued and used as measuring rods to
gauge the "successfulness" of nations— with state trading,
through a strong central government, becoming a significant
weapon in the struggle for a favorable balance of trade and
the resulting inflow of bullion.

The Mercantilist writer

Thomas Mun, commenting on the value of trade, put it this
way:
Although a kingdom may be enriched by gifts
received, or by purchase taken from some other
nation, yet these things are uncertain and of
small consideration when they happen. The ordinary
means therefore to increase our wealth and treasure
is by Foreign Trade, wherein we must ever observe
this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly than we
consume of theirs in value.6
As an instrument used to secure such ends, state
trading took several forms.

For example, trading monopolies

were created by special grants from the Crown, companies
like the Hudson Bay and East India Companies being cases in
point.

These organizations were actually "agents" of their

respective governments whose task was to explore the new
world for the benefit of their mother countries.

Although

not the government monopoly buyers and sellers of later
periods, they were granted exclusive licenses as merchants
of the Crown and thus constituted one of the first "true"
7

forms of state trading.'
6Philip C. Newman, Arthur D. Gayer, and Milton
Spencer, eds., Source Readings in Economic Thought (New
York: Norton and Company, 195*0, PP. 22-25.
?There may be some disagreement as to whether these
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Similarly (but usually overlooked by economic
historians), the securing of bullion was itself an expres
sion of state trading.

Noted earlier, it was a goal of

many nations to secure gold through a favorable balance of
trade.

In order to achieve this objective, government

intervention took place in an attempt to create those con
ditions necessary for the inflow of bullion.

Hence gold,

not usually viewed as a commodity in international exchange,
became a significant "good" exchanged between European
governments.®
In the years that followed, significant changes
occurred.

Scholars began to argue that international trade

could be of mutual advantage to nations engaged in exchange.
Bullionist doctrines lost some of their appeal in light of
new "liberal11 thinking.

In many instances, economic and

political power was still viewed as a legitimate objective
for governments, but even at its height, the influence of
Mercantilism was not universal.

For example, Pre-Classical

writers such as Sir Dudley North and David Hume viewed
wealth in a context void of the desirability of gold per
se.^

Moreover, if the automatic specie-flow mechanism were

companies were "state trading." However, as they were agents
of their respective governments involved in some degree of
international trade, it can be argued that they were indeed
practicing a form of government commerce.
®Edward Ames, "State Operations in Gold and Foreign
Exchange," Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer,
1959), 329-332.
^Newman, Gayer, and Spencer, op. cit.. p. 53.
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permitted to function, it was not necessary for nations to
place the weight of their policy decisions to securing gold.
As a result, the limited forms of state trading began to
diminish under the rising tide of economic liberalism
sweeping the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The Classical Period
In many respects the liberal doctrines of what later
came to be known as the Classical period are the direct
anti-thesis of Mercantilists thought and practice.

For

example, among the new ideas characterizing the period was
the notion that governments were to '’encourage" the selfinterest of individuals.

A "hands off" policy of limited

regulation and control was deemed more desirable than
allowing governments to manipulate international intercourse
for its own benefit.'*’®

The Benthamite philosophy of little

conflict between public good and self-interest reduced the
"need" for government intervention and helped create a
climate in which state trading all but stagnated and dis
appeared .
The tenor of the Classical period is best captured
by Adam Smith:
What is the species of domestic industry which
his capital can employ, and of which the produce is
likely to be of the greatest value, every individual,
it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge
10Ibid.. p. 117.
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much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do
for him . . . .
To give the monopoly of the home market to
the produce of domestic industry, in any particular
art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct
private people in what manner they ought to employ
their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be
either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the
produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap
as that of foreign industry, the regulation is
evidently useless.
If it cannot, it must generally
be hurtful.11
Ironically, along with creating (or interpreting)
the environment for the demise of state trading, the
Classical school indirectly laid the foundation for its
later rebirth.

The laissez-faire orientation of these

scholars (and the economic systems themselves) certainly
hastened the passing of the Industrial Revolution and the
development of many nations.

With the Revolution, however,

there appeared a myriad of abuses and social ills.

These

abuses, in turn, produced their own responses— one of which
was that of Karl Marx, with his vision of a state-directed
economy.
Socialism was from its very beginning a reaction
against social and economic discord and inequity.

The

Classical doctrines, as the Mercantilist philosophies before
them, were not universally accepted, even in their own time.
Criticism was especially evident against the possible
11Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 1937),
pp. 423-424.

15
by-products of industrialization— business crises, child
labor, long hours, and unemployment.

Socialists both in

England and on the Continent expressed through their
writings a desire for a new social order in which mankind
could solve his problems void of the competitive evils they
12
envisioned in the present system.
As products of the
Enlightraent, many distrusted authority yet built and
described systems in which authority was a requirement.

An

enlarged role for the state, including state trading, thus
became eminently more possible under the new models than
within the classical system.
The Twentieth Century
Of the periods in which state trading occurred, the
twentieth century has provided the most fertile climate for
its growth.

However, as with earlier epochs, an "up again,

down again" character has again appeared.

Governments con

tinued to use state trading as a tool to achieve certain
policy objectives which varied with economic and political
conditions.

World War I amply demonstrated the usefulness

of government trade as a means of securing strategic control
over various segments of an economy.

As pointed out by J.

Hazard, former adviser on state trading to the Department
of State:
12Newman, Gayer, and Spencer,

op.

cit.. pp. 23^-35.
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Purchasing missions on government account
appeared in the great markets of the world.
The Czar of Russia bought munitions in the
West, the firm of Morgan financed the French
Government in its commercial operations in the
United States. The retreat from private
enterprise was not limited to the continent.
The United States thought it necessary to
requisition the railways and to form a
commercial fleet to be managed by the War
Shipping Board. Yet, governments still relied
upon the price system to obtain the goods
they required. The War Shipping Board
waived its right to claim sovereign immunity
in the courts.
"Business as usual" is said
to have expressed not only one's patriotic
duty, but also abounding faith in the
transitory character of the whole episode.
Similarly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 laid the
foundation for a vast system of economic planning in which
state trading became a tool of utmost importance.

Lenin,

not content with traditional methods of exchange and/or
protection, turned to state monopolies of foreign trade.
In a decree of 1918 he declared:
All foreign trade is nationalized. Contracts
for the purchase or sale of all kinds of products
(the products of mines, of industry, of agriculture
and others) with foreign governments or individual
enterprises abroad will be carried out in the name
of the Russian Republic by specially empowered
organs. Apart from these organs every contract for
trade, for purchase or sale abroad is forbidden.14
In later statements Stalin followed Lenin's position but
was apparently unaware of effects other than immediate
protection for Soviet industries.
^Hazard, o p . cit., p. 2^.
l4Ibld.. p. 2^6.
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Not until the depression of the thirties and the
resulting difficulties in trading did it appear to other
nations that government trade could again help to secure
advantages in world markets.

Bulk buying and barter deals

then became contagious as international currencies became
scarce and trade restrictions grew.1-* Though intended as
only a temporary expedient until the depression ended, such
procurement methods allowed nations the opportunity to
"bargain" for strategic commodities— goods which could not
be easily obtained through traditional channels with the
limited amount of foreign exchange available.
Unfortunately, as economic conditions improved,
crises appeared anew with the growing possibility of armed
conflict.

Nazi Germany began to rearm in the middle 1930's,

and much of its war program depended on international trade.
Reminiscent of past Mercantile practices, state trading
developed new dimensions under a powerful and dominant
German central government.
The Allies were also busy in their attempts to
determine the usefulness of government trade.

Even before

the war, Russia had been negotiating with the United States
for the establishment of a trading mission to be located in
New York.

The Amtorg Trading Corporation, as it was

eventually entitled, originally attempted to isolate itself
15Ibid.
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from United States law and control.

However, unsuccessful

in its task, the agency was of little significance until
the war increased in severity.

At this point the American

government eased its former restrictions stimulating a
rapid increase in trade between the two nations.1^
Other allied nations also began to create similar
state trading entities.

Nor was trade one way in nature,

for the United States set up many of its own governmental
departments for the "securing*' or importation of strategic
materials from foreign countries.

The United States Com

mercial Corporation was a prime example of such a procure
ment agency.17
As these forms of state trading multiplied and
proliferated throughout the world, opposition appeared from
various interest groups.

Free trade was still a desired

objective (from the world point of view and by many private
traders) with many supporters in most nations.

In face of

this opposition, state trading slowly began to diminish
after the war without the protection or guise of a
"temporary expedient in difficult times."
Recent State Trading Activities
After war and depression memories had faded, most
countries attempted to reconstruct their trading relations
l6Ibid.. pp. 2/17-50.

17Ibld.
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using more acceptable peacetime methods.

With its commit

ment to the private enterprise market system, the United
States pressed for the readoption of private channels of
18
exchange.
Favoring "free" trade rather than "controlled,"
governments of most Western nations agreed to speed up and
facilitate the return of the private market system.

How

ever, several major representatives of the allied powers,
notably Britain and France, continued and in some cases
expanded the use of state trading.

Britain, a nation

dependent upon imports for her survival, negotiated several
long term contracts to ensure supplies of essential agri
cultural commodities.

Some of these lasted until 1955.

France formed similar state trading entities in its agri
cultural sector, in raw materials importation, manufactured
goods, and military hardware.

Between 19^8 and 1953,

imports on government account increased to approximately
35 per cent of French intra-European imports.

Moreover,

even as Great Britain began to phase out governmental
exchange, France continued and became the primary exponent
19
of state trading in Western Europe. 7
The Soviet Union also continued to expand its form
of government trade.

By extending its influence into the

^ O f course, such private channels were subject to
regulation through tariffs, quotas, and other trading
restrictions.
■^Marc Quinn, "State Trading in Western Europe,"
Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer, 1959), ^05.
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bordering nations of Eastern Europe, Russia created a
Soviet trading bloc with the •’adoption" of satellite
countries.

Each newly acquired neighbor eventually changed

its trading practices until nearly all exchange came under
the control of their respective central governments.
Similar in structure to the Russian model of trading
corporations, these state trading nations offered and con
tinue to offer a growing and unified core against the
private traders of the West.
Other less developed nations, seeing the success of
the British, French, and Soviet Bloc examples, began to
experiment with versions of state trading.

In many cases

these nations, lacking foreign exchange, viewed government
trade as a desirable means of obtaining needed foreign
currencies.

If they were especially subject to persistently

declining or unstable prices for their exports, they tended
to set up governmental agencies to negotiate bilateral trade
agreements.

Additionally, their search for new markets and

more stable trading relationships led many nations to in
creased trade with China, Russia, and other Sino-:Soviet
Bloc members.
An example of the undeveloped nations' efforts in
this direction may prove instructive.

Between 195^ and 1955

Burma negotiated bilateral trade and payments arrangements
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, Hungary,

21
Poland, Rumania, East Germany, and the Soviet Union.
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These agreements were made during a period in which Burma's
main export (rice) was experiencing severe price declines
in world markets.

Aggravated by production surpluses and

falling foreign exchange earnings, Burma felt that state
trading was the solution to its dilemma.

However, it did

not prove to be successful:
(1) The quality of imports from the Sino-Soviet
bloc were poor, and the deliveries slow and ir
regular; (2) Burma became an involuntary creditor
under some of the agreements when she expected to
receive credits; and (3 ) the world rice market
improved, making sales in the free market more
attractive than deliveries under contracts to the
Sino-Soviet bloc countries .21
Ironically, during this same period the United
States reversed Its policy and laid the foundation for the
resurgent development of its own special brand of state
trading.

In 195^ the Agricultural Trade and Development

and Assistance Act (referred to as Public Law 480) was
enacted.

The Act, known as the Pood for Peace program

today, was originally established for the disposal of
agricultural surpluses but has since served broadly as a
tool for (1 ) the encouragement of economic development in
poor countries, (2) the expansion of American markets, and
20J. N. Behrman, "State Trading By Undeveloped
Countries," Law and Contemporary Problems. XXVI (Summer,
1959), 454-55.
21Ibld.. p. 457.

(3) as a vehicle of U. S. foreign policy.
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Act is divided into three sections or titles.

Basically the
Title I

exports are sold abroad for foreign currencies or on credit
for U. S. dollars.

Title II exports are strictly unilateral

gifts to those nations requiring assistance because of
disasters, poor food supplies, or to promote economic
development.

Title III allows the Commodity Credit

Corporation to sell or "barter" government owned agricul
tural surpluses for strategic materials and supplies and
services required for the overseas operation of U. S.
agencies and the Defense Department.

Under this program,

U. S. firms make arrangements with the CCC to ship agricul
tural commodities to predetermined destinations and to
finance purchase of, or deliver, an equal bundle of com
modities that are being purchased by aid recipient nations
or by military establishments.

Such primary shipments are

restricted to areas that will potentially increase com
mercial sales for the U. S.

The receipts (to the

government) from these transactions are used to purchase
foreign commodities that are not required to be produced
domestically according to balance of payment requirements.
The contractor receives payment in agricultural goods for
22Baymond J. Doll, Glen H. Miller, Jr., and Richard
D. Rees, International Trade and American Agriculture.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (September, 19?0),
pp. 20-21.
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providing such services.
large as

Specifically, such payment may be

per cent of the value of the purchased items.

In recent years, 1967-69, total shipments worth 1.3 billion
dollars, 1.2 billion dollars, and 1 billion dollars
23
respectively have been made under the total program. J
Tables 1 and 2 present a break down of U. S. agricultural
exports under such government sponsored activities.
Under a similar program (but for stockpiling pur
poses), the Property Management and Disposal Service of the
General Service Administration procures and disposes of
materials from U. S. stockpile sources.

For purchasing,

sealed bids are received by this agency and are awarded
according to established criteria which is not always "the
lowest bid."

In other cases the government "barters" sur

plus stockpiled commodities for those materials in short
supply.

For example, titanium may be exchanged for copper,

a more desired commodity.

Also, stockpiled items may be

obtained from sources other than the free world if their
specifications require it.

2b

23of course such procurements and sales are subject
to the general regulations concerning overseas buying and
selling. Furthermore, general approval by Congress is
required for the disposition of stockpiled items.
2^The above information was secured from the Office
of Emergency Procurement. No written confirmation could be
obtained as the author was informed that the agencies in
question are only under broad guidelines and do not have
written instructions as to the specific details of their
operations. However, general regulations may be obtained
from: Stockpile Report to the Congress. Office of Emergency
Preparedness:
(January-June, 1970).

TABLE 1
U. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND GOVERNMENT FINANCED PROGRAMS
Calendar Years of 195^-69
(Millions of Dollars)
PUBLIC LAW 1+80
Long-term
Dollar and
Convertible
Foreign
Currency
Credit Sales

Donations
for Disaster
Relief and
Economic
Development

__

28

263

- -

638
760

—

56
65
39
**3
32
1+9
93

Sales for
Foreign
Currency

Year
195^+
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
I960
1961
1962

752
731
1 ,01 U

1967
1968

1969

- —

1

1,007

U2
52
97
152
239

899
815
736
539
329

1966

—

878
1,162
1,232

1963
196U
1965

- -

201

381+
1+09

81

99
62

73
79
108
101
10l+

Voluntary
Relief
Agency
Donations

Barter for
Strategic
Materials

20
186
187

22
262

70
767

372

175
159

21+1+

1,262
1 ,2 1 8

111
121+

65
175
117

1,019
1,01+9
1,301+
1,301+
1,1+1+5
1,511

151

181

178
160
186
180

137
38
35
5

1,612

132
179

1+1

1 ,3 0 6

150

13
3

152

—

1,237
1,177
99^

+July-December
SOURCE:

Total
Public
Law 1+80

Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, U. S. Department of Agriculture

1,309
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TABLE 2
U. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND GOVERNMENT-FINANCED PROGRAMS

Calendar Years of 1954-69
(Millions of Dollars)
Total Agricultural Exports

Year

Under
Specified
Government
Programs

Outside
Specified
Government
Programs*

1954 +
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

281
1,118

1,304

1,711
1,536
1,233
1,207
1,461
1,483
1,480
1,522
1,635
1,335
1,353
1,270

2,459
2,970

1968

1,188

1969

1,002

2 ,0 8 1

2,622

2,748
3,371
3,541
3,554
4,062
4,713
4,894
5,528
5,110
5,046
4,934

All
1,585
3,199
4,170
4,506
3,855
3,955
4,832
5,024
5,034
5,584
6,384
6 ,2 2 9
6 ,8 8 1
6 ,3 8 0

6,234
5,936

•"Total agricultural exports outside speoified Government
programs"'includes (1)! barter shipments for overseas pro
curement for U.S. agencies; (2) extension of credit and
oredit guarantees for relatively short periods; (5 ) sales
of government-owned commodities at less than domestic
market prices; and (4).export payments in cash or in kind.
+July-Deoember
Souroe:

Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States.
U.S. Deparimeni of Agriculture
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Since 1967, stockpiling purchases have been small,
and emphasis has been toward the disposition of excess
materials for currency.

Usually a fixed price is estab

lished (f. o. b.) for surplus items near or equal to current
world market prices of the commodity in question.

Table 3

gives a detailed breakdown of strategic materials bought and
sold under stockpile directives.
As a last possibility the U. S. has purchased goods
and services under its "offshore procurement" programs.
Basically, such buying practices are for military aid or
assistance.

Under the program the selling nation can

receive assistance in the development of its overall
military capability though higher income or productive capa
bilities.
Clearly, (as demonstrated by the presented cases)
the United States has also become a major participant in
state trading.
State Trading in Retrospect
Historically, then, state trading has occurred in
many forms and with many variations.

At present, the

practice is still so diverse that evaluation is an elusive
task at best.
Perhaps the most difficult task is to construct a
concise explanation of state trading which can encompass all
the cases mentioned earlier.

Governmental trade has taken

TABLE 3
TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 1*80— VALUE OF BARTER CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS
DELIVERED OR REIMBURSEMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH DEC. 31, 1969 *
(in millions of dollars)
July 1, 195^ through
Dec. 31, 1968
Type

Strategic materials for stockpile:
Strategic stockpile
Supplemental stockpile
Total
Procurements for other Government
agencies:
AID
AEC
DOD
Total
Grand total**

Cumulative through
Dec. 31, 1969

Contracting
(Purchases)

Deliveries
(Sales)

Contracting
(Purchases)

151.5
1,1+20.0

151.5
1,1+26.7

151.5
1,1+20.0

1 ,1+2 6 .8

1,571.5

1,573.2

1,571.5

1,578.3

33.5
6 8 .5

33.3
3.2
67.5

33.5
U.5
68.5

33.3
3.2
67.5

106.5

k/ltik.O

106.5

101+.0

1,678.0

1,682.3

b.5

1,678.0

1 ,682.2

Deliveries
(Sales)
151.5

*The table shows the value of strategic materials delivered to CCC by contractors and reimbursements
to CCC for procurements for U. S. Government agencies.
**Contracting totals do not equal delivery and reimbursements totals because the value of the latter,
and of the counterpart agricultural exports, varies from contracting figures because of tolerance, premiums
and discounts on materials delivered, and contract defaults, etc.
SOURCE: Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, U. S. Department of Agriculture.
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and continues to take on many different characteristics,
depending upon the country practicing it and on the circum
stances when it is employed.

At one extreme is the Soviet

Union, which is the "pure" case today.

Not only is foreign

exchange in governmental hands, but everything from produc
tion to distribution, both horizontally and vertically, is
government owned and controlled.

In other nations, the

state may limit itself to procurement (as in the United
States) and delegate to the private sector the task of
producing commodities for exchange.

Between these extremes

lie those countries (developed or under developed) that use
some combination of state production and procurement to
satisfy their objectives.

Thus any explanation of state

trading would have to consider political orientation, types
of commodities traded, level of income, and the special
features of the internal and external production and distri
bution system of the country or countries concerned.
Similarly, the exact form or type of trading
establishment varies from country to country.
most common form is the public corporation.

In some, the
In others there

appears to be a mixture of many forms, including purchase
offices, marketing boards, stores departments, supply
missions, committees, purchasing authorities, food agencies,
25
and import and/or export offices. J Moreover, these forms
^ U n i t e d Nations, State Trading in Countries of the
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vary in degrees of autonomy in their commercial operations.2^
As a result, advantages (or disadvantages) can accrue to
public agencies that are not available (without additional
costs or perhaps not at all) to private traders.

For

example, free use of government services may be made avail
able to state trading organizations while private merchants
27
have to go to the market for them. ' On the other hand,
without relative autonomy the state trader may be severely
limited in its flexibility and its ability to employ com
mercial principles in its operation.

Again, the degree of

autonomy will vary from case to case, depending on the goals
of the organization, the products it handles, the political
philosophy of the country, and so on.
It therefore appears that state trading can take on
a nearly infinite variety of forms and characteristics when
circumstances create different environments for its
existence.

How, then, can it be defined?

Obviously, the

definition must be broad, although much meaning may be lost

Asia and The Far East Region. Report by the ECAFE
Secretariat, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(New York: United Nations, 196*1-), pp. 2-3.
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Autonomy is the degree of restraint or freedom in
such areas as legal administration, financing, rights and
privileges, pricing policies, and objectives to be pursued.
2?Public Transportation services and additional
credit facilities being cases in point.
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in making it so general.

28

That, however, appears to be a

necessary evil.
For purposes of this study, therefore, "state
trading" shall be defined simply as "governmental partici
pation in international commerce as buyer or seller."
Objectives may vary, commodities and conditions may vary,
but if a government through any of its agencies purchases
or sells in International trade for its own account, it may
be said to be "state trading."

OO

This refers to the debate between realistic and
unrealistic assumptions in economic theory. Shall the
assumptions be realistically accurate and detailed in their
description or shall the assumptions be broad and "un
realistic" and hence lead to more universal application.
Perhaps Cartter's inbetween approach has merit in that:
"The more specific and descriptively realistic a
theory is, the more specialized is its use, carried to the
extreme, a theory based on thoroughly realistic and accurate
assumptions is applicable to one unique situation in time
and space. The wider the desired application of a theory
the simpler and more generalized it must be."
See: Cartter, Allan M., Theory of Wages and
Employment (Richard Irwin, Inc., 1959), P. **■, and also
Friedman, Milton, Essavs on Positive Economics.

CHAPTER III
GOALS AND CONSEQUENCES OP STATE TRADING
As noted earlier, state trading can result from a
myriad of motivating forces.

Depending on circumstances

and conditions, nations use governmental trade to secure
objectives that are varied and in many instances hidden
from view.

It is thus the purpose of this chapter to note

the various possible goals of state trading and explore
some economic consequences of its practice.
General Objectives
It is not easy to analyze the goals of state
trading, for they are complex.

Most nations do not have a

single goal but ’’mixtures" tied to the overall economic and
political aims of their governments.

Some of the major

objectives which may be sought singularly or in combination
include:
(a) Ensuring regular supplies of commodities
at stable or favorable prices. Britain has used
"bulk purchase" contracts with Argentina to ensure
itself of a regular supply of beef and other staples,
for example.
(Stability in home consumption standards
may be an important overall governmental objective.)
(b) Maintaining stable production levels at
home by means of international commodity agreements
which set price ranges and production quotas for
each member. Members of the International Coffee
31
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Agreement, for example, have this as one of their
several goals.
(c) Securing markets for the disposal of sur
plus commodities, either through barter of through
normal commercial channels. Public law Jj-80 sales
and grants of U. S. farm commodities is an example.
(d) Securing special advantages through bulk
transactions. Again, Britain's "bulk purchase"
contracts are cases in point. One such contract
entailed the purchase of New Zealand's entire ex
port surplus of meat for seven years, with prices
free to vary only 7k per cent annually.
(e) Ensuring the supply of strategic or essential
materials. U. S. stockpiling purchases of strategic
ores are an example.
(f) Maintaining control over foreign economic
assistance programs. Aid-receiving countries may
have a propensity to expend assistance in the form
of hard foreign exchange in wasteful or non-economic
ways; this tendency can be controlled by providing
assistance in the form of goods exported by the
donor government.
(g) Raising revenues. Financially hard-pressed
governments may profit by purchasing commodities
domestically at relatively low prices and selling
them at the world price.
(h) Regulating health and sanitary conditions.
A government may take it upon itself to ensure an
adequate supply of food or medicine by doing the
overseas purchasing itself,
(i) Making more effective use of foreign exchange
and/or conserving existing supplies. Straight barter
deals make usage of foreign exchange unnecessary;
similarly, trade can be directed away from scarcecurrency areas toward surplus-currency areas if
convertibility problems exist.
(j) Increasing the dependence of other countries
upon the state trader for political or economic
reasons. The Soviet Union has been quite successful
in this respect since World War II, and Hitler's
Germany made efforts in this direction during the
1930's.
(k) Increasing the effectiveness of economic
planning by enlarging government's role in the
economy. Britain's Labor government in the immediate
post-World War II period attempted just this strategy.
(1) Facilitating the economic development process.
By means of state trading, for example, the state
trader may stimulate production in its own industries
or industries of other nations.
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(m) Improving the terms of trade. By controlling
export supplies and buying imports in bloc, a state
trading government may be able to increase its gains
from trade.
(n) Facilitating trade with centrally planned
economies.
If a government feels that its private
traders would be at a bargaining disadvantage in
dealing with a Soviet-type country, it may set up a
trading agency,of its own to "balance off" the mono
lithic entity.
The above list, though long, is not necessarily
all-inclusive.

There may be other objectives not publicly

divulged or there may be subclasses of each major goal.
Moreover, a more broadly stated goal might include one.
The Economic Consequences of
State Trading (Static)
This section considers the economic-consequences of
various actions on the part of state traders, viewed in a
static framework.

In all cases, the term "state trader"

will refer to the practicing government agency.

A nation,

regardless of whether its economy is basically market or
non-market, employs its "agents" to perform its tasks.

For

sake of simplicity, such agents will be assumed to be the
•^See: United Nations, State Trading in Countries
of the Asia and the Far East Region, report by the ECAFE
Secretariat, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(New York: United Nations, 1964), PP. 1-3. Also see:
Walter Krause, International Economics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 19o5/» PP. 197-98, and pp. 206-09.
As the reader may note, these objectives are not
necessarily uniform in direction. That is, the pursuit of
one may conflict with the obtainment of another. For ex
ample, facilitating the development of another nation may
entail a sacrifice in the terms of trade of the assisting
country.

3^
state trading country*s sole international trader— in other
words, anything exported from the country is purchased by
the agency from those enterprises who do the actual pro
ducing and then sold to foreign consumers by the agency,
Just as it purchases all imports from foreign suppliers and
markets them to domestic consumers.

Also, it is assumed

that there are only two countries in the world— the state
trader and its trading partner, which might be labeled "the
rest of the world."
The actions considered may be taken in pursuit of
one or several of the objectives just outlined and do not
relate specifically to any single one.
are examined:

2

Two basic cases

that of undertrading, wherein fewer goods

are exchanged because of actions by the state trader; and
overtrading, where the reverse applies.

3

Acting as an Exporter (above previous export
prices).— In some situations, the state trader may attempt
to limit exports in order to secure one or more of the
previously stated objectives.

The effect of such an action

is similar to that of a tax on exports under a regime of
private trade.

That is, assume the state agency is

20f course, as noted earlier, profit does not have
to be pursued. Hence, the state trader does not have to
seek profits or avoid losses.
■^These terras will become apparent as the cases are
presented.
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initially selling exports at certain prices but then
attempts to sell the goods at higher prices by restricting
the volume exported.

li

Foreign purchasers (whether state

traders themselves or private merchants) will be confronted
with higher prices than before for their imports.

Faced

with such higher prices, the foreign consumer will in most
cases reduce the volume purchased.

These higher prices

in turn can be expected to stimulate foreign production in
overseas import-competing industries, if any.

In the state

trading nation, however, domestic consumption in the home
market may be stimulated with increased local supplies
resulting from possible lost overseas markets, especially
if home prices drop somewhat.

But, lower prices may dis

courage production of the commodity in question.
depicts such a trading situation.

Figure 1

The diagrams presented

are "back to back" supply and demand charts; one for the
exporting state trader's home market and one for the over
seas home market.^

The price axis is common to both

nations and the quantity axis represents the same type of
it
These initial prices might be called "world"
prices since, as will be seen, they are common to both the
exporting and importing countries.
^Diagrams of these types are found throughout most
international trade texts. For example, see: Delbert A.
Snider, An Introduction to International Bconomlcs (1967),
p. 46; or Charles P. Kindleberger, International Economics
(1973), P. 94.
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FIGURE 1
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EXPORTING NATION
(STATE TRADER)

IMPORTING NATION
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/

SIATE TRADER: ACTING AS AN EXPORTER ABOVE PREVIOUS EXPORT
PRICES
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good.

In Figure 1-A, S and D represent domestic supply and

demand in the state trading nation; S and D in Figure 1-B
similarly represent supply and demand in the overseas pur
chasing nation's domestic market.

Without any trade (and,

therefore, no state trading agency) supply and demand
conditions would establish a price of

in the state

trading nation, while a P2 price would prevail in the
overseas market.

As the state trader enters, total demand

in the state trading nation for the commodity in question
shifts to D,p creating a price of P y

At this P^ price

domestic quantity demanded is equal to P^B while total
domestic production is P^A.

The distance A3 represents

the demand by the state trading agency for the commodity
in question which in turn will be sold overseas.

Distance

AB thus represents the exports of the state trader.

In the

foreign country, these available goods from the state
trader give rise to a shift in the total supply schedule to
ST , which now includes foreign domestic production (import
competing goods) and the supply from the state trader.

A

P^ price results with P^C being domestically produced and
CE imported.

As may be noted, the distance CE = AB as ex

ports of one nation must equal the imports of the other
country.

P^ is now the assumed world selling price and the

price kn both markets.^
^The P^ price is the same price that would prevail
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At this point it is possible to illustrate the im
pact of the state trader limiting exports.

P^, as just

described, is the initial price in both markets when the
state trader sells volume AB overseas.

Now if the state

trader decreases its demand in its own market to DT ’, price
drops to P^,

At this P^ price domestic consumption is P^H,

an increase over previous consumption of P^3.

However,

total production now drops to P^J, a reduction relative to
P^A.

Of course, JH now represents the volume of exports

which is clearly smaller than before.
In the overseas market similar production and con
sumption effects occur.
from the state trader,
to ST *.

With reduced imports available
now is reduced (a leftward shift)

With the new reduced supply schedule and the

given demand schedule a price of P^ results.

At P^, over

seas domestic production (in importing competing industries)
is P^K— an increase over the previous P^C level.

Simi

larly, domestic consumption with the higher P^ price is
now P^P— a reduction relative to P^E.

Again, imports into

the buying overseas market must equal exports from the
state trader, or distance JH must equal KP.

In sum:

under conditions of free trade without any restrictions,
i.e., under conditions of pure competition. In effect, the
state trader is initially allowing this condition (price)
to exist even though it might be able to enlarge its ex
port earnings at some other price. Economic goals, in other
words, may not be its primary goals.
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(1) domestic production in the state trading nation is
reduced (P-^A to P^J); (2) domestic consumption in the state
trading nation is increased (P^B to Pj^H); (3 ) overseas con
sumption is reduced (P^E to P^F); and (4) overseas produc
tion in import-competing industries is stimulated (P^C to
P^K).

And as noted in the beginning, undertrading occurs

as fewer goods are internationally exchanged (originally
trade equalled AB * CE; now exports are reduced to JH =
KF).
It might be argued, from a welfare point of view,
that with higher export prices and restricted quantities
the world pattern of resource use is distorted.

That is,

the state trader underuses resources in its relatively low
cost industries.

The importing nation, however, tends to

expand production in a higher cost production area, using
too many world resources in the process.

This result can

only be avoided, of course, if the state trader limits its
undertrading activities, i.e., does not attempt to raise
export prices by reducing exports.

But then it would be

foregoing one of the advantages of engaging in state trad
ing.

Almost by definition, then, the state trader sub

ordinates world economic welfare for its own national
economic welfare— in a static sense, at least.
Acting as an Importer (below previous import
prices).— Under certain conditions it may also appear

desirable for the state trader to attempt to import com
modities below previous prices, which will reduce quantities
purchased if the foreign supply curve has any elasticity at
all.

In this case of undertrading the economic results are

similar to that of a tariff on imports.

The action tends

to reduce the price of the commodity in foreign markets by
leaving an increased supply abroad.

Foreign consumption

then tends to increase while foreign production is cut
back.

Similarly, within the state trading nation domestic

consumption may be restricted if prices rise with reduced
supplies of the imported good.

These price rises likewise

may stimulate domestic production in import-competing
industries.

Figure 2 depicts such a possible case.'

Start

ing this time with the P^ price (the world price with the
state trader already engaged in international commerce) it
is possible to illustrate the impacts when the state trader
limits or reduces its imports.

Initially at the

world

price, the state trader is domestically producing P^B in
its own import-competing industries (Figure 2-A).

Total

consumption, however, at the P^ price equals P y u

Distance

AB, therefore, equals the volume of imports into the state
trader before it attempts to reduce imports.

In the over

seas selling nation, total production at the P^ price equals
?The supply and demand curves are the same as in
the previous case and hence are not re-explained here.
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P^E (Figure 2-B).
equals P^C.

However, domestic demand at the P^ price

Distance CE thus equals the exports of this

nation and as in the previous case, exports of one nation
equal the imports of its trading partner, or distance CE **
AB.

If the state trader now attempts to limit imports by

reducing its overseas demand, the exporting nation's total
demand

shifts leftward to D^' (Figure 2-B).

prices drop to P^.

As a result,

At P^, production is reduced to P^J

while consumption (at this lower price) increases to P^K.
Within the state trading country the effect appears as a
reduction of total supply from ST to ST ' (Figure 2-A).
Prices rise to P«j.

At the higher P^ price, consumption is

reduced and now appears at P^G.

Additionally, the higher

P^ price stimulates production in the state trading nation's
import competing sectors— or graphically to P^H compared to
P^B previously.
In sum, the expected effects vrtien the state trader
reduces its imports are:

(1 ) reduced consumption in the

state trading nation (P^A to P^G); (2) increased production
in the state trader's import competing sector (P^B to
P 5H); (3) reduced production in the overseas exporting
nation (P^E to P^J); and (^) increased overseas consumption
(P3C to PjjK).
Acting as an Exporter (below previous export
prices).— In some situations a state trader may take the
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position of an exporter selling commodities below previous
export prices.

To accomplish this objective of lower ex

port prices, greater supplies are usually made available
to the overseas importing nation.

In such cases the eco

nomic effects are similar to those of subsidies of the
state trader's export industries.

Overtrading may then

result, in contrast to the previously analyzed cases of
g
undertrading.
More specifically, if the state trader sells ex
ports below previous prices by way of greater exports, an
increase in foreign consumption should result (assuming
foreign demand is not perfectly inelastic).

Lower prices

abroad would tend to force foreign import-competing
industries to restrict production, while domestic produc
tion in the state trader's nation would be stimulated by
the additional exports.

However, domestic consumption in

the state trading country would ordinarily be diminished as
home prices rise in consequence of the state trader's
policies.
tion.

Figure 3 depicts such a possible trading situa

Again the assumption of an initial

price remains.

Given this price, the state trader will export volume AB
while its citizens consume volume P^B (Figure 3-A).

Of

course, total production at the P^ price equals P^A in the
Q

In the cases of overtrading, the state trader is
buying at high prices and selling at low prices; obviously,
it is pursuing objectives other than revenue.
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state trading nation.

Overseas in the importing country,

given a price of P^, total production equals P^C while
total consumption equals P^E with the distance CE equaling
the volume of imports needed to allow total consumption to
be P^E (Figure 3-B).

Again, exports equal imports or dis

tance AB = CE.
At this point if the state trader begins its in
creased export policies, it will demand an additional amount
from its own domestic markets.
shift from DT to

This can be likened to a

1— or an increase in demand.

As a

result, in the state trading nation prices rise to P^.

At

this higher P^ price, consumption decreases and is now
equal to P^H.

Of course with higher prices, local indus

tries increase production until total output equals P^J—
an increase relative to P^A.
and equal to distance HJ.

Exports are also now larger

Overseas, the state trader's

policies are having consumption and production effects but
in an opposite direction (Figure 3-B).

The additional

quantities made available by the state trader have increased
the total supply from ST to ST '.

As a result, price drops

to P^ at which point increased total consumption occurs—
or PjjF.

However, lower prices in this overseas market will

normally curtail the production of import-competing goods.
In this case P^K in domestic production occurs rather than
the previously larger amount P^C.

Distance KF now

46
represents the increased imports into this country which
are again equal to the larger exports of the state trader—
or KF « JH.

In sum, if the state trader exports larger

volumes than in previous periods the effects will ordinar
ily be:

(1 ) increased production in the state trading

nation (P^A to F^J); (2) reduced consumption in the state
trader's country (P^B to P^H); (3) overseas, increased
consumption occurs (P^E to P^P); and (4) restricted produc
tion in import-competing sectors appears (P0C to P,,K). In
3
*•*
this case, therefore, overtrading is possible as greater
volumes are exchanged internationally (JH = KP, which is
greater than AB = CE).
AcfrAnft ag.JjnporJper (above,,prevjoug prices).— Over
trading can also result if the state trader imports
commodities above previous levels.

The effect is again

similar to that of a subsidy to private traders (the foreign
producer in this case) with similar production and consump
tion changes.

Within the buying or importing state trading

nation, the additional supplies from abroad (imports) will
normally lower prices in its domestic market stimulating
increased consumption.

However, the state trader's

domestic import-competing industries will usually reduce
production in light of lower prevailing prices in the
market.

Overseas, the effect of increased demand for the

good in question will normally raise prices in their

*J7
markets.

Such increased prices will in turn reduce con

sumption of the commodity if demand is anything but
perfectly inelastic.

Production, however, in light of the

increased demands by the buying state trader will normally
expand the subsidy effect to the foreign producer.

Graph

ically, this situation is illustrated by Figure b.

Again

the assumptions are the same as in Figures 1-3 and the
initial starting price is P^.

Of course at the P^ price,

exports from the overseas seller equals distance CE.

With

in the importing state trader*s nation these appear as
imports or distance AB . . . again imports of one nation
equal the exports of its trading partner or distance AB *
CE.
With the introduction of the state trader's new
purchasing policy, total demand in the overseas market in
creases to D t ' with resulting production and consumption
changes (Figure 4-B).

That is, with the increased demand

by the state trader and resulting higher overseas prices,
foreign production increases with the
an increase relative to P^E.

price to P^F—

However, foreign consumption

at the P^ price is reduced to P^K rather than the previous
larger volume at the P^ price of

Clearly, overseas

industries increase output while overseas consumers reduce
their purchases.

The difference betvreen the greater output

and reduced overseas consumption now appears as distance
KF, or the new larger volume of exports.
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Turning to the state trading country itself (Fig
ure *J~A), additional purchases from overseas markets appear
as increased supplies (additional imports) within the state
trader's nation.

Diagrammatically, these increased imports

cause the total supply schedule to increase from ST to ST '.
As a result, price drops to P^.

At the new P^ price level,

total consumption increases to P^J— an increase relative to
price level P^ and consumption of P^A.

Domestic import-

competing industries, however, in light of this lower price
reduce their output or production from P^B to P^H.

Hence,

total domestic production has decreased while total con
sumption has increased.

Of course, this is only made

possible by the increased volume of imports or distance
JH— the difference between domestic output and consumption.
In sum, the expected effects in this case are:

(1) over

seas production is stimulated (P^E to P^F); (2) overseas
consumption decreased (P^C to P^K); (3) within the state
trading nation consumption increases (P^A to P^J); and
(*0 the state trader's import-competing industries reduce
production (P^B to P^H).

However, in total more goods are

internationally exchanged (KF = JH which is greater than
/flE = AB7) or overtrading exists.

Internal effects.— The preceding sections detail
the impact of price changes on volumes traded and summarize
the production and consumption effects upon the trading

50
countries.

Perhaps a closer look at the latter will be

helpful.
To illustrate, it is possible to further explore a
case of undertrading, specifically the variant in which the
state trading agency is attempting to force import prices
down via reduced purchases.

As noted earlier, the domestic

impact upon the state trading country is similar to that of
a tax or tariff on imports.

The expected results would be:

(1) reduced domestic consumption as internal prices rise,
and (2) increased domestic production of import-competing
substitutes.
situation.

Figure 5 depicts such an undertrading
DD' is the state trading country's total demand

for the commodity.

SS' is the state trading country's

domestic supply curve of the good, reflecting its importcompeting industry's supply capabilities.

PSm is the supply

of importables coming from abroad, funnelled through the
state trading agency and sold initially at price P; this
curve is assumed to be perfectly elastic for the sake of
simplicity in the diagram, and the amount imported is
Amount OQ^ is produced domestically and 0Q2 is consumed in
total.

When the state trading agency cuts imports to, say,

because of its attempts to force world prices down,
domestic prices are forced up to P'.

Total consumption is

lowered to OQ^ while domestic production increased to 0Q^.
A number of welfare effects follow from this import
restriction.

First, there is a reduction of consumer's
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surplus because the commodity price has risen— the reduc
tion graphically is represented by the four-sided area
PbdP'.

Second, there is an increase in producer's surplus

from SaP to ScP', a net gain of PacP'.

This net gain by

producers at the expense of consumers may be called the
"redistribution effect" of the state trading action.

The

area aec represents the "protective effect," the loss of
consumer's surplus due to the cost of employing resources
in this relatively inefficient industry at the expense of
other industries.

Area fbd represents the "consumption

effect," a welfare loss traceable to the necessity of
shifting purchases to other less desired goods.

The

rectangle efdc represents a "revenue effect" or profit to
the state trading agency stemming from its purchases at low
prices and sales at higher ones.

(Of course, if the world

prices fall as it wishes, the area will be still greater.)
Meanwhile, what is transpiring in the exporting
country?

In Figure 6, DD' is the exporting country's home

demand curve for its own exportable good and SS' is its
supply curve.

FDX is the state trading country's demand

for exportables initially, again assumed perfectly elastic
for diagrammatic simplicity.
ports are
sumption is OQ^.
purchases back to

P is the initial price, ex

production is

domestic con

When the state trading agency trims its
the price drops to P' in the
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exporting country; production falls to OQ^ while domestic
consumption increases to OQ^.
The welfare effects, of course, are the reverse of
those in the importing country.

Producer's surplus is

trimmed from SbP to SdP', a loss of P'dbP.

Of this, con

sumers get P'caP as an addition to their consumers' sur
plus, and this part of the lost producers' surplus is the
"redistribution effect."

Area cdfe is lost to the state

trading agency in the importing country and might be thought
of as a negative "revenue effect."

Area cea might be

called a type of "consumption effect," stemming from the
diversion of domestic consumption from other, more preferred
goods (under previous price conditions) to the exportable
good.

Likewise, area dbf might be called a type of "pro

tective effect," reflecting efficiency losses from having
to employ factors of production in some "second best"
employment due to cuts in the production of exportables.
Similar analyses could be made of the other under
trading case or of either overtrading case, with similar
effects.

The point of all this is, of course, that actions

by a state trading agency to depart from "market" prices
distort production and consumption within the trading
countries as well as affecting trade volumes, values, terms
of trade of both partners, and revenues.
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The Determinants of Governmental Pricing Behavior.Clearly, the cases just described indicate that the state
trader may find it advantageous, depending on its objec
tives, to distort trade patterns and prices.

However, it

may also find it desirable to practice price discrimination
if more than one market exists for either its purchases or
sales.

It may arise not only because of a desire for in

creased monetary profits, but for other non-economic
objectives as well.
In its role as seller or exporter, if profit maximl
zation is desired and market demand elasticities vary, the
state trader will ordinarily attempt to equate its marginal
cost and marginal revenue.

Since the marginal cost (of

production if the state trader produces or of acquisition
if it does not) is assumed to be the same in both markets
the problem is one of determining the different marginal
revenues.

Two approaches may be used, one in which the

seller practices no price discrimination but could; and one
in which two prices are charged in different markets in
order to maximize profit.
In the first case, the state trader may ignore the
demand differences in the two markets and simply add
together the two demand curves and hence the marginal
revenue curves, as in Figure 7.

At the point of inter

section of the combined marginal revenue curves with the
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marginal cost curve, profit maximization will occur (given
the state trading unwillingness to discriminate).

But as

Figure 7 shows, higher marginal revenue results in Market
Two at the equilibrium level of output.

The state trader

could benefit by increasing sales in the more elastic
market (Number Two).
In Figure 8, however, the state trader is attempt
ing to truly maximize profits and is willing to engage in
price discrimination to do so.

The two markets have

different demand and marginal revenue conditions.

With a

shift of quantity QQ' to Market Two from Market One,
marginal revenues are equated to each other and to marginal
cost.

This means that profits are maximized by charging a

higher price (OP^) in Market One and a lower price (0P2 ^ *n
Market Two.

Taking advantage of the different demand
9
elasticities, discriminatory pricing results.
Obviously, then, a state trader may choose to sell
abroad at either a higher or lower price than that prevail
ing at home, depending on demand conditions.

And if

overseas (or home) markets are sufficiently isolated from
each other, further price discrimination could occur.

^In this case, profit maximization is assumed.
However, non-economic objectives may motivate sales in the
opposite direction of that described.
See pages 31, 32,
and 33 for a list of goals which do not always necessitate
maximization of profit or minimization of losses.
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Similarly, a state trader may not only sell goods
internationally but may also purchase goods from abroad.
If, in its role as importer or domestic buyer, the govern
ment trader wants to minimize its overall costs, its
policies will be affected by its monopsonistic position.
That is, if two sources of supply exist, the state trader
will ordinarily attempt to purchase more from

the market

whose supply is more elastic, as in Figure 9.

If the state

trader simply wanted to pay one price (equate AC-^ and AC2 ),
it would purchase OQ in each of the two markets.

But then

marginal cost would be greater in Market One than in
Market Two, implying foregone savings.

If the trader

transfers its buying from Market One to Market Two by amount
QQ', marginal costs are equated, costs minimized, and dis
crimination in pricing between the markets practiced.
This type of state trading behavior— buying abroad
at either higher or lower prices than those at home— is not
at all uncommon.

Bulk purchasing abroad, for example,

ordinarily involves overseas buying at lower prices than
the "protected" prices prevailing in the domestic market.
(Overseas supplies are usually more elastic than those in
narrower home markets.)

Cases where import prices are

higher than home prices are obviously much rarer.
Up to this point the discussion has centered on the
cases of a state trader dealing with private traders of
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various sizes.

However, perhaps a more pertinent case

(and a realistic one) is that of a government trader deal
ing with another government trader, i.e., the case of
bilateral monopoly.

The case is of special interest when

one considers recent thaws in the cold war between the
United States and China, West Germany and East Germany,
South and North Korea, and the growing importance of
regional trading blocks.
Figure 10 depicts a bilateral monopoly situation.
The curve D represents the demand curve (or average revenue
curve) from the point of view of the monopoly seller, or
the value of the marginal unit from the standpoint of the
buyer.

The MR curve is the standard marginal revenue

curve as seen by the seller, derived from curve D.

The

MC-S curve is the marginal cost curve of the seller, seen
by the monopsony buyer as a supply curve (or average cost
curve).

Curve MC* is the "marginal cost of buying" curve

as seen by the moriopsonist, derived from curve MC-S.

The

monopoly seller would maximize profit by equating its MC-S
with MR, producing 0Q2

selling at price 0P2 .

The

monopsony buyer would minimize outlay by equating the value
of the marginal unit (as indicated by D) with its marginal
cost (MC*) from its point of view; this would mean a
willingness to purchase OQj^ at price OP^.
Obviously, the solution is indeterminate, with 0P^
and 0P2 being the outer price limits and 0 ^

and 0Q2 the
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outer quantity limits.

In the words of C. E. Ferguson,

. . . price and quantity is indeterminate
in cases of bilateral monopoly. This does not
mean the market collapses or that the party fails
to reach a definite agreement on price and quantity.
Rather it means that the information the economist
has is not sufficient to determine the precise
market solution. The solution, in other words, is
based not only upon conditions of demand and cost,
with which the economist can deal but also upon
bargaining skills and other personal characteristics anterior to the realm of economic analysis.
In other ifords, state traders dealing with other
state traders need more than economic analysis in finding
a comfortable middle ground for prices and quantities of
goods traded.
Economic Consequences of State
Trading (Dynamic)
The so-called "dynamic" consequences of state
trading basically include those changes of a "process"
nature and can conveniently be treated under the headings
of factor changes, income distribution, and economic
development.
Factor Changes.— As time passes, goods price
changes induce movements and changes in the supply of
factors in an economy.

In the case of state trading, if

domestic prices of imports are held above world levels,
10C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 2^8.

domestic firms in import-competing industries are encourag
ed to expand production.

Additional resources (in use or

unemployed) are shifted into these lines of production
which may possibly increase factor prices.

Other countries

which have traditionally supplied such goods find their
export industries losing factors to other segments of their
economies (assuming third markets do not absorb the loss
in sales to the state trader).

The result is that the

normal tendency for factor prices to equalize between the
trading nations is reduced.

In addition, the passage of

time will ordinarily cause the supply of the factor(s)
whose price increases most t o ,increase relative to other
factors, changing the countries' factor endowments somewhat and possibly altering their comparative advantages.

11

Similarly, the case of overtrading (charging less
than domestic prices or buying at higher international
prices) can produce opposite effects.

The prices of fac

tors in each respective industry within the state trading
nation will be decreased when buying and increased when
selling.

Resources are shifted into other production

3-1In the other case of undertrading, exporting or
"selling" above domestic prices, factor prices are de
creased within the state trading nation and increased in
the importing nation's import substitution industries as
more resources are shifted into this area. Moreover, some
factor prices will be affected more than others if export
and import-competing industries utilize factors in dif
ferent combinations.

industries in the first case and into export areas in the
latter with the results noted above.
The above consequences, of course, assume basically
free market economies.

But when trade occurs between

market and non-market nations (or non-market to non-market)
price variations do not necessarily induce changes in
factor use or prices in the non-market nations.

Planned

economies trade internationally in accordance with a pre
conceived overall plan.

For example, in the Soviet system,

planning departments first consider prevailing committments
and requirements for domestic output.

Thereafter, in order

of priority, the all-union Ministry of Foreign Trade plans
trading activities in line with the overall national plan.
Direction, volume, prices, and costs are devised in coordi
nation with the State Planning Committee, Council of
Ministers, and the State Bank.

Corporations (monopolies)

conduct the domestic activities needed to engage in foreign
commerce while the Ministry of Foreign Trade operates
abroad through trade delegations or commercial agencies.

12

Each corporation or enterprise is expected to pro
duce planned profits in accordance with pre-conceived
margins.

Prices (sales) are in accordance with accepted
1?

■^Nicolas Spulber, The Soviet Economy: Structure.
Principles, and Problems (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
Inc., 1962), pp. 100-105. See also: Micolas Spulber, "The
Soviet-Bloc Foreign Trade System," Law and Contemporary
Problems. Summer, 1959, PP. ^20-53.
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norms with a markup ranging from 1 to 50 per cent of the
domestic wholesale price.

However, because of the variance

in trading motivation (which is subject to many non
monetary considerations),
. . . each Soviet agency tries to maximize
profits on individual transactions, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade considers the relation of total
values of exports and imports traded with any
given partner and attempts to maximize the dif
ference between them in internal Soviet wholesale
prices.
In order to obtain an import that is
particularly sought after, the ministry will
readily enjoin the trading agency to sell below
cost.13
Obviously, in cases like this state trading
monopolies need not accept or charge prices that are in
1k
line with commercial considerations.
In many cases use
of factors (and their prices) can be subject to shifts in
national plans rather than a result of movements and
changes in trading patterns.
Income distribution.— If internal production
structures are changed by state trading (as they ordinarily
will be), it follows that income distribution will nearly
l^Spulber, The Soviet Economy, op. clt.r p. 105.
^Moreover, as revealed by Holzman and others,
price discrimination is a relatively common practice between
the Soviet Union and its satellites and Europe.
See:
Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and the
Question of Discrimination," Review of Economic and
Statisticsr XLIV (May, 1962); and H. Mendershausen, "Mutual
Price Discrimination in Soviet Bloc Trade," Review of
Economics and Statistics, XLIV. (November, 19o2).
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always be affected as well.

In market countries, selling

imports internally above world prices or selling exports
abroad above domestic prices (undertrading) both tend to
expand import-competing industries at the expense of export
industries; similarly, overtrading tends to expand export
industries at the expense of import-competing industries.
If import-competing industries are, say, labor intensive
while export industries are capital intensive, undertrading
would tend to benefit labor and overtrading to benefit
capital.

These changes in income distribution could then

be expected to influence future demand patterns, savings
and reinvestmant rates, and so forth.
Economic development.— State trading can also be
used to encourage (and perhaps discourage) economic develop
ment.

That is, governmental trade can be of assistance or

can create conditions conducive to expansion of national
incomes.

For example, in consequence of increased national

ism and increased Sino-Soviet Bloc influence, many Far
Eastern nations have introduced state trading for develop
mental purposes.1-* Although not always successful, these
nations have negotiated bilateral contacts with other
•^The list of such nations include: Australia,
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China (Taiwan), India, Indonesia,
Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Phillipines, Republic of Viet Nam, and Thailand. See:
United Nations, State Trading in Countries of the Asia and
the Far East Regions, op. cit.

68
countries which, because of their trading structure,
require government to government exchange.

As noted

earlier, Burma’s experience was unsuccessful due to the
nature of its fixed contracts under changing world market
conditions.

However, not all concerned nations have

experienced difficulties.

Australia, India, and others

have received quite favorable influences from governmental
exchange.^
Basically, these countries seek firm contracts
which allow for the meeting of plans that require fixed
supplies and/or revenues.

If successfully obtained,

development may proceed without some of the competitive
risks involved in private commerce.

Foreign exchange

earnings are more secure and can be conserved with barter;
investments are easier to carry out with steady streams of
foreign exchange earnings; and just as in the case of free
trade, favorable trading conditions can be created with
trading partners.

In addition, variations in the prices

of contracted goods can alter income.

For example, offer

ing lower prices for exports has the same basic result as
an exchange depreciation with its resulting stimulation of
17
exports. ' Hence, in total, state trading can allow for
United Nations, State Trading in Countries of the
Asia and the Far East Region, op. cit.. pp. 10-20.
•^Richard I. Leighton, Economics of International
Trade (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1970), pp. 269-276.

69
more stable generation of income and development, assuming
favorable conditions prevail in the affected nation.

CHAPTER IV
THE COMPARATIVE COST DOCTRINE AS
A THEORY OP STATE TRADING
Prom the preceding, it is evident that state
trading is a unique form of international commerce.

But

can the behavior of state traders be explained with tradi
tional international economic theory?

Can it explain what

goods will be exchanged and at what prices (terms of
trade), for example?

This traditional theory (usually

called the "comparative cost" doctrine) has been the main
stay of most "western" economists for many decades.
However, as noted earlier, governmental trade can develop
from a variety of motives and with many varied ends.

How

applicable then, is this theory to those areas where trade
arises for reasons other than those of production and cost
efficiencies?
The Comparative Cost Doctrine
Pure form.— Actually, the doctrine of comparative
costs (or comparative advantage) has varied somewhat in
form as it evolved.

Most economic historians give credit

to Robert Torrens for his rudimentary statement of compara
tive advantage, but David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill have
70
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1
shared most of the recognition.

Ricardo, with his classic

"wine and cloth" example, illustrated the mutual advantages
to be gained through exchange.

Under free trade conditions,

each nation tended to specialize in those commodities whose
production costs were relatively cheaper and import those
items in which domestic producers had a comparative cost
2
disadvantage.
The model presented by Ricardo (and later refined
by Mill and others) was based on the labor theory of value
and explicitly assumed full mobility of factors of produc
tion within a nation but complete lack of factor mobility
between nations.

Hence, only one input (labor) and two

commodities and two nations were utilized.

Moreover, the

hypothesis implicitly assumed possible differences in
production functions between the trading nations.

Compara

tive advantage, according to Ricardo, was thus based on

^William R. Allen, ed., International Trade Theory:
Hume to Ohlin (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 4.

2lfiid.
3

^Gottfried Haberler, A Survey of International Trade
Theory. Special Papers in International Economics No. 1
(Princeton University:
International Finance Section, 1961),
p. 4.
Bela Balassa, "An Empirical Demonstration of
Classical Comparative Cost Theory," Review of Economics and
Statistics. XLV (August, 1963), 231-238.
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relative cost differentials arising from relative produc
tivity differentials.^
Mill, in his reformulation of Ricardo*s concepts,
used basically the same analytical technique.^

However,

rather than restrict the explanation to a specific exchange
ratio as Ricardo had done, Mill dealt with the possibility
of a range wherein the terms of trade could lie.

After

opening up trade, if each country exchanged goods within
the range established by their domestic cost ratios, both
would mutually gain from exchange.

The exact outcome or

exchange ratio was established by "reciprocal demand" with
7
exports purchasing imports.
Alfred Marshall later ex
pressed this reciprocal demand in terms of "offer curves"
of exports in exchange for imports.

So-called "representa

tive commodity bales," containing a fixed quantity of labor
embodied in a vast number of different commodities, were
offered by each trader.

Each offer curve reflected both

that country's willingness and ability to supply exports as
Q
well as its demand for the other country's exports.
Marshall's analysis represented a movement from a partial

^Mill's analysis was of a more general form than
Ricardo's and stressed different outputs produced by given
labor inputs instead of given outputs with variable inputs.
?Allen, o p . clt.f p. 13.
^Haberler, o p . clt.. p. 9.
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equilibrium analysis.

That is, each point along his offer

curve was a possible point of equilibrium with the concerned
nations adjusting their internal economies to the new
o
positions.
Between Ricardo's and Marshall's writings a number
of others made significant contributions, but for the most
part their analysis added to rather than changed the
original comparative cost doctrine.
Today, however, modern trade theory utilizes
"opportunity costs" rather than the "real costs" theories
of the early classicists.

Moreover, economists have tried

to explain whv comparative advantages may or may not exist.
Much of the credit for work done in this area belongs to
Bertin Ohlin and his former teacher, Eli Heckscher.'1'0
Ohlin set up a system only partially similar in
assumptions to those previously described in that:
(1)

factors were free to move within a region
but not across national boundaries;

(2)

two nations existed in which trading could
occur;

(3)

production functions were identical between
the nations with qualitatively identical
factors of production;

9lbld.. p. 10.
1QIbid.. p. 16.
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many commodities and factors of production
were present; and

(5)

a fixed rate of exchange was established.11

Ohlin, like his predecessors, also assumed perfect compe
tition, full employment, and no tariffs or transport costs.
Within the framework each nation specialized in those goods
it could produce the cheapest in money terms only, not in
terms of labor or other factors.

Price differentials arose

primarily because of the different factor endowments of the
trading nations.

A country thus exported those items that

used intensively those factors that were most abundant.
Conversely, it imported those commodities which used
12
intensively the scarce factors.
Comparative advantage
existed in the first instance with a comparative dis
advantage in the second case.
Briefly stated, then, Ohlin explained comparative
advantages in terms of factor endowments, not in terms of
different production functions as his predecessors had.
But in substance trade was still explained in terms of
comparative costs.

Since his contribution, there have been

additions, modifications, and tests of his hypothesis but

12

W. M. Corden, Recent Developments in the Theory
Of International Trade. Special Papers in International
Economics No. 7 (Princeton University:
International
Finance Section, 1965), p. 28.
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basically it stands today (with qualifications) as the
13

major "generalized" explanation of trade. J

The question

relevant here, however, is whether it is sufficient to
explain the trading patterns emerging from state trading.

gpiparafrlv.s. C.Q.stg-.ag AppHsflto State Trading
As may be surmised from what has been said, the
comparative cost doctrine has been an attempt to explain
the behavior of market-oriented economies.

That is, the

motivation behind trade has been one of profit, with
possible restraints.

Nations exchange goods with the

expectation of some possible gain, which is usually monetary
in form.

Indirectly, increased specialization is expected

to enlarge total output so that all traders can and do gain
from the exchange.

Or at least traditional theory has

emphasized this view.
But state trading may not be motivated primarily
by economic considerations.

Moreover, even if it is for

strictly economic reasons, the direction and pattern of
For example, discussions have been carried on as
to the (1) factor price equalization tendency of the
Heckscher Ohlin model; (2) testing of the assumptions,
especially the idea of identical production functions;
(3) testing of the main tenets themselves by Leontief
(leading to his "paradox"); (4) general refinements and
additions to the theory such as economies of scale,
technical change, and the inclusion of more than two
countries and two commodities. See: .W. M. Corden, op.
cit., pp. 24-34.
■^Not necessarily equally, however.
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exchange may be completely different from what comparative
costs would indicate. For example, in the non-market case
so amply portrayed by the Soviet Union (and other communist
bloc nations), trade has followed directions that in many
instances have not been along lines of comparative advan
tage.1^

The framework of the Soviet system is such that

the doctrine has been incompatible with their operational
setup.^
Non-market economies.— Specifically, the compara
tive cost doctrine has implicitly assumed that prices were
proportionally related to costs, i. e. that effective
competition prevailed.

However, pricing practices within

bloc nations do not correspond closely to costs of factors
or to demand conditions in product markets.

Instead,

prices have been fixed by planning commissions and are
regarded more as planning tools than as signals of scarcity
or utility.

Nor do Communist economists readily accept the

idea of marginality upon which comparative advantage rests.
Western economists have assumed prices of factors to equal
their marginal products along with product prices equalling
^ O t h e r similar examples could be cited. For
example, for the Chinese case see: Yuan-Li Wu, The Economy
of Communist China (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Pub1ishers, 1 ) , pp. 150-200.
^ J . Wilczynski, "The Theory of Comparative Costs
and Centrally Planned Economies," Economic Journal (March,
1965), 61-65.
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marginal costs.

Without the notion of marginality, gains

or advantages from trade cannot be readily shown.

17

Similarly, plans rather than price differentials
determine the export of commodities.

Exports, in fact,

have been viewed as a necessary sacrifice to acquire needed
imports.

In many cases development plans require certain

goods and services that cannot always be obtained domesti
cally.

As a result the Communists view trade as a means of

securing those items essential to fulfillment of their
plans.

Of course, Imports may be obtained by the "un

willing" loss of export items, and have indeed been so
obtained.

In addition, exports may sometimes be reflections

of planning mistakes— 1. e., overproduced items which
officials would rather dispose of abroad than domestically.
Hence, those goods exchanged do not necessarily (if at all)
correspond to those commodities that would be traded if
comparative advantage were followed.
The bloc nations have also viewed trade as a
political tool.

Since they want to minimize dependence

upon Western or other non-Communist sources, exchange has
been undertaken only when the results were consistent with
the meeting of non-economic (as well as economic) consider
ations and/or plans.

For instance, the Soviet Union has

supplied Italy with crude petroleum for years at very
17Ibid.
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favorable prices, gaining not only hard foreign exchange
but a measure of economic and political dependence at the
same time.
Finally, exchange rate practices do not allow for
an exact correlation between prices and costs (even if they
reflected comparative costs).

Official rates usually have

been at such levels as to arbitrarily overvalue bloc
currency.

The result has been further distortion of bloc

prices and costs.

In summary, one writer described the

feelings of Soviet economists toward the doctrine of
comparative cost as:
. . . a pseudo-scientific, reactionary
foreign trade theory disseminated by bour
geois economists . . . to serve as a theoretical
basis for the Western discriminatory foreign
trade policies toward Socialist countries.18
It is worth noting, however, that the Soviets have
(in the "research" stage) been paying increased attention
to indices of efficiency in exports (and to a smaller degree
in imports).

Such indices reveal a growing dissatisfaction

with the inherent weaknesses of their present trade system.
In their search for some kind of foreign trade profitability
criterion, planners hope that the indices may provide a
method of measuring the economic gains or losses from ex
change.

For example, one index— the "book keeping

efficiency of exports"— provides information on the profit
ability of exports to the foreign trade corporations within
18Ibld.. p. 66.
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the Soviet system.

19

Other indices provide similar data

for those segments deemed in need of a guide to the gains
from trade.

However, such studies have been subject to

limitations because of uncertainty about what should or
should not be included as variables.

More important,

however, has been the problem of when to use the informa
tion the indices have provided.

As J. Wilczynski put it,

The economic leadership, for the time being,
is very cautious in acting on the results of ef
ficiency calculations except in extreme cases . . . .
The same writer concludes that:
The structure of foreign trade has changed
little as a result of these studies. The final
decision on the structure and direction of foreign
trade takes into account non-commercial considera
tions, which in many cases assume the main
20
importance, overriding efficiency calculations.
The general conclusion concerning state trading in
nonmarket economies, then, is that they do not necessarily
adhere to the principles of comparative advantage when other
factors outweigh the efficiency aspects of trade.

Non-

market economies have been structured to forms which cannot
*^More specifically the index compares export
revenues with local sale prices or: bE =
Rd
where
P + me
bE « Bookkeeping efficiency of exports
Rd = Official exchange rate value of foreign exchange
P = Domestic wholesale prices trading corporations pay to
local enterprises
me = Local portion of marketing costs
See: Wilczynski, J., op. cit., p. 70.
20

Wilczynski,

op

. cit.. p. 79.
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be fully rationalized by "Western" explanations of ex
change .
Market economies.— Next, a more difficult case needs
inspection:

do "market" economies conform to comparative
21
advantage in their state trading activities?
If the
government trader behaves in the same fashion as a private
trader, the answer would have to be a qualified yes.

Of

course, this assumes that comparative cost is accepted as
an explanation of private exchange and that the state trader
is functioning essentially as a private trader.
cases cannot be dismissed as easily.

But other

22

Earlier it was pointed out that the comparative
costs doctrine is generally recognized as the major explana
tion of trade, but that trade can take place for other
"economic" reasons that are not necessarily consistent with
comparative advantage.

For instance, it has long been

recognized that countries may encourage exports (by subsi
dies, etc.,) in order to achieve economies of scale.
Although there may be no initial comparative advantage in
the industries concerned, it is possible that they may later
emerge as output enlarges and unit costs decline.
21

The assumption here is that trade takes place
only between market economies, not non-market to market.
220f course, each particular nation would have to
be analyzed separately. However, certain general conclu
sions can be reached concerning exchange among "recognized"
market economies.
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The above has been typical of many Latin American,
African, and Par Eastern nations.

Being relatively under

developed, they have used trade channels to expand industry
via both export expansion and import substitution~in other
words, by means of intervention, which is ordinarily
considered anti-comparative advantage in nature.

This

interference has sometimes been in the form of direct subsi
dies to the industries desired, and sometimes in the form
of (or coupled with) state trading.

In any case, government

trade does not necessarily have to conform to the prices and
the directions of trade dictated by comparative advantage
(although it may).
Another example of non-comparative advantage trade
among market economies is that of underdeveloped countries
suffering from severe shortages of foreign exchange.
Governments often use state trading to enlarge the number
and volume of exports in order to augment their foreign
exchange receipts, as well as to limit so-called "unneces
sary" imports.
However, perhaps of greater significance is the
realization of what comparative costs emphasize.

That is,

it has been and remains primarily a supplv-orlented
explanation of trade.

Demand plays little if any role in

the "pure" form of the doctrine.

Later economists added

demand conditions, but for the most part they have been
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additional theories in themselves.2-^ Under such a supply
interpretation, state trading can be readily shown to create
changes in production that can possibly divert trade away
from comparative advantage areas.

For instance, in the

earlier discussion of the economic consequences of govern
ment trade, it was noted that a state trader may attempt
to buy or sell goods below or above current market prices.
As a result certain domestic (or foreign) distortions
appeared in the consumption and production of the traded
item (or its substitute).

These distortions in many cases

manifest themselves through the supply of the commodity.
Again, many countries have agricultural policies
(such as those of the United States) which artificially keep
certain commodity prices above world market prices and
ordinarily stimulate domestic production of such goods.
Surpluses have resulted which in many cases have been pur
chased by their respective governments and later sold
internationally.

If it is the policy at the time of the

sale to sell at current world prices (lower than domestic),
the government trader has indirectly encouraged domestic

^ D e m a n d (tastes and preferences) may help explain
the desire to purchase certain items from sources that do
not offer the lowest relative prices. For example:
the
United States buying of strategic items only from "friendly"
nations. Other cases could be cited.
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production which may or may not be in line with the com24
parative advantage of the concerned nation.
Generally, then, the state trader can alter supplies
and demands by creating conditions which induce or hinder
the production or consumption of traded goods.

And the

resulting direction of flow, composition of trade, and
prices of traded goods may have little or nothing in common
with comparative advantage.
Modification to Comparative

C.g,g,t_P£g.t.r.toes

If comparative costs in its basic form is not
completely applicable to the cases of government trade, can
it be modified?

Or can other theories be applied?

questions the answer is a tentative "yes."

To both

A modification

is considered in the remainder of this chapter, while other
theories are taken up later.
Offer curves, though relatively old, are (ironi
cally) uniquely suited to analysis of today's revival of
exchange under barter conditions.

Many countries, notably

the non-market ones, negotiate bilateral contracts which in
many instances require the exchange of one commodity against
Oh,

^ T h e writer is aware that the basic purpose of
United States agricultural policy has not been the creation
of goods for sale to the government to be stored or later
resold. The point is that the possibility of later resale
(gaining revenue for the government) may be of some signif
icance in the argument for the maintenance of domestic
price supports and of greater importance in explaining dis
tortions in resource use.

8**
another.2^

As noted earlier, the graphic reflection of

preferences of this nature was originally created by Alfred
Marshall using his so-called "representative commodity
bales."
Specifically, offer curves or reciprocal demand
curves reflect the willingness of one nation to exchange a
certain bundle of export goods against the exports (also a
certain bundle) of another.

Each point on a curve repre

sents a definite amount of one good offered for a specific
amount of the demanded good.

When both countries' offer

curves are considered, their intersection represents the
same price in both countries for the two traded items.
Figure 11 may help illustrate offer curves and how
they may apply to state trading.

Two goods are exchanged,

A-exports and B-exports, from countries A and B.

Curves A

and B represent the offer curves of state traders A and B.
As the graph indicates, many prices (of one good in terms
-’Barter between free trading nations normally
varies somewhat from the described situation. There usually
exists a middleman— a barter specialist, commodity broker,
or bank. Basically he arranges for each commodity to be
exchanged for cash or foreign exchange. For example, the
broker may notice a surplus in nation One. He then attempts
to find a commodity in nation Two which nation One would
like to have. Finding such a good, nation Two is contacted
and a price agreed upon, which is usually a cash price.
Nation One is then offered the good in exchange for the
agreed upon cash value of his commodity. The profit or
price differential depends on market conditions and the
bargaining skill of the middleman.
See: Staff, "Barter is Respectable," The Economist.
CCXVIII (January 29, 1966), 1*28-29.

FIGURE 11
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OFFER OURVES: TWO STATE TRADERS (ECONOMIC
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86
of another) are possible.

These price ratio lines extend

from the origin outward and reflect (for example) higher
import prices (and lower export prices) for nation A as the
slope of the price lines increase.

(Conversely, nation B

would receive more favorable prices.)

Note that the offer

curves are tangent to price lines I and II.

Price line III

represents the equilibrium price (or terms of trade) as
determined by the given set of curves.

Price lines I and

II are especially important for they indicate the limits of
the offer curves under normal conditions— they represent
the domestic prices of goods A and B in the two countries.
As one writer put it:
. . . the price line is a limit beyond which
the offer curve cannot go.
This is obvious enough,
no country will export products for less in the
way of imports than it can produce in import-competing
goods at home.2®
For the state trader, however, these “outer limit"
price lines could be wider apart (or closer together) if
non-economic considerations were allowed to influence a
country's offer curves (i. e., if the relative cost of
producing A and B was not the only determinant of the
position and shape of the offer curves).

For example, if

the offer curves were drawn to include political a3 well as
economic (cost) preferences, the limits (price lines) might
reveal an enlarged bargaining zone— an area subject to
2^Kindleberger,

op

. cit.. p. **0.
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negotiation, with the barter outcome influenced by the
economic and political power of the concerned parties.
This could occur if the trade preferences of the trading
governments rested on non-economic considerations such as
strategic goods needed for defense or the desire to pro
vide development assistance to poorer countries.
12 may be helpful in illustrating this.

Figure

Recall that the

offer curves show a country's willingness to give up a
bundle of one good for a bundle of another.

Suppose

initially that offer curves A and B reflect economic conditions (or considerations) only, line IV is the equilib
rium price line, line II reflects country A's internal
costs of production, and line I reflects B's.

Now suppose

that country B introduces a political element into its
trade preferences— let's say it wishes to assist economic
development in A through extremely favorable prices for A's
goods.

This political element may be shown graphically as

a lowering of B's "base price" line from I to III, the
"wedge" or angle between these two lines reflecting the
intensity of the economic sacrifice B is willing to make
in order to get a political "gain."

Offer curve B is the

all-inclusive (economic and political) offer curve, and X
is the new terms of trade line.

Note, however, that line

III is not consistent with domestic economic opportunity
costs in B.

FIGURE 12
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Figure 12 might also reflect a strong political
preference for good A by country B.

Good A might be con

sidered militarily important, perhaps, or good B might be
deemed harmful politically, or at least of little political
value.

The Soviet Union, for example, reputedly mines gold

and sells it abroad at a loss, presumably because (1) it is
politically and perhaps economically useless within Russia,
(2) it is widely demanded both economically and politically
outside Russia, and (3) it is a sure-fire way of obtaining
foreign goods of greater strategic, political, or economic
value for Russia.
Offer curves may also be used to reveal the wide
range of alternative prices available to a state trader.
In Figure 13 the government trader (B) restricts its im
ports of good Y to OC.
P to P*, or rise to P".
between P* P".

As a result prices may fall from
Or they may lie at any point

As previously pointed out, the solution

becomes theoretically indeterminate.
In conclusion, then, it is evident that the state
trader fLoes not necessarily conform to trading patterns
traditionally explained by comparative costs doctrines.
This is expecially true within non-market nations and in
market economies when non-economic considerations dominate
exchange policies.

Even when traditional theory is

modified, it is not completely satisfactory for all the

FIGURE 13
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possible situations that can arise.

Are there other,

better methods of explaining the limits, resulting prices,
and direction of trade?

The next chapter considers use of

game theory and suggests a bargaining model more applicable
to state trading in many respects than those considered so
far.

CHAPTER V
GAME
In the

THEORY AS APPLIED TO STATE TRADING
previous chapters it was noted that in some

instances of state trading, prices (the terms of trade)
and the direction of traded commodities cannot be fully
explained by traditional theory.

The cases of bilateral

monopoly have been debated and refined for many years.
Proposals by Edgeworth and others have illuminated possible
solutions but have also revealed many difficulties.
In the early 19^0's, Von Neumann and Morgenstern
introduced their pioneering work in the field of game
theory.

Since their original study, many others have added

to the existing body of knowledge.

This chapter examines

those variations of game theory which appear to best fit
the various cases of state trading.
beginning with
narrow

Several approaches—

a broad overview (macro) and ending

(micro) examination— are utilized to reveal

witha
the

relevance of game theory.
Assumptions of Game Theory
In any attempt to present an explanatory model of
government trade, it is of utmost importance to establish
what game theory is— not only its strengths but its
92
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limitations.

Basically, it is a branch of mathematics

which utilizes formal models in the analysis of decision
making within the realm of conflict.1

Problems involving

opposition between two or more parties (with cooperation
p
possible, also) are subject to inquiry.
The motivation
for participation may be economic, political, psychological,
or any other force behind human endeavors— including those
found within state trading.
The word "game” implies that two (or more) sides
are participating, with the outcome dependent to a degree
on the activities of all "players."

The theory has as its

main objective the finding of rational decisions or choices
for the opposing sides.

However, since real world

situations are subject to many forces and pressures, a
model capable of being handled and solved must be limited
and simplified.

When this is achieved, the result or model
■a

is referred to as a "game."v
Moreover, unlike real world games, a formalized
model must be constructed and solved according to some
preconceived and defined rules.

Such conditions limit and

M artin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related
Approaches to Social Behavior (iJew York: John Wiley and
£>ons, Inc., 19^)* P«

2Ibid.
^E. S. Venttsel, An Introduction to the Theory of
Games (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963), p. 1.
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channel the action of the players during the decision
making periods within the game.

When making moves according

to a determined strategy, the result or outcome can usually
be

. quantitatively represented by a number of measures,

including utility.

When a game is assigned a numerical

result, a payoff, each player can share (in different
proportions) in the benefits.
A variety of approaches may be taken in applying
game theory to state trading.

For example, if the total

payoff to two parties is fixed, so that one trader must give
up what the other gains, the game is "zero-sum" or "constant
sum" in nature.

This is the simplest type of game, and is

reasonably applicable to the state-trading situation.*1Non-zero-sum games, where winners may gain more or less
than losers give up, may be more typical or real-world
games or conflict situations, but are more complex at the
same time.
In addition, players may be assumed to make moves
reflecting pure personal or rational choice, with no element
of chance involved, or chance may be included.

If chance is

not a factor, payoffs are a certainty; if chance enters^ a .
probability distribution of payoffs is necessary.

**X)f course, this assumes that the state trading
case under consideration is the simplest in form and all
values in the game can be calculated.
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The degree of ignorance is another determinant of.
game payoffs.

Perfect information may be assumed— implying

that each side knows the available plays and all previous
ones— or, more realistically, partial or total ignorance may
be assumed.^
As can be thus surmised, limitations are necessary
if a definite game is to be created— a game with a finite
solution.

Given the above workings of game theory, a

rational solution can be presented for the case of state
traders with complete or incomplete information, personal
choice and chance moves, and a zero-sum or non-zero-sum
payoff.
The Zero Sum Game (Two State Traders)
As noted earlier, a zero-sum game exists when a
payoff to one player is exactly equal to the losses of the
other player.

In other words, the interests of the par

ticipants are completely opposed.

In order to determine

which moves to make during the game, the player (state
trader) can decide beforehand on the specific choices avail
able.

That is, he can conceive of all the possible situa

tions and develop all possible appropriate moves.

For any

solvable game, the number of choices must be limited to a
finite figure.

In government trading cases, these choices

^A personal move or choice eliminates the necessity
of a probability distribution for the chance selections.
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may regard the number of bargainers, location of talks,
size of the trading "package,11 and so forth.
At this point it may be appropriate to point out a
major difficulty in selecting the alternative strategies.
The state trader can be assumed to represent a single
entity with its own preferences or desires; or it can be
assumed to represent the collective wants of the citizens
of the representative nation.

In either case, however, some

expression must be made about the utility of a particular
strategy.

It is necessary, then, to become involved with

measuring utility and making interpersonal (or inter
country) utility comparisons.

And this is a truly major

problem in the real world.
Originally, some early writers (i.e., Menger,
Jevons, and Walras) assumed utility to be measurable and
capable of comparison between individuals.

Moreover, the

utility of one good was assumed to be independent of that
of other commodities that were consumed.

Later writers such

as Marshall and Pareto avoided these assumptions with the
indifference approach (where only ordinal measurements were
required) and thereby reduced the importance of the early

7

cardinal measures.'

However, in state trading, approached

(L

Illinois:

Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Homewood,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 3*7.

?C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), pp. 19-20.
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through game theory, the basic problem of utility measurement
remains.

With the cardinal utility approach, comparisons can

be made using standard utils of satisfaction.

Ordinal

measurements do not allow for such a finite comparison.

Yet

in the selection of strategies for the government trader, it
is often assumed that cardinal measurements can be made— an
assumption highly questionable at best.
Even with this important flaw, it is still possible
to gain useful insights into the state trading process by
means of game theory.

After all, community indifference

curves are theoretically impossible to construct without
making interpersonal utility comparisons, but they are used
nonetheless (see Chapter IV) with some very satisfactory
Q
results.
There are various ways to handle the difficulties
involved in cardinal measurements of utility.

Models can

be devised that avoid interpersonal comparisons; hypotheses
can be modified with restrictive assumptions concerning
behavior and values— for instance, using money as a common
measure; or cardinal utility measures can be assumed to
exist.

All three approaches may be utilized, depending

upon certain conditions.
O
see:

For a discussion of community indifference curves,
Kindleberger, o p . cit.. pp.
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A Simple Game Theory Model
Suppose two state traders are confronting one
another over a trade "package," with one basically a buyer
and the other basically a seller.

For purposes of illus

tration, it can be assumed that they desire similar ends
(profits or prestige) and that what one gains, the other
must lose (in an opportunity sense).

The gains (losses)

are measured in "utils" and are derived from getting favor
able (unfavorable) prices, quantities, commodity mixes,
qualities, and degrees of political and economic dependence.
Assuming only two strategies available to each for the sake
of simplicity, the result is a "zero-sum, two person, two
strategy game," in the language of game theorists.
"payoff matrix" is displayed in Figure

The

and represents

the seller’s point of view (although the buyer must lose
what the seller gains in a zero-sum game).

Note that the

exporter (seller) has two strategies available to him.

The

outcome of the strategies cam, of course, be assigned
utility values that are not necessarily consistent with
market behavior.

That is, if profit maximization is not

the goal, high prices or large quantities may not be sought
Q
but some other outcome with higher utility.7 However, if
^Utility in this instance could include economic,
political, military, or other such values. These possi
bilities will be analyzed later. Note, too, that both state
traders must share the same utility functions in this
zero-sum example.
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profit is the main objective for both traders, a higher-thanmarket price (or larger quantities, perhaps) would give the
state trader (exporter) the highest utility from the avail
able choices.

If the importer (the other player) is moti

vated by similar objectives, his best strategy might include
a purchase "below” market prices.
In Figure 1i+, the seller's two strategies are
arrayed down the side and the buyer's across the top.

If

the seller employs his strategy A while the buyer does
likewise, for example, the seller will receive 12 utils of
satisfaction (and the buyer will lose 12).

If the seller

uses A and the buyer B, however, the payoff will be only 10.
As can be noted from the matrix, if each state
trader attempts .to seek his most advantageous position, the
buyer will choose strategy A, and the seller strategy B.
By selecting A, the seller ensures that he will receive at
least 10 utils, no matter what the buyer does, and the buyer
ensures that he will lose no more than 10, regardless of
what the seller does.

Perfect knowledge and intelligent

choosing would thus gain the seller 10, and lose the buyer
10 (his minimum loss).

The seller will choose the strategy

that maximizes the minimum he cam gaiin (maximin), while the
buyer will try to minimize the maximum he can lose (minimax).
These amounts are starred in Figure 1/+.
The game shown in Figure 1/+ is both simple and
trivial, however.

The optimum strategy is so straightforward
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and the payoffs so certain that it has little resemblance
to most real-world conflict situations.

For example, it

tells us nothing about the chances lying behind the payoff
figures shown, and these "chances" may reflect not only
"luck" or nature*s tricks with payoffs, but the respective
power positions of the traders, as well.

Let us suppose

that the payoff of 12 utils to the selling state trader
when he (or they) selects (select) strategy A and the buyer
also selects A is a long-run average payoff derived from
the following set of probabilities:
A zero probability of 3 utils payoff;
A 50% probability of 6 utils;
A zero

probability of 9 utils;

A zero

probability of 12 utils;

A zero

probability of 15 utils, and

A 50% probability of 18 utils.
The seller's expected payoff of 12 is thus the result of
50% x 6 utils plus 50% x 18 utils, the other payoffs having
no possibilities; note that he never actually receives 12,
only 6 or 18 in equal proportions over the long run.
payoffs

may be the only open ones because

the others, or

perhaps because actions by

These

naturehas blocked
thebuyerhave

blocked them (chance and power position may both be
reflected, therefore).
Chance, however, does not change the long-run pay
off matrix, and if Figure lif reflects the long-run average
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payoffs with chance fully taken into account, the optimum
choice of strategies is still the same:

A for the seller

in each game, and B for the buyer.
Figure 1Zf•s payoff matrix is still something of a
special case, however— even if probabilities (or chance) are
taken into account.

Note that the seller's maximin and the

buyer's minimax are both the same in terms of payoff utils—
10, in this case.

This game, therefore, has what game

theorists call a "saddle point"— the seller's smallest
minimum coincides with the buyer's largest minimum, the
seller viewing the "saddle" from the side and the buyer from
a fore-and-aft direction parallel to the "saddle."

And

games with saddle points are strictly determined. with a
solution easily determined by inspection.

But what happens

if a game does not have a saddle point?
In Figure 15 the seller's row minimums are 10 and
8, and his maximin is 10, corresponding to strategy A; the
buyer's column maximums are 12 and 1Zf, his minimax being 12.
The game has no saddle point.

What is more, if one player

selects one strategy and sticks with it consistently, the
other can consistently outplay the first.

So, if the seller

chooses strategy A to ensure a payoff of at least 10 utils,
the buyer would naturally choose his strategy B to minimize
his losses.

But if the buyer sticks religiously to his B

the seller can raise his payoff by shifting over to his
strategy B and receive 1Zf utils for having done so.
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Likewise, if the buyer chooses his strategy A in order to
minimize his losses to 12, the seller can calmly play
strategy A, win 12 instead of his row minimum of 10, and
keep on doing so.

In sum, the seller is sure he can win at

least 10, while the buyer is certain he need lose no more
than 12.

But each may do better than their maximins or

minimaxes by changing strategies in some chance way— that
is, by mixing their strategies.
Without going into the details of deriving odds,
suppose the seller decides to mix his strategies in the
proportion of 3 strategy A to each strategy B.

His average

payoff if the buyer chooses his•strategy A is ,75 x 12 +

.25 x 8 = 11; in other words, 3 times out of four (75% of
the time) he will win 12 and 25% of the time he will win 8,
averaging out to 11, which is of course superior to the 10
he would be sure of by playing strategy A all the time.

The

value of the game to the seller is thus 11 if he mixes his
strategy in some optimum, but random way (3 to l).1^
The seller's strategy of three A to one B would
yield similar results against the buyer's strategy B.

In

this case, the value of the game would be .75 x 10 + .25 x
1*f =

11.

1(^He must use some chance device, of course, like
playing strategy B each time he draws a spade from a deck
of cards— otherwise, a pattern may emerge which would per
mit the buyer to predict when the seller would use B,
enabling him to choose his strategy A and cut his losses to

8.
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The buyer's best strategy in this game v/ould be to
mix his strategies evenly— one A to one B— according to some
chance device like the toss of a coin.

The value of the

game to the buyer if the seller uses strategy A is thus
.50 x 12 + .50 x 10 = 11; if the seller uses B, then the
arithmetic would be .50 x 8 + .50 x 1/+ = 11— an identical
value to the seller's, of course, since the winnings of one
are the losses of the other.

And 11 is a smaller loss to

the buyer than the minimum of 12 which would have been lost
had the seller picked pure strategy A.
In games without saddle points, then, both sides
gain by mixing their strategies in some optimum proportion.

11

So far it has been- shown that solutions may be
found in zero-sum games, when chance is a factor in the
payoff matrix, and when mixed strategies may be required.
But what has been learned is a way to present a state-trading
situation, without a description of what actions are
actually involved in each strategy, or what the elements
of the payoff have been.

Perhaps seller's strategy A is a

long, involved sequence of steps, including threshold prices
and quantities, quality levels, volume of ancillary services
(like credit, freight, and insurance), mode of presentation
of the package, terms of the transaction, timing, and so on.
11

For a simple way to compute odds in a two-strategy
game, see: J. D. Williams, The Compleat Strategist (New
Y ork: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
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Strategies for B may include the same or different items,
in different proportions, sequences, etc.

The payoff may

be measured in terms of profits, strategic concessions, or
political advantages.

Yet although game theory cannot tell

everything about a state trading situation, it nonetheless
can clearly reveal the nature of the conflict situation
somewhat better, and it is capable of providing determinate
solutions to problems when all the elements are known.
Moreover, whether the game is (1) zero sum or non
constant, (2) pure strategies or mixed, (3) with or without
a saddle point, one of the essential elements lies in the
power position of the respective participants.

The proba

bility distributions required are, hence, subject to the
ability of traders to increase his "chances" of a desired
outcome.

The method of solution can, therefore, be subro

gated to the probability of an event which in turn is a
function (to a large degree) of the powers of the state
trading "players."

Information is thus essential concerning

their respective size, bargaining ability, strength of their
need to sell or purchase the commodity in question or in
essence— their respective power positions.
Probability and Power
One of the most important questions in a state
trading situation is that of the probability of state trader
A exerting his influence over B.

In other words, A's power

107
can be measured by the probability of getting a certain
strategy selected by B.

Power in this context thus varies

from many alternative interpretations available.

12

In considering such a concept of power several
dimensions can be identified:
(a) The base of power, i.e., the resources
(economic assets, constitutional prerogatives,
military forces, popular prestige, etc.) that A
can use to influence B's behavior.
(b) The means of power, i.e., the specific
action promises, threats, public appeals, etc.)
by which A can make actual use of these resources
to influence B's behavior.
(c) The scope of power, i.e., the set of
specific actions that A, by using his means of
power, can get B to perform.
(d) The amount of power, i.e., the net in
crease in the probability of B ’s actually perform
ing some specific action X, due to A's using his
means of power against B.
(e) The set of individuals over whom A has.,
power. The extension of power, in other words. ^
12

In reality there are many concepts of power and
many methods of measurement.. The method described, however,
is felt to better illustrate the case of state trading.
Perhaps it is very close to Max Weber's definition of power
as "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior
of other persons." See: Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An
Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, doubleday
and Co., Inc., 19&2), P. 290.
1x
«John Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power,
Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining
Games," Behavioral Science. VII, No. 1 (January, 1962). The
same material may also 6e found in: Martin Shubik, ed.,
Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 196*f), p.
Note:
footnote references are to the Shubik text.
As may be noted reference will be made to state
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If these dimensions of power are known, the posi
tions of government traders can be compared.

For instance,

an individual (state trader) has more "power” the greater
are items (a) through (e).

However, item (d), the amount

of power, is the most significant for this paper's purposes.
Moreover, item (d) is the only item that can be quantified
as a "real" number; all the other listings are specific
objects or actions.

It is defined, after all, as a dif

ference of two probabilities.

And it may be regarded as a

general measure of power, possibility including elements of
other dimensions— for example, scope and extent of power.
Up to this point no mention has been made as to the
possible costs involved.

Hence, another dimension is

needed:
(f) The opportunity costs to A of attempting
to influence B's behavior, i.e., the opportunity
costs of using his power over B (and of acquiring
this pov/er over B in the first place if A does not
yet possess the required power); which we shall call
the costs of A's power over B; and
(g) The opportunity costs to B of refusing to
do what A wants him to do, i.e., of refusing to
yield to A's attempt to influence his behavior. As
these opportunity costs measure the strength of B's
incentives for yielding to A's influence, we shall
call them the strength of A's power over B.'^
trading as if Harsanyi's article deals with government ex
change. It does not. However, it offers a method of
analyzing the bargaining procedure and is capable of
application to the state trading case.
1^Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches
to Social Behavior. op.'"cit., p. 186.
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A's power over B therefore not only includes the
ability of A to secure desired action from B with a certain
probability, but also within a certain cost to A.

These

costs may be expressed in physical units, monetary units,
or abstract utility measurements.
In addition, state traders A and B may have different
views of costs.Nation A may be able to
force a certain

dominate B and

act to be performed but only at a consider

able expense relative to what costs nation B might incur to
15
force a similar
act in its favor. ^ One
way to measure
power might be to hold

costs constant in

both countriesand

then compare the power or influence of the two nations which
results.

However, nations (or their respective governments)

do not necessarily seek an objective from a "power-perdollar" point of view.

Thus one country's subjective

evaluation of the goal may necessitate larger (or smaller)
cost outlays compared to another's.

And in the extreme, a

nation may have limited resources to devote to a desired
objective even though their evaluation would suggest the
desirability of a larger commitment.
Costs, then, are important.

16
As the concept of

opportunity costs implies, nation B must be aware of the
costs involved in not complying (or agreeing) to nation A.
15Ibid., pp. 186-189.
16

This point is especially significant when small
and large nations mutually state trade.

That is, by not allowing A ’s strategy to dominate, B may
undergo a cost of "noncompliance," and this will naturally
influence B ’s decisions to comply or not comply with A's
wishes.

Moreover, state trader A can influence such oppor

tunity costs in several ways.

It may offer B certain

advantages or disadvantages without any conditions attached
or nation A may offer possible rewards (or punishments)
subject to conditions.

And these results can be actual or

real or they may be perceived (what B thinks they are).1^
For instance, from A's point of view, the cost of influenc
ing B may be "objective" costs (known from rational
analysis), while B might be less rational and have only a
vague idea of the costs of compliance or noncompliance.
In summary, then, it has been stated that a state
trader's power over another can be thought of in terms of
increases in probabilities of securing certain actions,
conditioned by any costs incurred by A to influence B and
by B of refusing to be influenced.

But more can be said by

defining the strength of power as Harsanyi does in (g)
above (in terms of the utility B gives up if it refuses A's
attempt to influence its behavior), and then relating this
potential gain in utility for B to B's disutility of per
forming an action desired by A.

As a result, the maximum

increase in probabilities that A can influence B is
17
'That is, nation B may think the costs to be at
one level when they are really quite different.

Ill

revealed.

And this increase in probabilities is the maxi

mum amount of power A can exert on B.
if

In algebraic terms,

A P is the increase in probabilities or amount of A's

power, u is the utility gain for B from acceding to A's
demands, and x the disutility to B of acceding or
AP g

u , That is, A's power maximum is simply the ratio
X
of B's utility gain to its disutility from c a r rying out the
action.
Realistically speaking, however, such a measure of
power would require theoretical probabilities; yet in state
trading, nation B's behavior may be observed over a series
of similar events in which B complied with A in some pro
portion of the times.
empirical frequencies.

Probability in this sense becomes
B's behavior will yield disutility

of various amounts in the observed events.

B will tend,

therefore, to comply with A in those cases when the dis
utility is smallest.

It is also possible that if B

increases his agreements with A, his disutility for com
pliance would increase as the more "distasteful" actions
remained (as the less distasteful were selected first).

As

a result, the amount of A's power over B may increase some
what less than proportionally over time if the number of
1Q
possible actions are limited.

l8Ibid., p. 187-193
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The Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi Solution
for Bilateral Power Positions
Thus far, probability and power have been discussed
as though only one player or state trader had power over the
other.

In general, however, both parties have power over

the other.

In the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi general model of

bilateral power situations, both parties' power functions
are analyzed, i.e., each state trader's power function must
be viewed simultaneously.
It was assumed earlier that nation A had attempted
1Q
to influence nation B into performing an act-say Y. y

B, of

^ T h e following symbols will be utilized in order of
appearance:
Y

= act wanted by trader A

y

- disutility to trader B when performing act Y

p.j

- probability of performing act Y

s

-mixed strategy

s(pj)

--mixed strategy with probability p^

s(o)

- mixed strategy with probability o,yielding smaller
utility to B than s(p1)

Uj

= B's utility for s(p.j) performance

uQ

- B's utility if using other strategy s(o)

uQ*

- A's utility if B does not perform act Y

y*

-•increase in A's utility if B performs with a
probability of 1

Z

~ reward by A given to B for compliance to Act
increasing probability to p2

s(pP )

mixed strategy with new pP probability (reward z
included)

z

- gain to B for reward Z

z*

- cost to A for Z reward to B

u2*

Y

-= A's expected utility with cost of reward Z and
increased probability p2
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course, could realize a certain disutility (y) in complying
yet would perform with a probability p 1 /or a mixed strategy,
s, would be chosen with the probability p^ or 6 ^ / 7 .

That

is, s(p^) to B can be assumed to yield a higher level of
utility than a refusal by B to comply to the act.

Another

strategy s(o) would yield a smaller payoff uQ, rather than
the higher payoff u 1, for using the mixed strategy s with
a probability p^ or s(p^).

B's total expected utility would

thus be u^ - p^y greater than uQ /or B's utility for using
his strategy minus the disutility associated with it would
be greater than the utility gained when using another
strategy s(o27.
u2

- B's expected utility with reward Z and probability

D

sanction or damages imposed by A against B in an
attempt to increase the probability of agreement

d

loss to B for sanction from A

d*

cost to A for imposing sanction on B
expected total utility f o r A with sanction against B
B's expected total utilitywith sanction
B's retaliatory action against A
A's retaliatory action against B

d

new total loss for B in conflict

d*

new total cost for A in conflict

p2b

equilibrium probability for action Y for B

p2a

equilibrium probability for action Y for A
A's expected utility in asymetric case
B's expected utility in asymetric case

CA

complementary act to action Y if Y is not performed
by B
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If in the event that B did not conform to A's wishes,
then A's utility would be lower, or uQ*.

However, if B con

formed with a probability of one, A's utility would be larger
by y*.

But in the event that the original probability p^

existed, then A's expected utility would be uQ* + p^y*,
or the sum of these new possibilities of performance and
nonperformance.
Of course, in all bargaining situations, it is
possible for rewards to be offered for the performance of an
act.

If player A nov; introduces a reward Z to B, B's

probability of compliance could increase to p2 .

For

instance, state trader A may offer certain political con
cessions to increase the probability of agreement.
new strategy is possible represented by s(p2 ).

Again a

From a

utility standpoint, the inducement Z added to B's utility
while it represented a cost to A in satisfaction /or a gain
z to B and a loss (cost) z* to A/.

The reward now allows

A's expected utility with the new probability (p2 ) to be the
sum of A's utility if B does not perform minus the cost of
the reward plus the increase in utility arising from the new
probability.

Nation B's expected value would differ by the

addition of the reward.

Symbolically, for A:

U2* - U2 *(P2 ) :: U Q* - Z* + P2y*
and for B:
U2 = U2 (p2 ) = Ul + z — p2y.

U5
If the opposite approach is utilized, i.e., sanctions
A can impose a penalty, or damaged D, against B in an attempt
to increase the probability of agreement.

Such penalties

could include lost political or military ties, loss markets,
reduced orders, or other denied favors (or penalties) that
A may restrict (impose) to (on) B.

Again in utility

standards, the penalty D to nation B would create a loss d,
while A would incur a cost d* by imposing the sanction.

As

with the rewards discussed previously, A's new expected
satisfaction includes the utility if B does not perform
minus the cost of the sanction plus the utility from the
original p^ probability.

Player B's expected value would be

the utility from the p^ probability minus the sanction less
the disutility when performing.

Algebraically, A's.expected

utility with an "in doubt" p2 would be U y

= uQ* - d* + p^y*

while B's expected utility would become

- u^ - d - p^y.

The assumption in this situation is that B would still
retain his p^ probability for performance (or that they could
not agree on the value of ^ 2) •
In more realistic cases of state trading, both
parties usually have the ability to use retaliatory
strategies and direct them against each other.

In most

trading situations, a passive participant is rare.

Each

trading party has its own unique "methods" depending on the
interpreted value of the action.

In addition, such action

will be limited by the size and resources of each respective

116
«

nation.

For instance, Russia while trading with smaller

countries has been quite capable of securing advantages
simply because of the sheer magnitude of her possible
retaliatory actions.
Assuming these conditions to be present, nation A
can use measure

and nation B may resort to measure Vg.

If this situation arose, d would now become the total loss
for B in a conflict, a cost accruing from B's own rataliatory
strategy and the cost (loss) created by A's actions.

For

similar reasons, d* would include both cost items for trader
A.
Up to this point, no mention has been made of the
actual probability p2 , i.e., the equilibrium probability for
action Y of the state traders.

However, with all possible

actions now presented, it is possible to find such a value.
Obviously, it lies between the two nations' concession
limits.

A's concession limit is reached when the expected

utility from those actions with rewards equals that ex
pected utility with sanctions or damages.

Or algebraically

when U2* = U^* and similarly when U2* = u-j* - z* + p2y*
equals U^* = uQ* - d* + p^y*.
A

Solving these equations for
7*-d*

the p0 value for A gives p~‘ = p1 + _---- -

If the equilib-

rium probability p2 equals p2 A , then y*
A's expected total
utility will be u2*(p2A ) = U^* = uQ* - d* + p^y* as before
but now d* includes retaliatory actions.

Similarly, B's
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expected total utility with the p2
u2

(

p2

a)

= U1 + z

“

A

value becomes

~ P «|y-

y
As with nation A, B's concession limit is realized

when the expected utility from those actions with rewards
equals that expected utility with sanctions or damages.
T3
That is, when U2 =
giving the p2 value for B of p2 =
j
B
p^ + 5
Again with p2 = p2 , B's expected total
y
g
utility becomes U2 (P2 ) =
= Uj - d - p ^ .
Similarly, A's
B
B
expected utility with the p2 value becomes U2*(P2) =
u * _ z* + _Zl(z + d) + p,y*.
o
y
1*7
When translated into a geometric figure in the form
of a utility plane (see Figure 16), the total of agreement
points

lie

on a straight line connecting the twotraders'

concession limits— points Q and W.

Algebraically, in the

plane (U*, U) the agreement points

are U(p) =

U2 (p227 with the concession limit

points Q = U(p2 )

(p2 ),
=

/U2*(P2B ), U2 (p2Bi7 and W = U ( p / ) = ^I2*( p2 A ), U2(p 2A17.
The payoff in conflict cases occurs at N with N ~ ( U y , U^).
If a further assumption is made that the
points

(U)

agreement

lie on the straight line QW, the solution, pro

vided that the game is perfectly symmetrical between the
players, falls halfway between Q and W— (or at H).

Again

algebraically, A's expected utility at point H equals
V
= ^ 2 #(P2A) + U2*(p2B^7 = uo* “ Z* ’2 ■
d'* +
(Z + d) +
y
a
p ^ * ; while B's expected utility becomes
= -£/CT2(p2 ) +
U2 ^ P 2 B1 7 = U1 +

(z *

“ d#)

” P 1y#

FIGURE 16
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Setting U^* = U2*(p2 ) and

= U2(p2 ) the equilibrium value

of p2 consistent with the solution point H becomes
p~

=

p,

+

z

*

d

+

z*

-

d * -2 Q

2y
2y*
In addition, trader A will attempt to select a Z
value (reward to B) which will maximize the following:
A z = £ - £*. By achieving such a maximum, A has the best
y
y*
Z as an incentive, minus the cost of providing this service
to B.

In a similar fashion, A will attempt to choose the

penalty D to maximize the following:

A d = £ - i-LL. That
y
y*
is, A by maximizing the difference between the penalty value
and its cost, adds to its power position.
In the more realistic case of both parties using
their retaliatory strategies, A would attempt the above when
B's retaliatory strategy is given.

B, of course, would

attempt the same type of maximization procedure given A's
retaliatory strategy but would achieve it by minimizing A d
when A's strategy

is known.

As a result of both parties'

actions, the equilibrium choice of Dg and
that value to allow A d to be a maximum.

will be of

21

As a consequence, B can select a strategy s(p2 ), the
equilibrium probability strategy, which would allow the
amount of A's power over B to be the difference in proba
bility two minus probability one or A P = P2 - P| .
20Ibid., p. 201.
21 Ibid.

If A and
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B agree from this to do act Y with the probability p2 then
B will not perform act Y with a probability of 1 - P2 »
Technically speaking, A and B have agreed on a jointly
randomized mixed strategy with a probability p2 of compliance
for B and a 1 - p2 probability of noncompliance.

However,

noncompliance by B toward A measures B's power over A to
perform a complementary action (CA) to action Y with a
probability of 1 - p2 «
Thus as noted, if B does not comply to A's wishes,
A will perform action CA.

If so, A will have lost the

utility associated with compliance by B, or y*.

In other

words, y* now is a measure of disutility to A when forced
to perform the complementary action CA.

If (as shown above)

the amount of A's power over B is p = p2 - p^ or p = p2 - p^»
■Kz +d - d* - z*) then (z + d) measures the sum of the
y
y*
reward for 3 for compliance plus the penalty for noncompliance.
agree with A.

In reality, it indicates B's willingness to
It thus represents the conflict opportunity

costs to B and hence the "total" strength of A's influence
over B.

Moreover

£ measures A's "relative" strength
y

over B.
In addition- (d* - z*) indicates the cost differential
to A of a sanction against B and the cost of rewarding B.
Similarly, (as with B) the difference measures A's willing
ness to agree with B.

From A's point of vievi, it is his

opportunity costs of conflict with (d* - z*) measuring the
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"total” strength of B over A and
tive strength of B over A.

being the relav*

22

As pointed out by Harsanyi:
If both parties follow the rationality postu
lates of the Zeuthen-Nash theory of the two person
bargaining game, then in bilateral power situations
the amount of A's power over B with respect to some
action . . . tends to be equal to half the net
strength of A's power over B with respect to the
same action . . . this net strength being defined
as the difference between the gross relative strength
of A's power over B with respect to action • . . and
the gross relative strength of B's power over A with
respect to the complementary action . . „ .25
More specifically, this applied model reveals the
amount of power a state trader (A) may have over trader (B)
under the given assumptions.

It includes the possible

rewards a nation may offer plus the possible penalties it
may impose to force compliance to an act.

At the same time

it includes another force, that one of less submission in
light of the concessions that B perceives A may have to
make.

The strength of these forces is the difference be

tween the total relative strength of nation A over B
relative to event Y, and the total relative strength of
nation B over A with respect to a complementary event CA.
Given the symmetry assumption (the same starting disagree
ment point), the amount of power would be equal to one-half
of the differences of these two strengths.
22Ibid., p. 203.
23Ibid., p. 20if.

Symbolically,
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it would appear as i

)7. That is, nation A's
y
y* ./
power over B equals one-half the rewards plus the penalties

L

given to B by A divided by the disutility to B for performing
(this is one strength or force); minus—the cost to A for
imposing any damages or penalties on B minus the cost of any
rewards given to B divided by the gain in utility to A if B
performs with increased probability (1).2Zf

The greater the

difference between these two forces, the greater will be the
power of one state trader (A) over another (B).
In sum, the above system yields the following
results:

In the first instance, it provides an equilibrium

probability for action under the described (limited)
assumptions.

Moreover, the presented solution is Pareto

optimal for it lies on the boundary of the utility plane
(see Figure 16) and is the best position for both players.
In addition, symmetry was assumed, allowing for the
determination of the equilibrium probability and utility.
That is, the final solution had to lie within the confines
of the utility plane with zero as the common origin (i.e.,
25
the same disagreement point) for both parties. J
^ O f course, y* has become a measure of disutility
to A in conflict.
^ A s may be surmised, the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi
solution is not the "only" theory of the bargaining process.
However, its emphasis on power relationships made it more
significant than most for state trading purposes. Though
approaches may vary, the outcomes may be relatively close.
As pointed out by J. Cross: "In view of these results, it
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Power over another, therefore, depends on the
strength of the individual (or nation) to influence or
command compliance.

The greater such strength the greater

will be the scope and extension of power.

Incentives for

action include utility or disutility for performing, with
greater power going to those willing to assume the costs
depending on their interpretation of the value of the
achieved event.

By analogy to production theory, output

is a function of the various inputs.

With power, the

ability to influence others is a function of the utility
and costs borne in forcing compliance.
The Values Within the
Payoff Matrix
It may be recalled that as the simple state trading
model was presented, the solution was limited in its
"description" of strategies.

The Harsanyi procedure (when

applied to state trading) provides a solution (with weak
nesses) but it lacks the capability of divulging "all"
influences on the selection of various strategies.

The

original model had these possibilities but as presented was
is not hard to surmise why international negotiations, where
learning and discount rates are probably lower . . . ex
pectations may be more optimistic, and bargaining costs are
practically zero, can last for years, although for the same
reason we would expect that the outcomes will be fairly near
the Nash solution." See: John G. Cross, "A Theory of the
Bargaining Process," The American Economic Review. LXVI
(March, 1969)* PP« 68^"7.

12^
incomplete.

The following is aimed at supplementing the

previous material by looking more deeply into the component
parts of a strategy, i.e., into the values within a simple
payoff matrix.

More specifically, how may economic goals

be reconciled with political or military or general
prestige goals, and how are the overall values (including
both economic and noneconomic elements) of the payoffs
determined?
Just as Harsanyi made use of cost-benefit ideas in
the development of his bilateral power position model, the
cost-benefit approach may be employed in analyzing the
trade-off between economic and noneconomic goals.

Harry G,

Johnson used essentially this technique in his explanation
of why small countries often attempt to industrialize even
though inefficiency will obviously result.

According to

Johnson, certain policy actions will be taken "up to the
point where the value of the marginal collective utility
derived from collective consumption of national power is
pr

just equal to its marginal excess private cost."

Later,

B. J. Cohen modified the approach to explain the trade-off
between consumption of economic goods and services on one
26

Benjamin J. Cohen, ed., American Foreign Economic
Policy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 19b8),~p. lb.
See also: Harry G. Johnson, "An Economic Theory of Protec
tionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs
Unions," Journal of Political Economy, LXXIII (June. 1965).
256-283.
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hand and the consumption of power (a political good) on the
other.

Cohen's formulation is especially helpful in the

state trading case.
First, it is possible to define the real income of
a country in terms of its total utility derived from its
total consumption of economic goods and services together
with its total consumption of national power.

National

power is defined so as to include military position, politi
cal advantages, international prestige, and so forth; it is
thus a noneconomic end in itself, rather like a consumer
good, as well as a means to both more economic goods and
services (potentially) and more power.

In the latter

respect, national power serves as a type of noneconomic
capital good, which can be used to raise real income in the
future while serving as a noneconomic consumer good at the
same time.

It is, therefore, a direct noneconomic equiva

lent to economic goods and services, which are partly
consumer goods and services and partly capital-type goods
and services.
The potential total real income of a country is, in
turn, determined by the volume and quality of resources
(broadly defined) available.

To some extent, national

power and economic goods and services are mutually rein
forcing parts of total real income— that it, the more goods
and services available, the more potent the country may be
in a political or military sense as well (and vice versa),
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but only to a point.

At some point, greater international

power may require the sacrifice of resources:

more men and

material for arms production, perhaps, at the expense of
domestic living standards, or more economic assistance for
politically pivotal underdeveloped countries at the expense
of domestic environmental improvement.

When this point is

reached, income maximization can occur only by means of a
trade-off of economic goods and services for national pov/er
or vice-versa.

To maximize real income, therefore, a

country should trade off economic consumption of goods and
services for national power as long as the marginal collec
tive utility of consuming national pov/er is greater than the
marginal cost of foregone consumption of goods and services.
The United States and the Soviet Union are excel
lent polar cases of this trade-off phenomenon.

In the

U. S., a relatively high valuation is put on economic goods
and services, and usage of resources for military buildups
or foreign aid (which serve to enhance national power) is
permitted only grudgingly.

In the Soviet Union (at least

until quite recently), high priority has been put on
military expenditures, economic penetration of the under
developed countries, acquisition of high-technology goods
from the West, and so forth, at considerable cost in terms
of living standards.

Obviously, these two countries

formulate state-trading strategies quite differently— their
payoff matrices are very different, and the makeup of each
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matrix square is quite different, since their relative
valuations of national pov/er and economic goods and services
vary so.
Cost-benefit analysis (or marginal analysis, if that
is a better term), then, can help explain the composition
of the values in a matrix— how much utility is derived
from national power and how much from consumption of eco
nomic goods and services.

Likewise, it can also be helpful

in showing what the amounts are.

Since a state-trading

matrix is necessarily based on trade between two governments,
it is only necessary to say that the amount of value
(economic plus noneconomic) in each matrix square depends
on the marginal contribution of imports to total real income
or utility minus the cost to real income of foregoing those
goods and services exported.

Since different strategy

combinations will yield different volumes and terms of
trade (as well as different political concessions granted
and received), the matrix values will also differ.
Perhaps a rough example may help clarify the fore
going.

Suppose the U. S. is considering the negotiation of

a trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

Suppose further

that the United States* strategy A amounts to a relatively
generous (by past standards) offering of wheat, computers,
and heavy equipment at attractive prices if the Russians
respond with a relatively liberal strategy permitting U. S.
firms to enter into co-production arrangements in the

U. S. S. R., to develop markets for U. S. products like
Coca Cola, and to import sizable amounts of Soviet crude
oil.

On the other hand, strategy A may require the U. S.

to supply only a small amount of wheat and accept only
homogenized yak furs if the Russians adopt a relatively
restrictive strategy.

A liberal response may well yield a

much higher increment to U. S. real income, since enlarged
sales and production of "comparitve advantage" goods
coupled with increased power over the Soviets stemming from
their increased dependence upon this country could be
expected to substantially outweigh the economic and political
costs of foregone wheat, computers, heavy equipment, and
dependence upon Russian oil and markets.

A restrictive

response by the Russians would not cost so much, but
neither might the net benefits be more than incidental,
with a correspondingly low matrix value.
In conclusion, this chapter has dealt with game
theory as applied to the state-trading situation. Initially,
a simple two-person zero-sum game was hypothesized to
indicate the nature of game theory as an analytical tool.
This was then expanded, using the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi
approach, to permit power positions to enter the statetrading calculus.

Finally, cost-benefit analysis was

employed in an attempt to show how both economic and non
economic considerations may enter into the determination of
state-trading payoffs.

Although game theory may not be

able to offer a determinate solution to the real-world
policymaker, it nonetheless offers a unique view of the
state trading situation, emphasizing the importance of
conflict, of benefits and costs, and of power and prob
abilities.

Game theory may not be especially useful as

predictive device, therefore, but does appear to have
useful explanatory powers inasmuch as it, more than any
other approach, gets to the root of the basic nature of
state trading— conflict.

CHAPTER VI
STATE TRADING IN WHEAT
It has been shown that state trading can take many
forms, employ both economic and political measures, and
have some far-reaching consequences.

The preceding chapter

suggested that game theory may have some useful applications
to state trading situations, perhaps more in the way of
helping to understand why state traders behave as they do
than in any predictive sense.

As a tool of analysis, game

theory thus may be somewhat comparable to the kinked
oligopoly demand curve:

it tells us something about the

nature of an economic situation, but it cannot really tell
us much about how that situation came to be in the first
place.

Game theory merely offers a method of analyzing the

outcome of a bargain or transaction, which may nonetheless
be of considerable value.

This chapter explores just such

a deal— the Soviet Union's purchase of wheat from the United
States in 1972.
The Wheat and Pood Aid Treaty
In order to understand and truly appreciate the
Soviet-American wheat deal, it is first necessary to examine
briefly several aspects of U. S. agricultural policy which
130
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appear to operate as "external restraints" on the American
side.1

It is commonly known that the United States has a

complex set of policies and regulations concerning the
production and distribution of its grain products.

Nor is

the U. S. alone in such practices— many other nations also
supervise their agricultural activities for both external
and internal reasons.
In addition, the United States is a member of an
international wheat agreement which has been renewed and
modified over the years until it reached its present form
2
in 1971.
Under this agreement, member countries report
to a "Wheat Council" and "Secretariat" those of its
activities which govern the production and sale of wheat
in its domestic markets.

The Council and Secretariat then

use this information to monitor world wheat prices and
market conditions and make whatever recommendations seem
necessary to maintain stability in these markets.
Of course, stability in prices ideally requires
some reference point from which to measure changes.

Prior

*0f course, only those activities and regulations
concerning state trading (of the nearly infinite number of
agricultural regulations) are examined. Other regulations
are dealt with only as they apply to the various aspects of
the Soviet deal.
2United States Congress, International Wheat Agree
ment. 1971. Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
International Wheat Agreement of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, on Executive F, 92nd Con
gress, 1st Session, June 15, 17, and 29 . 1971 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), P. 1**3. The
agreement will last until July, 197^.
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to the 1971 extension of the agreement, the U. S. had hoped
that one standard type of wheat would be adopted— the top
quality wheat in the world, Manitoba No. 1 at a price of
$1.62| at Lakehead ports— and that all other wheats would
be pegged against it.

However, for several reasons agree

ment could not be reached on this matter in the 1971 exten
sion.

For one thing, Canada was in the midst of installing

a new grading system for wheat, and secondly, neither
Canada nor thq U. S. was willing to have one of their grains
adopted as the reference wheat.

Therefore the final agree

ment— without a reference wheat— also lacked a reference
price.3

This meant that the 1971 wheat agreement, unlike

its predecessors, had neither an agreed maximum nor minimum
price (setting a range within which world prices would
float).
The Soviet-American Wheat Peal
Given these world wheat pricing conditions— flexible
ones, to say the least— the stage was set for the
^This point will have significance when examination
of the Soviet wheat deal is made.
At this point it may be beneficial to note that as
part of the international wheat agreement, a food aid
agreement was also signed. Under its terms, the U. S. (only
one of 31 nations— including the U.S.S.R.) agreed to donate
to "needy" nations a sum of wheat according to its capability
to produce wheat. Of course, the U.S., being the largest
producer in the world, was allocated the largest share.
Contributions are made under Public Law ^80 and are given
out of Commodity Credit Corporation stockpiles. The U. S.
donation amounts to 1,890,000 metric tons each year over
the life of the three-year agreement.
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Soviet-American wheat transaction.

In December of 1971

information was received by the u. S. government concerning
Soviet difficulties with grain production.

Bad weather and

crop failures had plagued the Russians, forcing them to
turn to international markets to meet their grain needs.
In April of the next year, Secretary of Agriculture Earl
L. Butz led a trade mission to Moscow and conducted the
beginning discussions.

Two months later, on July 8, 1972,

President Nixon announced that agreement had been reached
on the sale of grains to Russia.^
Behind the scenes, however, the negotiations were
conducted in two distinct segments.

In June, a Soviet

delegation arrived in the United States prepared to pur
chase various grains specified in the Moscow meeting in
April.

However, the delegation consisted of two distinct

groups.

Private negotiations took place between part of

the delegation and eight large American grain exporting
firms while government negotiations on credit arrangements
were handled by the rest of the Soviet representatives with
the U. S. government.

On July 8, final agreements had been

reached on both parts of the grain sale.

At this point,

however, neither the type (or types) of commodity (or
commodities), nor their volumes, were stipulated in the
All About That Soviet Wheat Deal," TJ. S. News and
World Reports. DCXIII (October 9, 1972), 28-30.

13**
agreement or publicly disclosed— the specifics would be
5
determined at some future date.
It was not until one month later that the Russians
announced their intentions to purchase wheat only, excluding
other grains that had been previously considered.

As a

result of the announcement, the wheat market responded
vigorously, with domestic prices rising from $1.65 per
bushel in June to $2.27 by late November.

Of course, along

with the domestic price increase, U. S. export subsidies
aiso rose.^
At this point, it may be helpful to review U. S.
export subsidy policies relating to the wheat deal.
Basically, the U. S. Department of Agriculture's export
subsidy is a discretionary "tool" resting with the Secretary
of Agriculture.

It is designed to ensure the "competitive

ness" of U. S. wheat in world markets.^

In addition, the

subsidy may be used to stabilize world wheat prices, to aid
price-support programs by strengthening domestic market
prices, and to reduce the quantities of wheat the Commodity
5united States Congress, House of Representatives,
Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Livestock and Grains of the Committee on Agriculture,
92nd Congress, Second Session, September l*f, 18, and 19,
1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972),
PP. 1-5.
6Ibid.. pp. 5-15.
?In recent years U. S. wheat prices have been above
world prices. Export subsidy payments are made to bridge
the gap between higher domestic prices and world selling
prices.
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Credit Corporation (CCC) must purchase to maintain domestic
Q
prices at their support levels.
Prior to the wheat sale of 1972 the subsidy rate
was very low.

It was determined daily by USDA officials,

and set at levels high enough to ensure the competitive
ness of U. S. wheat in world markets.

To receive a subsidy,

an exporter had to apply for it and offer to export a
certain quantity and quality of wheat from a specific port.^
If the application was accepted by the Agriculture Depart
ment, the subsidy was fixed at that day's rate (regardless
of when the wheat was actually shipped).

Payment of the

subsidy was then made by the CCC after proof of shipment
was presented to them.
Naturally, after the Soviet grain deal was publi
cized and domestic prices began to rise substantially above
world prices, the export subsidy rate soared.

Table 4

shows the U. S. export subsidy rates and domestic prices
for wheat for those months immediately after the announce
ment of the deal.

Of special interest is the period between

Q

United States Congress, United States Senate,
Extension of Farms and Related Programs. Hearings before
the Committee of Agriculture and Forestry, 93rd Congress,
1st Session, February 27, 28; March 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 1^, and
20, 1973 (Washington: D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1973).
^The exporter does not necessarily have to have
orders for wheat but may be contemplating a shipment . . .
or he may be trying to take advantage of that day's favor
able export subsidy rate!
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TABLE 4
U. S. EXPORT SUBSIDY RATES AND PRICES FOR HARD RED WINTER WHEAT
FOR THE PERIOD OF JULY 1 TO SEPT. 25, 1972
(Per bushel)

Date

Delivered
shipboard
At U.S. port
(Domestic Price)

Export
subsidy
rate

Export
target
price
("World" Price)

$0 .0 5

$1.63 1/4

1972
3
5
6
7
10
11
12
13
14
17
18
19
20
21
24
25
26

27
28

31
1
2
3
4
7
8
9
10
11
l4
15

$1.68
1.69
1.71
1.69
1.71
1.76
1.76
1.76
1.73

1/k
1/2
7/8
7/8

1/k
1/2
1/2

1/k
1,7k 1/k

1.76
1.79
1.77
1.76
1.78
1.79
1.77
1.76
1.78
1.79

7/8

1/k

1.64 !/8
1.62 7/8
1.62 7/8
1 .63 1/4
1 .6 3 1/2
1.63 1/2
1 .63 1/4
1.63 1/4
1 .63 7/8
1.64 1/4
1.63 5/8
1.63 1/4
1.64 3/4
1.64 1/8
1.63 7/8
1.63 5/8
1.64
1 .6 3 3/4
1.64 1/2
1.63 3/4
1.64
1.64
1.74
1.73
1.65 1/4
1.66
1.68 3/4

5/8

,1k
.13
.14
•15

1/8
7/8
5/8

3/k

1 .8 0 1/2
1 .8 0 3/k

1.88
1.95
2.05

2,Ok

16

17

2 .0 8

18

2.10 1/k
2.10 1/2
2.11 3/k

2k

1.63

.07
.07
.09
.13
.13
.13
.10
.11
.13
.15

1/k
3/k

1.96 l/k
2.02
2.04 3/k
2.05
2.02 3/k
2.0U

21
22
23

.06

2.1k 1/k
2.12

.Ik
.13
.14
.16
.16

.17
.21
.31
.31
.31
.31
.36
.36
•36
•35
.36
.38
.38
.38
.38
.38
.38

1.6 9
1.6 7 3/4

1.68
1.70
1.72
1.72
1.73
1.76
1.74

1/4

1/2
3/4
1/4

137
TABLE U— Continued

Delivered
shipboard
At U.S. port
(Domestic Price)

Date

Export
target
price
("World" Price)

Export
subsidy

rate

1972
25
28
29
30
31
Sept. 1
5
6
7
8
11
12
13
lU
15
19
20
21
22
25
Source:

$2.09
2.10
2.13
2.lU
2.12
2.17
2.18
2.17
2.17
2.18
2.21
2.27
2.25
2.29
2.38
2.U6
2.1*0
2.39
2.1*3
2.39

3/1*
1/1*
1/1*
1/1*
1/1*
1/2
1/k

1/8
3/8
1/2
3A
1/8
1/2
1/1*
3/k

5/8
1/2

.1*7
.1*7
.1*7
.1*7
.1*7

$0.38
.37
.35
.32
.30
.30
.30
.30
.29
.30
.29
.28
.26
.25
.25
.21
.19
.11*
.00
.00

1.62
1.63
1.66
1.67
1.65

3/!+
1/1+
1/U
1/1*

$1.71
1.73
1.78
1.82
1.82
1.87
1.88
1.87
1.88
1.88
1.92
1.99
1.99
2.0l*
2..13
2.25
2.21
2.25
2.1*3
2.39

3/k
1/k

1/1*
1/U
l/U
1/2
l/U
1/8
3/8
1/2
3/U
1/8
1/2
1/U
3/U
5/8
1/2

United States Congress, United States Senate, Extension of Farm
and Related Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Agri
culture and Forestry, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, February 27,
28; March 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, lU, and 20, 1973 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1973)> pp. 753-5U.
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August 25 and August 31.

During that one week, the Agri

culture Department, having decided to phase out subsidies
altogether, adopted a so-called "two-tier" export payment
system.

In fairness to U. S. exporters who had previously

made commitments to sell wheat around the $1.63-$1 .65
target ("world") price range through 1973 on the assumption
that the subsidy program would continue those targets, the
Department offered— for one week only, from August 25 to
31— an export subsidy rate of either ^7 cents per bushel
(using target prices in the range of $1.62 to $1.67) or a
lower rate, which actually ranged from 30 to 38 cents
(using target prices in the $1.71 to $1.82 range).10

This

4-7 cent rate was offered on all prior or present sales or
commitments made at prices based on the assumption that
subsidies would continue.

So, naturally, exporters all

signed up for the higher subsidy rate, making it a one-tier
system, in effect.11

No doubt some exporters with prior

commitments were bailed out by this action, and no doubt
others were able to profit nicely by selling their wares
abroad at prices considerably above that week's artificially
low target prices.
10The target price is the one set by Agriculture
Department officials to ensure "competitiveness" in world
markets and, of course, to control domestic quantities at
the same time. It also determines, along with domestic
prices, the amount of export subsidy to be paid.
^ Extension of Farm and Related Programs, p. 737.
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Why did the USDA decide to phase out the export
subsidies?

The steep increase (from 5 cents in July to 38

cents in August) in the subsidies certainly was one reason.
Also, the Department's export goals had generally been
met, and world wheat prices were on the rise, anyway.

A

cynic might say that, having seen how the Russians were able
to profit from the subsidies, the USDA decided it was in for
heavy criticism and moved to cut off any other would-be
buyers who might be interested in sharing in the largesse.
It was noted earlier that the U. S. government was
arranging credit terms with the Russians while the private
exporters were negotiating the sale itself.

In effect,

then, the agreement signed on July 8, 1972 was not a sales
agreement between the United States and Russia.

It was

really only an agreement on the amount of credit to be
extended by the Commodity Credit Corporation to the Soviet
12
purchasing agency.
Basically, a credit limit was
established of $750 million to be used over a three-year
period.

No limit was set on the amount or types of grains

to be purchased, nor were minimums set.

The only require

ment was that no more than $500 million of CCC credit be
outstanding at one time. *3

under normal CCC arrangements,

^ I n addition, deliveries could be made to other
Eastern European nations!
^ Extension of Farm and Related Programs. Hearings,
P. 7^7.
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a three-year maturity period is allowed at an annual
interest charge of 6.125 per cent.1** These terms were
extended to and accepted (reluctantly, or so it seemed at
the time) by the Russians.
The Cost and Benefits of the Deal
It thus appears that the type(s) of state trading
practiced during the wheat sale consisted not of one form,
but two.

The Soviet state trading agency made its arrange

ments on credit with the U. S. government (state trader to
state trader) and arranged the sale itself with private
U. S. exporters (state trader to private trader).

More

over, within both deals certain costs and benefits can be
identified which can help illuminate motives and strategies
which will be of interest later when game theory is taken
up in more detail.
Foremost among the many possible benefits resulting
from the deal was the income received from the sale of the
wheat, which depended in part on the price.

Most government

representatives (such as the Secretary of Agriculture)
guessed that the privately negotiated price was very close
to the U. S. target price range of $1.63 to $1.65.

However,

as the actual arrangements over price were made with private
lZhj. S. Department of Agriculture, P. L. 480 Conressional Sales. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No.
5 Economic Research Service, September, 1970 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 10-15.

f

traders, no exact price information was disclosed publicly.
In addition, under the export subsidy program, receiving a
subsidy does not require a price to be revealed.

Instead,

the difference between the U. S. target price and the
domestic price is used as the basis for the subsidy.

How

ever, since the negotiations were conducted in the June-July
period during which the domestic price level approximated
$1.69 with export subsidies of around seven cents, it is
probable that the negotiated prices fell very close to U. S.
target prices.
Even at these prices, various U. S. benefits are
subject to identification, if not precise measurement.
Obviously, American wheat dealers were the direct recipients
of Soviet outlays.

In addition, as increased demand drove

up American domestic wheat prices, farmers' incomes
increased substantially (in accord with the goals of U. S.
farm policy).

However, the agreed-upon selling price, it

has been argued, was quite low relative to what it could
have been.

Farmers who had sold their wheat before notice

was given of the deal were naturally quite upset at the lost
revenue they "could" have had, given information about the
size of the sale.

Agricultural Department officials, how

ever, have argued that they did not know the magnitude of
the Russian wheat purchase themselves.
Secretary of Agriculture Butz:

According to

M
We do know that Soviet buying agents were
in New York during the first week of July. But
any contacts they made at that time were with
trading firms— not with us. And of course, the
purchases were made from private sources and not
from the U. S. Government.
This is long estab
lished policy, fully in keeping with the American
free enterprise system and with repeated congres
sional directives and policy statements.
I emphasize that nobody knew then— neither
the Department of Agriculture nor the trade— just
how much the Russians would buy. The export
traders were not telling each other how much the
Soviets were booking with them. The exporters
did not tell the Department of Agriculture. Nor
were the Russians talking.
It is accurate to say that the eventual size
of the Soviet purchases caught everyone by sur
prise, including the Russians themselves. Soviet
grain purchasers were in this country dealing
with the private export trade in July and went
home. Unexpectedly, they came back in a few
days— apparently after getting a further assessment
of the damage that had been done to their wheat
crop by the hot, dry weather.15
It is apparent from the above, therefore, that the
American farmer gained substantially from the deal.

How

ever, it can also be contended that they could have made
greater gains with more information while the deal was
being negotiated.
Similarly, benefits went to the dealers handling
the grain because of the CCC's export subsidy setup.
Depending on what future subsidy rates are expected to be,
an exporter may register immediately or delay registering
for a particular subsidy rate.

According to E. B. Staats,

Comptroller-General of the U. S.:
^ Sale of wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 7.

1^3
The speculative aspects of the subsidy
registration system are illustrated by five
examples, CCC will pay exporters subsidies
totaling about $60^,493, whereas had the ex
porter registered on the sales dates the
subsidies would have totaled $268,188 or
$318, 305 less.1°
If benefits are measured by extra income to such dealers,
it can be argued that the CCC arrangements allowed some
traders to benefit, albeit at a cost to the American tax
payer.

This, of course, may or may not mean a net gain to

the U. S. as a whole.

All we can say is that some income

redistribution resulted.
For similar reasons, beneficiaries of the sale in
cluded those industries and organizations related to the
movement of wheat— trucking, rail, and barge lines, as well
as those engaged in ocean shipping.
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Perhaps of more

importance, though, was the impact of the wheat sale upon
the U. S. balance of payments.

Approximately one billion

dollars in earned revenue has emanated from the transaction.
And the CCC itself has saved another estimated one-half
billion dollars from reduced storage costs and farm sub
sidy payments.*®
In sum, then, it is possible to identify several
quite tangible benefits to the U. S. from the wheat sale.
^ Extension of Farm and Related Programs. Hearings,
p. 390.
*?It has also been argued that some high officials
used their inside information for personal gain. However,
these have been unsupported claims.
*Qsale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 8.
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Perhaps one of the more subtle economic benefits is the
overall improvement in economic efficiency commonly
associated with the expansion of industries which have
notable comparative advantages (which the wheat-growers of
the U. S. are ordinarily presumed to have) and the added
pressure this puts on other industries via competition for
factors and so forth.

Additionally, since added exports

usually translate into added imports at some point in time,
there are important consumption gains, as well as competi
tive pressures on import-competing industries to make
better use of their inputs.
Furthermore, it is likely that various political
or less tangible (in the sense that they are not easily
measured) benefits accrued, as well.

For example, it is

likely that the transaction assisted in building the
"detente” or accommodation with Russia that the U. S.
government had been seeking.

To the extent that such under

takings reduce tensions and anxieties, head off wasteful
arms races and the like, welfare in the total sense is
clearly increased.

It may also be that the wheat deal

constituted part of the pressure the U. S. was putting on
the Soviet Union to limit its assistance to North Vietnam
and to counsel de-escalation in that conflict.

Some politi

cal observers also feel that closer ties between the U. S.
and Russia help keep a wedge driven between Russia and Red
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China— the enemy disunited, in other words.

Still others

believe that U. S. trade with Russia is beneficial in
serving notice to our European allies that they cannot
take this country for granted, thereby making them more
pliable in NATO negotiations, GATT and IMP negotiations,
and so forth.
It might even be argued that the U. S. reaped an
important international prestige gain by presenting the
world with the image of a well-fed capitalist nation
marketing its surplus food to a hungry country that just
happens to be the "showcase" of world communism.

It may

have been good public relations, in other words.
Yet the sale did not develop without some quite
large cost factors that must also be considered.

As noted

earlier, the price agreed upon for wheat was undeniably
low, considering world supply and demand conditions at the
time of the sale.

Several months prior to the Soviet-

Araerican agreement, Canada had sold a large volume of
wheat to Russia.

After the sale, Canada withdrew from

international wheat markets fearing possible domestic
shortages in light of recently increasing production
problems.

Similarly, many European and Asian countries

were encountering potential supply problems.

The most

potent factor, however, was that the U. S. export subsidy
program, as exporters saw it, was supposedly to continue.
During negotiations with the Russians, therefore, prices
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were set with the assumption that governmental support
for target prices would continue.

Under these conditions,

exporters felt that they could afford to sell at approxi
mately $1.63-1.65, knowing that any difference in export
market prices and domestic prices would be made up by
subsidies.

The stage was set.

Skillful Soviet negotiators,

having done their homework, arranged for a deal which,
according to the real supply and demand conditions, could
have been at much higher prices.

Assuming an inelastic

Russian demand for U. S. wheat, potential income was there
by lost to American interests.

This is a definite "cost"

of the deal in the opportunity sense.
Additionally, it should be noted that the magnitude
of the wheat sale severely disrupted the markets of American
products using wheat.

In the later months of 1972, wheat

prices rose to levels more than 80 cents above pre-Soviet
sales peaks.

Quite obviously, wheat users suffered addi

tional cost burdens (and lost consumer surpluses) which
eventually pushed up prices for products such as bread.
Other grain products which were substitutes for wheat also
rose in price.

These generally higher food prices, of

course, also tend to raise living costs, money wages, and
contribute to general inflationary pressure from the cost
side.
Another costly result of the sale was the tremendous
bottleneck that developed in those transport industries
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charged with moving the wheat.

Complicating the matter

was the fact that the U. S. economy was gaining momentum
and approaching full employment by late 1972 .^

This

placed still more strain on rail lines, barge lines, and
international shipping firms.

As in most such cases, the
20
quality of services also deteriorated as costs rose.
There were undoubtedly political and prestige
losses stemming from the wheat deal, too.

There is some

evidence that the thaw in U. S.-Chinese relations stalled
somewhat as U. S.-Soviet relations warmed up.

There was

also angry reaction in Europe from allies who felt that
U. S. "friendship" with Russia was coming partly at the
expense of U. S. ties with Europe.

Other wheat-exporting

countries were understandably unhappy with the transaction,
as were grain-exporting countries in general.

Poor

countries which had come to depend on cheap U. S. wheat
financed by Public Law 480 moneys were hurt as prices rose.
And many diplomats feared that U. S.-Soviet cooperation
might expand to the point where the two superpowers might
join forces to exploit less powerful countries both
politically and economically.
Grain Strain: Shipping U. S. Wheat to Russians
Burdens Transportation Systems," Wall Street Journal. CXC
(October 18, 1972), 1.
^^These costs and benefits have been discussed from
the American point of view. Russia's costs and/or benefits
will be dealt with in a later section.
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Finally, in weighing costs and benefits a distinc
tion must be made between gains or costs to the U. S.
economy as a whole and gains or costs to a particular
sector.

Overall gains depend on the weighted sum of the

various benefits minus any costs to society.
gains obviously occur only to certain groups.

Individual
It is pos

sible to argue, for example, that the present administra
tion was in favor of the deal because it wanted to
redistribute incomes toward farmer and exporters at the
expense of others, even though the nation as a whole might
suffer from the exchange.

Or from another perspective, the

combination of satisfied farmer and exporters, reduced cold
war tensions, and so forth may have in total outweighed any
disutility to the unhappy consumers and taxpayers.

In

either and all interpretations, separation of individual
and/or societal gains must be made.
It may be noted that the benefits and costs of the
credit arrangements made with the Russians have not been
explicitly discussed.

Fairly obviously, these arrangements

were made primarily to permit the grain sale to be made—
that is, they were basically passive or accommodating in
nature.

It is not likely that a great hunger for interest

income prompted the U. S. government to make the financing
available, nor does it appear that the Russians enjoy in
debtedness to the U. S. at capitalistic interest rates.
costs to the U. S. might include whatever added financial

The
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market or inflationary pressure which may have resulted,
as well as some foregone or postponed investment activity.
The costs to the Soviet Union would include the interest
charges themselves, and perhaps a prestige loss from having
to borrow in order to finance necessities, as well as other
possible internal financial problems connected with distri
bution and repayment.
State Trading and Game
Theory Applications
The preceding section was intended to offer some
insights into the nature of the wheat deal and suggest
some of its resulting costs and benefits.

However, several

unanswered questions remain concerning additional motives
and strategies

the sale, the applicability of the com

parative costs doctrine, and the applicability of game
theory.
First, the sale involved two of the four possible
types of transactions.

In one case private merchants sold

to a Soviet state trading agency.

In the other, govern

ments dealt with each other over credit arrangements.
Obviously, the motives for action in both instances varied.
In the first case, where private IT. S. merchants
negotiated sales with Soviet governmental buyers, several
objectives can be postulated.

For the U. S. exporters,

profits were no doubt of primary importance.

It was noted

earlier that most of the sales were within the $1.63- 1.65

150
range, which was consistent with then-current prices in
world markets.

However, negotiated prices could conceiv

ably have been at higher levels with complete knowledge of
Soviet demand and world supply conditions.

The motive of

the private traders was thus most likely profit, but sub
ject to a '•knowledge" constraint.

This was pointed out by

Secretary of Agriculture Butz in response to a question
during Congressional hearings:
Mr. Pindley: Would you give us some insight
as to what that means to a private trader in this
country in attempting to negotiate a major deal
with either China or the Soviet Union? If he is
up against a state trader, what are the hazards
that he has?
Secretary Butz: Well, if he is up against
a state trader, he has no firm idea what his total
intentions are, what his total program likely will
be. If he is up against a competitive situation,
you have some basis for more public information
than if you are up against a situation where the
decision is made at the top of the hierarchy and
filters down through.21
On the Soviet side, even given some degree of
monopsonistic power, the sole motive of profit (purchases
at lowest possible prices) cannot be so easily assumed.
The objectives of the Soviet Union, as with all government
traders, are usually complex, varied, and secret.

But it

is quite obvious that the main goal of the Russians was
the simple securing of badly needed wheat.

Soviet crops

had been adversely affected by an extremely severe winter;
21Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 3^.
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Eastern European countries were similarly affected; and
prior Soviet purchases had been made from Canada, Austra
lia, and France.

Under these conditions, and coupled with

a shift in Soviet import policy (placing higher priority
on consumer demands), the Soviet bargaining position was
anything but favorable.

Yet, through skillful negotiation

and bulk purchases, significant advantages were gained.
It can only be conjectured at this point, but other Soviet
motives probably included better relations with the U. S.
(perhaps due in part to fear of China), the opening of
future markets and sources of vital, high-technologymachinery, a desire for access to more consumer goods, or
any number of other possible undisclosed objectives.
Likewise, the negotiations over credit terms (state
trader to state trader) are subject to the same type of
interpretation.

That is, each government had its own

motives for action.

For the Russians, financing was

probably necessary, given its shortage of convertible
foreign exchange and the necessity of having the wheat.
But why did the U. S. enter into both the sale and
the financing arrangements?

At first glance, expanded

exports prompted by balance-of-payments difficulties appears
to have been a strong motive.

In addition, it has been a

policy of the Nixon Administration to improve relations
with many nations formally held in "ill repute."

Moreover,

the Soviet Union offered a large market for American goods
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and offered many more potential imports (oil, minerals,
and so forth).

Under these circumstances, expansion of

trade was inevitable.

The wheat deal was only one of many

possible avenues.
The sale itself, however, appears to have been
arranged with very specific intentions.

The private market

was used exclusively to supply the commodity.
Credit Corporation stocks were to be involved.

No Commodity
Export sub

sidies were paid, but were more than offset by reduced crop
subsidy income payments to the farmers and savings in
storage costs to the CCC.

As a result, farmers' incomes

rose, crop surpluses were reduced, and fewer controls were
placed on crop production— and all are goals of U. S.
agricultural policy.

In addition, the credit arrangements,

although favorable to the Russians, were made in part on
the assumption that negotiations would continue on Russian
lend-lease debt, high seas shipping problems, and ending
22
the Viet Nam conflict.
In sum, the objectives were quite
specific, economic and political in nature, and conditioned
by possible future arrangements.
To the broader question of whether the sales accorded
with comparative advantage, the answer is more illusive.
For years it has been argued that the greatest comparative
advantages of the U. S. were in capital goods and
22Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 25-26.

manufactured products.

The question arising today, however,

is to what extent the U. S. in fact may have a comparative
advantage in agricultural production.

However, due to the

many regulations and controls over farm production and
prices, it is difficult if not impossible to correctly
assess the situation.

That is, due to U. S. participation

in various commodity agreements (for example— the previously
described International Wheat Agreement) and domestic
regulatory policies, "true" output and price levels are
difficult to determine.

It can be stated, however, that

the sale has forced some relaxation of control over land
use and output levels (additional supplies are desired).
The deal thus may have "pushed" the IJ. S. more into an area
of comparative advantage with a resulting more efficient
use of world resources.
Several observations regarding the applicability of
game theory to the wheat sale and the credit arrangement
now appear in order.

The game(s) can under certain con

ditions be said to be "zero sum" (the losses of one equal
the gains of the other).

The players (Russia, the U. S.

government, and private traders) each gained (gave up) or
lost (gained) from the trading partner.

The export of

wheat from the U. S. equaled the imports received by
Russia, the price paid by Russia equaled the price received
by the U. S., the loss of possibly higher prices to U. S.
farmers equaled the saved cost to the Soviet Union, and the
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concessions in credit by the U. S. equaled those gained by
Russia.

Prom an alternative position, however, it can also .

be argued that the game(s) was (were) not zero sum.
Certainly the higher prices of wheat and wheat products in
the U. S. as a result of the deal were not "direct" gains
to the Soviet Union.

Nor can production, employment and

consumption effects be counted as equal losses or gains to
each party.

However, whether gains or losses are measured

by the deal itself (zero sum) or whether all the end
results of the exchange are included (non zero sum), game
theory can help reveal many interesting elements of the
transaction.

In the discussion to be taken up shortly, a

non zero sum assumption is made.
Similarly, the degree of ignorance on the part of
each trader can be questioned.

Neither side had much real

knowledge of the other's motives or expectations in either
"game."

This was especially true of U. S. farm interests

and partially true for Soviet dealers in the wheat sale
transaction in that "it is accurate to say that the even
tual size of the Soviet purchases caught everyone by
surprise, including the Russians themselves.

Technically

speaking, therefore, the strategies were not known in total
to all sides.

Under these circumstances, the game(s) can

be classified (depending on the above conditions of
^ Sale of Wheat to Russia. Hearings, p. 7.
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interpretation) as having complete or incomplete informa
tion and being zero or non-zero sum in payoff.
In the case where the U. S. government faced the .
Soviet government (state trader to state trader), it is
equally possible to argue that in an "opportunity" sense
the same was zero sum.
that gained.

Profit or prestige loss equaled

Moreover, each government could have con

ceivably (beforehand) calculated the various strategies
available to itself and its trading partner (complete
knowledge).

In turn, depending on the preferences and

desires of each country, the strategies would yield varying
amounts of utility.

As we saw earlier, such desires or

objectives were varied (for example— future expanded trade,
increased supplies of wheat, better international relations,
fear of third parties, and so on).

They were in fact,

blends of political and economic preferences.

Profit

maximization may or may not have been exclusively consider
ed.

Hence the resulting utility to each trader can only be

assumed to be at a certain level and of a cardinal scale,
for simplicity's sake.
Be that as it may, the crux of the game(s) for all
of the players lies in the ability of one party to exert
his influence over the other.

In other words, the power of

one party can be measured by the probability of getting a
certain strategy selected by the other player.

As pre

viously noted (see Chapter V), several power dimensions may

be identified ranging from the base of the power (resources,
assets, etc.) to the opportunity costs of refusing to an
action.

This point is especially significant in the case

of American farm interests.

Quite obviously the base,

means, scope and extension of their power was quite limited
relative to the "collective" interests of the Soviet
trading agency.

The same cannot be said when comparing the

U. S. with Russia over credit arrangements.

Power "dimen

sions" therefore were considerably greater for the Soviet
Union when dealing with the "individual" wheat exporters.
The "amount" of power in both deals, however,
depended on the difference of two probabilities.

In the

case of the American private exporters, it can be argued
that the Soviet Union*s power can be thought of in terms
of increased probabilities of securing certain actions
(the sale), conditioned by the costs borne by the wheat
dealers for refusing to be influenced.

Moreover, the

"strength" of such power can be phrased in terms of
utility lost to the exporters if they had refused to make
the sale (in this case lost revenue of over 1 billion
dollars).

This in turn can be related to the exporters'

disutility in performing the sale.

In this situation the

disutility was "perceived" as market prices rose and
dealers lamented "what could have been."

However, at the
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time of the sale such disutility was nearly zero.

2 if

In

algebraic terms, following the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi model
of Chapter V, p can be the increase in probabilities or
amount of Russia's power, u the utility gain to the ex
porters for acceding to the Russians, and x the disutility
to the wheat dealers for accepting the sale or A p £ H.
x
That is, the Soviet Union's power maximum was simply the
ratio of the exporters' gained utility to their disutility
from agreeing to the sale.

Under the described conditions,

it therefore appears that the exporters had little to lose,
much to gain, and the Soviets had correspondingly greater
power in its bargaining position.
In the case of the Soviet Union and the U. S.
government, such an assumed power position is somewhat more
complex.

That is, both parties had power over each other.
In reality, a “true" bilateral power situation pre

vailed in the agreement to trade and in the arrangements
over credit.

Under such conditions, there existed the

possibility of mixed strategies, rewards, sanctions and
retaliatory actions.
^Disutility could have arisen if the wheat could
have been sold in other markets at more favorable prices.
However, this was highly unlikely during the period of the
sale.
2^In the case of the U.S. exporters being motivated
by profit, it was assumed that the only power they had was
to refuse to sell— a highly unlikely assumption. As price
was set by previously described forces, much out of the
hands of the exporters, this was not considered a relative
power force either.
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More specifically, it was possible for both nations
to use mixed strategies— or change their strategies in
some chance fashion to insure a more favorable payoff.

In

addition, rewards could have been offered for the perform
ance of an act.

As noted, at the time of the deal,

negotiations were taking place over shipping problems, lend
lease debt and Viet Nam.

Additional possible rewards could

have included future markets, much needed sources of
supplies of certain critical items (for example— in the
case of the U. S.-oil), or political concessions.

Along

similar lines, sanctions and retaliatory actions could have
included the loss or reduction of such benefits.
In terms of the previously presented game theory
model, and if the previous assumptions are accepted, the
amount of Russia*s power over the United States would be
equal to one-half the difference between:

the rewards plus

the penalties given the U. S. by Russia, divided by the
disutility to the u. S. for agreeing to the sale; minus— the cost to the Soviet Union for imposing any damages,
minus the cost of any rewards given to the U. S., divided
by the gain in utility to Russia if the U. S. performs with
absolute certainty.

The greater the difference between the

two forces, the greater will be Soviet power.

26

2^It might be noted that the U. S. position can now
be considered to be a collective one. That is, it includes
not only direct gains (losses) to government but also gains
(losses) to its citizens.
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Symbolically the deal would appear as:
i /"rewards (U.S.) + Penalties (U.S.)
L.
disutility (U.S.)
Penalties Costs (U.S.S.R.) - Reward Costs (U.S.S.R. 27
Utility gains for certain performance (U.S.S.R.) __/*
Prom the preceding analysis of the various costs
and benefits (Section "The Costs and Benefits of the Deal"
of this chapter) that conceivably could apply to the deal,
the rewards, penalties and disutility to the U. S. "appear"
to have been larger than the penalty and reward costs and
utility gain (i.e., one probability utility gain) to the
28
Soviet Union.
If such was the case, the bargaining
position of the Soviet Union would have been greater and
actual deal closer to Russian desires.
Unfortunately, the game theory analysis, although
beneficial, suffers from a lack of concise and reliable
data.

This is, in part, due to the nature of the model

(utility is required) and in part caused by incomplete
information concerning the deal itself.

The entire system

has value, however, in its unique "view" of the grain deal
and its ability to reveal many facets incapable of strictly
economic analysis.
27por instance, rough numbers for the model could
appear as i / ^ + l _ (.7-.5)7
Of course, such numbers are

*L~ r ~
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*

not available— especially any gains or costs to the Soviet
Union.
In addition, for a more mechanical breakdown of the
workings of the model, see Chapter V.
28
See footnote 25 in Chapter V.

CHAPTER VII
STATE TRADING IN OIL— THE OPEC CASE
The wheat deal between the United States and the
Soviet Union is a good example of the increasing role that
governments are having in international trade.

Still

another is the subject of this chapter— the crucial role
that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) has come to play in determining world oil prices,
availabilities, and to some extent, the level and distri
bution of world income and output.
There can be little question that, of the many
economic problems facing the United States, the energy
crisis stands foremost.

A full production, full employment

economy with reasonable price stability is simply not
possible without adequate supplies of oil and petroleum
products.

As demonstrated by the Arab oil embargo of 1973-

7k> the U. S. is no longer in a position to ’'assume" that
such supplies will be automatically forthcoming.

But

growing oil imports, notwithstanding Mr. Nixon's "Project
Independence," continue to be a necessity.

Presently, the

United States produces approximately 76% of its petroleum
needs domestically.

(These data reflect pre-embargo
160
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conditions.)

By 1980, according to an Oil Import Control

authority, oil consumption will total 18 million barrels a
day, of which 10 million will be from domestic sources.

As

a result, nearly half of American oil needs will have to be
met by imports.

And these imports must come primarily from

areas of known oil reserves, i. e., the Middle East.1

A

study of U. S. petroleum sources is 'therefore to a very
considerable extent, a study of the OPEC— THE state trader
of oil.2
The OPEC— Its Origin and Development
The history of the OPEC is, in a large part, the
recent history of the Middle East.

That is, many of the

factors that affected the development of Middle Eastern
countries also influenced (both favorably and unfavorably),
the OPEC.

A complete history of the area would be too

immense for this paper’s purposes, due to the mass and
complexity of political, economic, and religious factors
involved.

Hence, although all of these influences are

important, only those of a "critical" nature to OPEC are
considered below.
1United States Congress, U. S. Interests in and
Policy Toward the Persian Gulf. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near feast of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, Second
Session, February 2, June 7, August 8 and 15. 1972 (Washing
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972;, p. 14-0.
2The term "state trader" applies to OPEC as all oil
is owned by each respective state.
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The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Nations had
its "official" beginning in Baghdad in September, 1960.^
However, its seeds had been planted many years earlier in
various arrangements and agreements created by major oil
producing companies.

And just as labor unions found

strength through collective action, the OPEC nations sought
similar power by banding together.^

Venezuela has been

credited with the initial role because of its early contacts
( 19JLf8—lf9) with "Eastern" oil exporters.

However, it was not

until 1959» at the first Arabian Congress in Cairo, that oil
became an acceptable topic on the agenda of the Congress.
Basically, the exporting countries were seeking a common
policy or attitude toward the united front of petroleum
companies.

Although no positive action was taken in the

initial meetings, all members of the "to be" OPEC were
brought together, notwithstanding their diverse backgrounds.
Included were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela.^
At this point it might be beneficial to examine
briefly the oil-purchasing companies and their role in the
•^John Maffre, "Administration Searching for Methods
to Aid U. S. Oil Interests in Bargaining With OPEC,"
National Journal. IV (May 13, 1972), 810.
^Collective strength (or countervailing power) is,
of course, only one of many possible reasons for the develop
ment of labor unions.
^Charles A. Heller, "Ten Years of OPEC," World
Petroleum. XVI (November, 1970), *t6.

creation of the OPEC.

Basically, seven major oil producers

(referred to as the "Seven Sisters") had been investing for
many years in the Middle East.^

Due to many price wars,

however, these companies had reached agreement (as early as

1929) on an elaborate system of quotas and posted prices.
This system remained in force through World War II but
began to shov; signs of cracking under the rising tide of
nationalism in the early 1950's.

By the late fifties, a

market generally characterized by excess demand for oil
products had created a new rivalry between these producers
and some new independent manufacturers.

The producing

countries, hov/ever, many with their income primarily depen
dent on oil royalties, began to sense the possibility of
losing revenues.

This suspicion was confirmed in 1960 when

the "Seven Sisters" announced— v/ithout consulting the oil
producing countries— a price reduction of 2 to 5.5 per cent.
As a result, the Middle Eastern countries lost, in i960
alone, $93 million in royalties.^
Thus the stage was set— the final provocative act
had been committed.

The resulting coalition of the five

charter members of OPEC took place within 50 days after the
price reduction.

Although other events such as the Suez

c

The companies were: Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, Royal Dutch, Shell Group, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, and British Petroleum.
^Maffre, loc. cit., pp. 810-812.
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Canal crisis in 1957-58, growing nationalistic feelings,
and so forth also conditioned the OPEC’s formation, the
"one-sidedness" of power in the hands of the producing
companies appears to have been the galvanizing force stimu
lating a countervailing power.

Today, however, that power

is anything but one-sided.
Recent OPEC Activities
From its inception, the organization was plagued by
many difficulties.

As previously noted, the members have
O
power struggles among themselves.
Arab unity, in partic

ular, has been extremely fragile, since the Arab political
spectrum runs from radical or revolutionary regimes such as
Libya to such traditional, conservative, and stable
Q
governments as those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
In truth,
OPEC’s unity comes only from a common dependence on oil
revenues— a single but cohesive force.
However, over the years the organization’s power
(and membership) has been steadily growing, accompanied by
a firming-up of its objectives.
are three-fold:

Basically, these objectives

(1) the achievement of price stability for

petroleum in world markets; (2) increased revenue and
O
Marwan Iskandar, MOPEC in Less Than Unanmity,"
World Petroleum. XLII (December, 1 9 7 0 , 30-31.
Q
^Iran, a non-Arab country, is politically similar
to Saudi Arabia.

returns to member countries; and (3) the establishment of a
common oil policy toward the oil companies.1^

For several

years these goals were generally unfulfilled except for
rather minor successes in preventing further posted price
reductions and in securing slightly better tax rates on the
oil producers.

But in 1967 the "paper tiger" began to

reveal its potential strength.

As the Arab-Israeli dispute

deepened, the Arab members of the organization threatened
to cut off oil supplies to Western countries if any assis
tance was given Israel.

With the coming of the "six day

war," the threat was kept.

However, due to available

supplies from other sources and some previous customer
stockpiling, the effect was small, and the embargo ended
some two months later.

The OPEC had flexed its muscles

although they were not quite fully developed.
Out of failure, though, can come a new, "harder
line" approach.

Unsuccessful in cutting off supplies by

embargoes, the OPEC began to focus attention on a much
broader method of control— that of participation.

11

In a

declaratory statement of petroleum policy at its sixteenth
conference in June 1968, the OPEC announced as their
10Heller, op. cit.. p. 50.
^Michael Field, "Oil: OPEC and Participation,"
The World Today, January, 1972, p. 5-7.
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ultimate goal "complete” control over the oil industry.

12

Furthermore, the declaration stated their view that each
country had permanent sovereignty over its own natural
resources.

To achieve the control objective, the following

principles were to apply:

(1) the government would super

vise foreign capital investments, (2) the government would
regulate the operation of foreign contractors, (3) explora
tion and development of petroleum would be in government
hands, (if) renewal provisions would be included in operating
contracts at pre-determined dates, (5) renewal provisions
would guarantee future government participation, (6) the
government's assessment of the operator's income, taxes, and
payments to the state would be based on negotiated agree
ments with consideration given to the prices of manufactured
goods traded internationally, (7) excess profit earnings
would be open to renegotiation, (8) there would be
established in each member country a "petroleum policy"
providing for training domestic workers, for participation
in the setting of royalty rates, tax rates, and so forth
and (9) disputes would be handled by national courts.1-^
In sum, a "New Petroleum Deal" was created in 1968
which acted as a reference base for future actions by the
12

In the shorter run, however, the OPEC countries
demanded and were granted concessions that led to the treat
ment of royalties as part of operating expenses along with
a reduction of marketing discounts.
^ Ibid.. p. 5Zf.
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OPEC members.

Quite obviously, not all of the objectives

have been fulfilled, but they have served (in part, at
least) as the bases for present and "new" radical demands.
For instance, in 1971 in Tehran and Tripoli, 23 oil com
panies, including the Seven Sisters, bargained "collectively"
with the (then) seven OPEC members.

(Ironically, the

governments of Britain, France, and the United States had
granted antitrust privileges to the oil. companies, allowing
them to negotiate as a group.

The U. S. delegation,

according to a Justice Department decision, would not be
breaking any antitrust laws.

Like trucking companies

bargaining with the Teamsters, the oil companies could thus
offer a united front— and legally so.)1**
During the actual negotiations, the threat of an
embargo was potentially much more dangerous in 1971 than
it had been earlier because of changing market conditions.
The OPEC countries, taking advantage of their position,
demanded $15 billion in additional taxes from the companies
(over 5 years) for the privilege of having "business as
usual."

Their demands were met, along with an additional

$700 million six months later following the devaluation of
the dollar.1^
1if"Is a Cartel Next for Oilmen?" Business Week
January 23, 1971, p. **6-47.
^J o h n Maffre, op. cit.. p. S H . The $700 million
was demanded to compensate for the drop in the value of the
dollar . . . the basic unit of payment by the oil companies.
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OPEC Participation.

Added revenues are important

gains, of course, but the central, dominant goal of the OPEC
today remains participation.

Just as labor unions first

sought membership before greater economic benefits, the OPEC
nations in their first ten years sought economic benefits
and now sire pursuing control.
of today and tomorrow.

Participation is the question

As pointed out by Nadim Pachachi,

Secretary General of OPEC:
Over the last twenty years circumstances have
changed, and nowhere do governments accept the role
of sleeping partner. They want to have a direct
role in the management and exploration of national
oil resources, so as to get knowhow, and to develop
national expertise in the production and marketing
of oil.16
The degree and type of participation, however,
varies from country to country.

Ultimately, the OPEC mem

bers would like to control outlets in comsumer countries—
the so-called "downstream ventures."

Of course, the

companies' role as middleman would then be eliminated.

The

benefits would presumably be substantial, but the capital
costs would be extremely high— perhaps too high relative to
current income.

A more moderate short term goal has been

the control of production "within" the host nation— the
"upstream" end of the industry.
^Michael Field. "Oil: OPEC and Participation,"
The World Today. XVIII (January, 1972), 6-7.
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Given the desire for participation— which most oil
companies feel is inevitable— two types of participation
are possible.

First, the OPEC members might opt for equity

shareholding, or secondly, the more active "joint venture"
approach.

The latter currently appears to be the most

desired option.

However, there appears to be little agree

ment among either the oil companies or the OPEC members
regarding compensation for the investments.

As pointed out

in a report on an OPEC session, for example:
Three different positions emerged: Abu Dhabi,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia favored
a 20 per cent shareholding in operating companies,
Libya, supported by Algeria and following in its
pattern called for either a 51 per cent participa
tion or nationalization. Indonesia, Nigeria and
Venezuela did not actively seek to support either
position because of their own particular circum
stances . . . .17
Similarly, the oil companies themselves have been
unable to reach agreement on a common "acceptance policy"
for participation.

Some companies would like to hold out

as long as possible, but not so long as to precipitate
nationalization.

Other firms, taking a somewhat more

dynamic view, would prefer to anticipate the changing
nature of oil agreements and perhaps secure better compen
sation thereby.
17

In general, U. S. companies seem to have

'Marwan Iskandor, op. cit.. p. 30.
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adopted the first position, while European firms have been
18
more willing to modify existing arrangements.
Further complicating the matter is disagreement
among all parties as to the value of compensation once the
question of the form of participation has been settled.
Basically, the OPEC members would prefer to use the book
value of the operator’s assets— including such items as
plants, pipelines, etc.— at cost price minus depreciation.
On the other hand, the companies want a procedure that
would allow for the covering of lost anticipated profits.
And the discrepancies between the two positions would
appear to be enormous.
The OPEC Lesson
In the relatively short period of its existence, it
is quite apparent that the OPEC has become a very formidable
state trader.

Moreover, its existence and development

offer some useful insights into the complex nature of state
trading itself, and cast light on both past trends and
future possibilities.
It is quite apparent that, so far, only the "tip of
the iceberg" has been revealed by OPEC activities.

The

U. S., like most other industrialized coutries, will
18

United States Congress, The United States and the
Persian Gulf. Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, September 29, 1972 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 4.
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doubtless find itself confronted with growing demands by
the OPEC members.

Because of the essential and strategic

nature of petroleum, the U. S.— whether willing or
unwilling— will be forced to expand its relations with OPEC.
As Table 5 shows, the United States controls only a small
fraction of total known oil reserves.

The largest source-

greater than all others combined— is the Arab Middle East
and North Africa.

And in the short run, oil demand appears

to be quite inelastic, given the paucity of available sub
stitutes.

Under these conditions, it is anything but a

buyer's market.

Most of the "iceberg," therefore, is the

chronic need of the industrial countries for OPEC oil.
Another part of the OPEC problem is monetary.

As

Table 6 points out, the revenues which are expected to
accrue to the Middle Eastern members of the OPEC alone are
enormous.

From an estimated $6 billion in funds in 1973,

the Middle East's receipts should rise to approximately
$36 billion annually by 1980.

And these estimates are

based on mid-1973 values for oil, not on the more recently
inflated figures.

As far as the U. S. balance of payments

is concerned, it was estimated before the oil embargo that

$17 to $20 billion annually would be paid for oil imports
(from all sources) by 1980 and $30 billion by 1985, and
1Q
this, too, was based on mid-1973 oil prices. y
~

«Q

7U. S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian
Gulf, p. 5:^
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TABLE 5
WORLDWIDE 'PUBLISHED PROVED' OIL RESERVES

Country

Barrels
(Billions)

Share of
Total io

United States
Canada
Caribbean
Other Western Hemisphere

1+5.1+
10.2
17.1
lU.5

6.8
1.5
2.8
2.3

87.2

13.1+

lU.8
58.9
366.8
98.5
15.6

2.3
8.9
57.6
15.1+
2.1+

55^.6

86.6

6U1.8

100.0

Total Western Hemisphere

Western Europe
Africa
Middle East
U.S.S.R., East Europe and China
Other Eastern Hemisphere
Total Eastern Hemisphere

World

Source: Robert E. Hunter, The Energy Crisis and U. S. Foreign Policy,
Headline Series, No. 216 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1973)> p. 27.

TABLE 6
ESTIMATES OF MIDDLE EAST OIL PRODUCTION AND REVENUES
(Production stated in thousands of barrels per day,
and revenue in billions of dollars per year)
1970
Annual
production

Annual
revenue

Annual
production

Annual
revenue

Annual
production

Annual
revenue

3,848
3,798
2,989
1,558

7,300
8,500
3,500
1,900
2,300

857

1.1
1.2
.9
.5
.2
.3

1,8 0 0

4.3
5.2
2.0
1.2
1.4
1.0

8,900
14,000
4,000
3,000
3,500
2,000

12.2
3.5
2.8
3.1
1.8

13,741

4.2

25,300

15.1

35,400

31.3

3,321
900

1.3
.4

2,200
1,200

2.0
1.1

2,000
1,500

2.6
1.9

Subtotal

4,311

1.7

3,400

3.1

3,500

4.5

Total

18,952

5.9

28,700

1 8 .2

38,900

35.8

Middle East:
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Iraq
Abu Dhabi
Other Persian Gulf States
Subtotal
North Africa:
Libya
Algeria

SOURCE:

1980

1975

691

7 .9

United States Congress, The United States and the Persian Gulf, Report of the Subcommittee on the
Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, September 29, 1972
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 5«

-0
U)
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The impact of this enormous revenue exchange will
be critical for all concerned parties.

For the United

States, which presently has a favorable trade balance with
the Middle East, the increase should be easier to swallow
than for Western Europe and Japan, whose dependence on OPEC
oil approaches 100% in some causes.

Also, the U. S.’s trade

balance with the OPEC countries may be helped as the
development process raises their incomes and, hopefully,
their future purchases from the United States.

However,

these improvements may seem somewhat insignificant com paired
to the $10 billion (in 1980) or $15 billion (in 1985) that
20
oil imports from the Middle East are expected to cost.
Moreover the returns on U. S. investments (presently
approximately $1.5 billion annually) will probably decline
as Middle East "interests" replace Western "interests" in
the ownership of oil producing facilities.
.To the Persian Gulf States, these funds must seem
like manna from heaven.

Though

relatively underdeveloped

at present, these countries can employ enormous amounts to
development, raise consumption, and provide for increased
social welfare benefits.

But on the negative side (from

the U. S. point of view), these balances will give the OPEC
states unique and sudden abundance of hard foreign exchange.
20

The $10 and $15 billion figures are derived from
estimates that one-half of U. S. oil will come from the
Persian Gulf by 1980-85.
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Much of this will be held in the form of American dollars,
and thus pose a potential threat to stable exchange rates
and money markets around the world.

In fact, these

countries could become primary sources of international
investment funds, and may even become the homes of major
international financial centers.

(Beirut, though

not in a

major petroleum producing country, has already become a
financial force to be reckoned with in the Middle East.)
As this occurs, the U. S. may expect new impacts upon its
balance of payments, its monetary policy, its aid policy,
and its general bargaining position in the world.
In light of the above features, it is now possible
to cast the bargaining positions (game theory) of the OPEC
and the purchasing companies.

First, it is necessary to

know something about the players.

Actually, their makeup

and characteristics have been changing and appear to still
be seeking permanent forms.

Originally, for example, the

OPEC numbered five but has grown to eleven over the years
through a method which allows degrees of membership.

The

degrees range from full charter membership to "new" full
membership to "associate" membership.

21

Under this arrange

ment, the OPEC may expand and allow other countries to join
the organization (by degree) and thereby increase the
21Ruad Rouhaui, A History of OPEC, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 7.

effective collective strength of the group.

In fact,

potential members need not be substantial exporters of oil,
but only share the same common interests and beliefs of the
OPEC nations.

Similarly, the oil companies themselves have

been taking on various changing forms.

In the original

negotiations with OPEC, the companies bargained somewhat
independently, but as noted earlier, they have been allowed
by their respective national governments to combine their
forces into one united front.

It can therefore, be argued

that the producers are in effect one buyer.

Given the one

seller— the OPEC— and one buying oil company group, a
reasonable approximation of bilateral monopoly can be said
to exist.

In this situation, a state trader (the OPEC)

confronts a private trading bloc (the oil companies).

2?

It is interesting to note, however, that these conditions
are not necessarily permanent, since additional assistance
may be given either side if conditions warrant such inter
ference.

For example, U. S. government intervention may

take place on behalf of American oil interests in the case
of possible nationalization.
22

Or the OPEC countries could

It must be pointed out that the term "private
trading bloc" is more applicable to U. S. interests than
that of all companies. U. S. firms are private organiza
tions but not all importing organizations are. In addition,
the United States is one of the few that recognizes private
ownership of petroleum (or mineral rights). Most govern
ments claim ownership of oil beneath the ground.
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conceivably ask for Russian assistance if armed intervention
on the part of Western powers appeared likely.
As to the actual bargaining itself, Herbert Hansen,
Vice President for government agreements of Gulf Oil
Corporation, perhaps best summarizes the problem:
Negotiating with OPEC can be a mysterious
process which has been likened to the mating of
elephants. Everything takes place at a very
high level, in clouds of dust, and it is several
years before you can see the results. ^3
In other words, OPEC negotiations, like many other
state trading arrangements, are subject to a high degree of
vagueness and secrecy.

As in the case of the Soviet wheat

deal, much is still unknown (or unavailable) concerning the
arrangements.

However, a game theory approach can be

helpful in isolating some variables relevant to the nego
tiations.
First, it may be recalled that each player may
select various strategies, depending on his interpretation
of the

events.

For each party, each strategy

unique value orworth (utility).

has its ov/n

The actual payoff, of

course, depends on the opposing strategy employed by the
other player.

For example, the OPEC nations may employ a

particular strategy while the oil companies do likewise.
The payoff from these two strategies (whether zero-sum or

23

-OJ. S.
Gulf. Hearings,

Interests in andPolicy Toward
op. cit..p. 37.

the Persian
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non-zero sum) depends partly on chance or luck, and partly
on the respective power position of the traders.
has been previously stated.

This much

But what are some of the

possible "elements1' within each party's strategies?
On the side of the OPEC, the group's overall
strategies are very much affected by the very disparity in
the sub-goals of the different members which were referred
to earlier.

The formal objectives of the OPEC are gener

ally accepted by all members, of course, but the degree of
importance attached to each goal doubtless varies for each
country.

Hence, the overall OPEC stance will depend in

part on which political (or economic) faction dominates the
organization.
In the earlier years of the OPEC, a fairly mild
attitude prevailed with the elements of its strategies con
sisting mainly of increased royalties and maintenance of
posted prices.

As the organization developed both in

numbers and potential power, its desires became more
extreme.

Assuming that the more radical "factions" (like

Libya and Algeria) dominate, the elements within their
strategies would probably consist of much higher royalty
rates, increased nationalization efforts, greater down
stream participation, higher crude prices, and greater
political use of oil "power."

Elements within other

strategies would be similar but perhaps lesser in degree—
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for example, a 20% participation rate rather than national
ization.2^
Recent events tend to indicate that the more
extreme position is in fact coming to dominate the policies
of the OPEC.

During the recent renewal of fighting between

Israel and several Arab countries, for example, the threat
of an oil embargo against the U. S. for supporting Israel
was made and carried out.

In addition, Libya nationalized

the holdings of two U. S. oil companies on the grounds of
"Israeli agression."

More directly, the OPEC itself, had

actually taken unilateral action in doubling posted prices
twice.

These actions were taken even though the 1971

Tehran agreement was supposed to last 5 years!
With the above influencing factors present, and
with use of the previously described game theory model, the
OPEC nations' power derives from its ability to secure
desired action from the oil companies.

The rewards to the

oil companies basically take the form of continued supplies
of crude oil at negotiated prices.

Additional rewards

could stem from better relationships with Middle Eastern
countries (precluding or diminishing the need for greater
dependence on Russia or for finding added oil elsewhere)
2i+The elements within the oil buyers' strategies
would also vary in degree, depending on the "weighted"
influences and desires of the concerned companies. As
previously noted, the U. S. has taken a firmer stance than
European interests on such issues as nationalization,
participation, prices, etc.
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and from participation rather than nationalization of
company oil interests.

The cost of these "rewards" to the

OPEC can be measured by the difference between whatever
revenues are secured from a mutual agreement and those
financial gains which could be had from a stronger degree
of participation and/or nationalization.
The penalties to the companies similarly, could
include and OPEC refusal to supply oil, worsened relation
ships, and/or complete nationalization.

In degree, all of

these have already been imposed against the oil companies.
In the last major negotiation arranged in Tehran and
Tripoli in 1971, the five year agreement was reached after
the threat of an embargo.

This penalty move cost the

companies some $15 billion in revenue over the life of the
contract.

Nationalization also has been used as a penalty,

but for somewhat different reasons.

In addition to the

aforementioned October, 1973 takeover, Col. Muammar Raddafi
of Libya had earlier on June 11, 1973, nationalized the
Hunt Oil Company in what was termed a prelude to a wide25
spread showdown. ^

The takeover in this case was not a

direct OPEC act, but the state and OPEC for most practical
purposes are inseparable.

Libya, along with other Arab

countries, was pressing for further participation at the
^ " S l a p in the Face by Libya— Why," U. S. News and
World Report. June 25, 1973, p. 72.
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time.

In addition, the penalty was imposed directly

against American oil interests in retaliation for American
support of Israel.
On the buying side, the oil companies have also
taken on changing forms.

Their obtaining of official

governmental approval for cartel behavior certainly served
to increase their power position.

Also, the companies can

count to some extent on "backlash" against the OPEC by
non-OPEC countries.

The 1973-7^ embargo, for example,

seems to have hurt fuel-using underdeveloped countries more
than it has the developed countries.

The world-wide price

rise for petroleum has also boosted oil company profits,
stimulated more oil production by non-members and added
exploration outside OPEC territories, and set energy users
to exploring other sources of power, particularly coal.
These, over the long run, clearly strengthen the companies'
bargaining position.
However, due to the (shortrun) crucial nature of
petroleum products, it is not too likely that the oil
companies (and the consuming countries they serve) will be
able to impose any real sanctions against the OPEC nations.
These sanctions might include the refusal to buy oil,
attempting to lower posted prices or reduced royalties and
taxes, or the reduction of trade and aid; but none seem
feasible in the face of growing world oil needs and the
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OPEC's swiftly improving financial position.

The afore

mentioned sanctions against the oil companies (embargoes,
higher prices, and so forth) therefore appear to be more
likely to prevail in practice.
Giving consideration to the various rewards and
penalties, then, the amount of OPEC's power over the oil
•

companies would be equal to one-half the difference between:
the rewards plus the penalties given the oil companies by
OPEC, divided by the disutility to the oil companies for
agreeing to the OPEC's terms; minus . . . the cost to the
OPEC for imposing any damages, minus the cost of any rewards
given to the oil companies, divided by the gain in utility
to the OPEC if the companies perform with absolute cer
tainty.

The greater the difference between the two forces,

the greater

will be the OPEC's power.

Symbolically, the

deal would appear as:
£ / A w a r d s (companies) + Penalties (companies)
L .
Disutility (companies)
Penalties Costs (OPEC) - Reward Costs (OPEC)
Utility gains for certain performances (OPEC)
Under the described conditions, the rewards,
penalties, and disutility to the oil companies (and the
concerned nations) appear to be larger than the penalty and
reward costs and utility gain to the OPEC.

If this is
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correct, the bargaining strength and position of OPEC would
be greater than that of the oil companies.

26

Given this disadvantageous power position for the
oil companies and the consuming interests they represent,
some have given consideration to the development of a new
countervailing power— OPIC.

An Organization of Petroleum

Importing Countries has been proposed as a possible
equalizing factor to offset OPEC's position.

In fact, this

step was partially taken when the Justice Department
allowed "cartel11 bargaining by American firms.

It may be

noted, however, that the domestic interests of American
companies are basically similar, so this step was a
relatively easy one.

But the needs and desires of European

oil companies are far from being "basically similar" to
those of their American counterparts.

In light of Europe's

dependence on Middle Eastern oil, it seems highly unlikely
that in the near future such am international OPIC alliance
would be possible.

This, coupled with official European

"neutrality" in the Israeli-Arab conflict, appears to leave
the OPEC relatively unchallenged.
The OPEC case thus helps to point out the crucial
nature and significance of state trading.
26

Quite obviously,

In this situation, the power for the seller
appears to be greater. In the Soviet wheat deal, greater
power appeared to have been in the hands of the purchaser.
Also see footnote 25, Chapter V.
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the commodity in question (petroleum) is very essential;
other goods exchanged by state traders are not always as
important.

However, that in itself suggests that the

potentials of government commerce are virtually boundless.
Practically any good (or service) can be state traded.
Failure to recognize this may put the United States (or
any country) in an undesirable position with respect to
foreign and domestic policy.

The OPEC lesson is clear;

state trading can offer both advantages and disadvantages
to the v/orld.

Either way, it gives every appearance of

fostering a true revolution in world trade and investment.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As noted at the beginning, the purpose of this
study has been to explore and analytically examine the
economic and non-economic nature of governmental trade.
The need for such a study has become apparent.

Although

information has been available concerning certain aspects
of state trading, little has been done in analyzing the
economic purpose, significance, and "indeterminancy" of
such exchange.

In addition, "game theory" has not been

previously applied to the unique situations found within
government commerce.
As a result of this inquiry, some new insights
into the state trading process have hopefully been devel
oped.

Briefly, government trading was defined as inter

national commerce between national governments or their
agents.

Although state trading dates back at least as far

as the Middle Ages, it was sporadic and poorly developed
in that period.

However, as market economies appeared, new

avenues of expansion were made available.

Especially in

the Mercantile period, governments grew in statute and
power, with state trading flourishing with the successes
185
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of the trading monopolies created by many European govern
ments .
Ironically, although economic liberalism ushered
*
in the Industrial Revolution and eventually socialA®® and
"total" state trading in some parts of the world, its
atmosphere of "free thinking" first led in the direction of
lalssez faire.

Especially in the Classical period, there

was increased pressure for change in the direction of a
"hands off" policy of limited regulation and control.

The

concept of ".self interest and the public good" reduced the
need for government intervention, creating a climate in
which state trading stagnated and all but disappeared.
It thus appears that one of the first character
istics of state trading was its fluctuating pattern.
trait, once established, has never ceased.

This

As further

evidence, after the Classical era, governmental commerce
was again rekindled under the aegis of Socialism.

Social

istic writings generally advocated that economies be
"planned" rather than market-oriented.

Of course, the role

of the state in all affairs was more extensive under
socialism than under previous economic systems.
By the turn of the twentieth century, countries
such as the United States, Prance, and Russia had estab
lished world-wide government trading missions.

These

beginnings, although sporadic and piecemeal, grew and be
came more permanent with the need for strategic supplies

during World War I.

However, after the War, the U. S.

returned its emphasis to more private channels of exchange,
while Russia, Prance, and some Par East nations continued
to develop and expand their methods of government commerce.
By the decade of the thirties, the Soviet Union offered
such a strong example that many nations, facing growing
trade barriers abroad and unemployment at home, eagerly
adopted state trading practices to ease their difficulties.
And with the 1939 outbreak of hostilities in Europe, new
trade alignments were made (including trade agreements be
tween Russia and the United States).

These practices were

broadened and continued into the late forties.
In more recent years the Spread of state trading
has continued.

During, the 1950's, Prance and Britain,

along with "many Par Eastern countries, negotiated govern
ment contracts for the securing of essential agricultural
commodities.

Similarly, the Soviet Union continued to

expand its form of government trade while extending its
influence into the bordering nations of Eastern Europe with
the "adoption" of satellite countries.
Ironically, during this same period the United
States again reversed its generally market-oriented policy
and laid the foundation for the resurgent development of
its own special brand of state trading.

With the enactment

of Public Law 4-80, today's Pood-for-Peace program, the
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disposal of government-owned agricultural surpluses
accelerated.
for:

In addition, the program has become a tool

(1) the encouragement of economic development abroad,

(2) the expansion of American markets, and (3) more general
U. S. foreign policy goals.

However, in the early

seventies the volume exchanged under the program declined
slightly, although recent grain and oil contracts (1972-73)
with the Soviet Union and China indicate renewed interest
for expansion in these areas.

Prom peak to trough, the

cyclical pattern appears to be firmly established.
The goals and consequences of state trading, like
the history of government exchange, have also been subject
to variation in light of the conditions of the times.
There has been a myriad of motivating forces for government
trading.

In some instances single goals have been subro

gated to multiple combinations or blends.

They include the

following, either singularly or in combination:

(1) secur

ing regular flows of goods at favorable or stable prices,
(2) maintenance of stable production, (3) disposition of
surplus commodities, (4) ensurance of adequate supplies via
bulk purchase contracts, (5) assistance to government aid
and development programs, (6) raising revenues, (7) regula
tion of health and sanitary conditions, (8) securing of
barter deals, (9) rationing of foreign exchange, (10) the
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practicing of price discrimination, and (11) the facili
tation of trade with centrally planned economies.
Though the motivations may be quite specific, the
broad economic consequences of state trading are most use
fully grouped according to whether the goods are traded
below, at, or above market prices.

In the case of commodi

ties sold above domestic .prices the effect is basically the
same as a tax on exports under a regime of private trade.
Foreign consumption tends to be restricted, while importcompeting industries are stimulated.

Similarly, domestic

consumption in the selling nation may be stimulated by in
creased local supplies resulting from lost overseas
markets.

Overall, domestic production may be reduced,

since efficient production is displaced by less efficient.
Under certain conditions it may also appear
desirable to the state trader to import commodities below
foreign prices.

In this case the effects are similar to

that of a tariff on imports equal to the difference between
foreign and domestic prices.

If the reduced imports

increase supplies abroad (as seems likely), foreign con
sumption would likely be increased and foreign production
restricted.

Similarly, domestic consumption would be

reduced, assuming prices rise with reduced supplies of the
imported good.

This in turn may stimulate domestic

production in import-competing industries.

In addition,
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as in the previous case, the "terms of trade" effect
depends on the bargaining strengths of the respective
nations.

That is, the attempted buying of imports below

domestic prices may induce the exporting nation to sell at
lower prices to maintain sales and revenue.

If the state

trader is large and is a dominant buyer of the commodity
in question, the exporting country's terms of trade can
worsen.

Conversely, the government trader's terms may

improve.
In some situations the state trader may take the
position of an exporter selling commodities below domestic
price levels.

The economic effects are similar to those

of subsidies in private trade with the degree of impact
being determined by the divergence between world and domes
tic prices.

Overtrading could result, rather than the

previous case of undertrading.

That is, increased domestic

production and increased foreign consumption can take place
while decreased foreign production and restricted domestic
consumption can occur.
As a last alternative the state trader occasionally
may import goods above world market prices.

The effect is

again similar to that of a subsidy to private trade (but to
a foreign producer) with similar production and consumption
distortions.

In sum, the effects are:

(1) decreased

foreign consumption; (2) decreased domestic production in
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import-competing industries; (3) increased domestic con
sumption; and (*0 increased foreign production.
In total, the alternatives clearly demonstrate the
ability of the state trader to influence not only the
conditions of its own exchange but also international
prices, market conditions, and resource usages.

Of course,

the selection of one alternative over another depends on
the motives and objectives of the traders.

Additionally,

price discrimination becomes a distinct possibility.

It

may arise because of increased monetary profits stemming
from different demand conditions or because other non
economic objectives may be sought which result in price
discrimination (for economic gain or even possible loss).
Over the longer run, such pricing policies may
either induce or hinder movement of factors of production.
The normally assumed tendency of factor prices to equalize
between trading nations can be severely dampened, or may be
hastened.

Moreover, when trade occurs between market and

non-market nations (or non-market to non-market), price
variations do not necessarily induce changes in factor use
or factor prices in the non-market countries.

In such

countries, the use of factors (and their prices) is usually
determined by the priorities of national plans rather than
by market conditions.
The analysis of these trading practices and the
consequences thereof made it evident that traditional
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theories based on comparative costs were insufficient for
explaining which goods would be exchanged and at what price
(or terms of trade) under state trading.

As pointed out

earlier, government trade developed from a variety of
motives, and the comparative cost doctrine is simply not
broad enough to explain all possible cases.
Basically, comparative cost theories have been
attempts to explain the behavior of market-oriented
economies.

Under free trade conditions, each country tends

to specialize in the production of those commodities whose
production costs are relatively lower and import those
items in which domestic producers have a comparative cost
disadvantage.

The motive behind trade is one of profit

(with some possible restraints).

However, as noted many

times, state trading may be motivated by considerations
other than economic.

Moreover, even if trade is conducted

for strictly economic purposes, the direction and pattern
of exchange may be completely opposite to what comparative
costs would dictate.

For example, in the non-market case

so amply portrayed by the Soviet Union (and other communist
bloc nations) trade has followed directions that in many
instances have not been according to comparative advantage.
In these countries much of their trade has been viewed as
a political and "plan fulfilling" phenomenon.
Similarly, market economies that practice state
trading do not necessarily follow commercial principles of
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exchange.

This situation is typical of many South Ameri

can, African, and Par Eastern nations.

Being relatively

underdeveloped, they have turned to trade in order to
achieve more sophistication in their economies and to foster
industries that would not ordinarily appear without inter
vention.

This interference has been in the form of subsi

dies to the industries to be prompted, or in the form of
(or coupled with) state-trading practices.
However, perhaps of greater significance was the
realization that many advanced countries also state trade
along lines not necessarily consistent with comparative
advantage.

The U. S., for instance, promotes the produc

tion of agricultural commodities through its various
assistance programs to farmers.

Surpluses have often

resulted which have been purchased by the government and
later sold internationally.

The essential fact, of course,

is that the government trader has indirectly encouraged
domestic production which may or may not be in line with
the long-term comparative advantage of the United States.
More generally, the state trader may alter supplies
by creating conditions which induce or hinder the creation
of traded goods.

Without reviewing all the presented cases,

it was noted that domestic production was stimulated when
overtrading was practiced and hindered with undertrading.
Conversely, the reverse was true for the trading partners.
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It is, therefore, possible that production may be directed
to areas which may not reflect relative efficiency or
productive competence.
On the demand side, traditional theories were also
found less than fully capable of explaining the prices,
direction, and volume of state trade.

Demand, reflected by

offer curves, may be expressed in terms of the willingness
of one nation to exchange a certain bundle of goods against
the export bundle of another country.

If the curves are

constructed so as to incorporate political as well as
economic preferences, the outer limits to trade (price
lines) could reveal an enlarged bargaining zone subject to
influence by the economic and political power of the con
cerned parties.

It is, therefore, evident that the state

trader does not necessarily conform to trading patterns
traditionally explained by comparative cost doctrines.
This is especially true within non-market countries and in
market economies where non-economic considerations dominate
exchange policies.

Even when traditional theory is modi

fied, it is not completely satisfactory for all the pos
sible situations that can arise.

Under either barter

conditions or the more normal money-based transactions,
various limits are established wherein exchange can occur.
However, the power positions of the respective nations can
dominate the outcome, overwhelming economic considerations.
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State trading, therefore, does not always lead to
nice, neat determinate solutions.

Prices (the terms of

trade) and the direction of traded commodities may not be
able to be rationalized by traditional theory.

Past work

by Edgeworth and others has provided possible solutions to
the bilateral monopoly problem.

However, these approaches

are fraught with many difficulties.

The game theory

approach of Von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced in the
early 19^0*s proved more beneficial.
Game theory utilizes formal models in the analysis
of decision making within the realm of conflict.

It

generally deals with problems involving opposition between
one or more parties, with cooperation also possible.

The

motivation for participation may be economic, political,
psychological, or any other force behind human endeavors—
including those found within state trading.
In those cases analyzed within this study, however,
certain restrictions or assumptions were made.

Of course,

this is true of all models where pre-set rules are
required.

In the presented case of a zero sum game, each

side was assigned a value for each possible move or
strategy.

The exporter and importer then had to choose a

strategy which ensured that over the length of the game,
each player's losses would be confined to a minimum.

Two

possibilities were discussed, games with saddle points and
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those without saddle points.
played a decisive role.

In both situations probability

Probabilities, however, are

partially determined by relative power positions.
In considering the impact of power in state trading,
several dimensions were identified.

These included:

(1) the base of power, (2) the means of power, (3) the
scope of power, (^) the opportunity cost of power to both
players, (5) and the most critical— the amount of power.
In total, player A had greater power over 3 when A's costs
to force compliance were smaller and when B's disutility
for refusing were larger.

It was noted that these costs

could be expressed in physical units, monetary units, or
abstract utility measurements.

A's power over B thus

included not only the ability of A to secure desired
action from B with a certain probability, but also within
a certain cost to A.
In total, the maximum amount of power that player
A had over B was equal to the strength that A had over B
divided by B's disutility of performing an action.
Realistically speaking, however, such a measure required
theoretical probabilities:

in state trading, it was noted

that nation B's behavior might be observed over a series
of similar events in which B complied with A in some pro
portion of the times.
empirical frequencies.

Probability in this sense became
B's behavior yielded disutility of
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various amounts in the observed events.

B, therefore, com

plied with A in those cases when the disutility was
smallest.
As an illustration of the described situation,
including those elements of costs, probability, and power,
the Zeuthen-Nash-Harsanyi model was utilized and modified.
In this model of bilateral power, both traders' functions
were analyzed.

That is, both state traders' power func

tions were viewed simultaneously.
Symbolically, when consideration was given to all
possibilities— including retaliatory strategies— 3 selected
a strategy s(p2 ), the equilibrium probability, which allowed
the amount of A's power over B to beAp = P2 - P^ (the
difference in two probabilities).

When A and B agree from

this to do act Y with the probability p2 then B's non
performance for act Y assumed the probability of 1 - p2 »
Technically speaking, A and 3 agreed on a jointly randomized
mixed strategy with a probability p2 for B and 1 - p2
probability of non-compliance for A.

As noted by Harsanyi:

. . . A ' s power over 3 with respect to
action . . . tends to be equal to half the net
strength of A's power over B with respect to the
same action . . . this net strength being defined
as the difference between the gross relative
strength of A's power over B . . . and the gross
relative strength of B's power over A with respect
to the complementary action
■*NSee page 121, Chapter V.
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With respect to state trading the described system
yielded multiple results.

First, it provided an equilibrium

probability for action in the example considered.

In addi

tion, the solution was Pareto Optimum, for neither state
trader could increase its utility without harming the other
trader.

Thirdly, retaliatory strategies could be and were

included for the more normal case of conflict between
parties.
In addition, when the system was carried into
matrix squares and modified with an additional marginal
♦

cost-marginal benefit analysis a more descriptive and
complete matrix was found.

At this point, the complemen

tary nature of each method became apparent.

That is,

(1) the minimax-maximin solution (or the more complex
mixed strategy approach), (2) the equilibrium solution of
Zeuthen, Nash, and Harsanyi, and (3) method Ill's costbenefit analysis— all revealed useful and complementary
and new

insights into the state trading process.

Finally,

the game theory model proved capable of application to the
American wheat deal with the Soviet Union and in the OPEC
oil case.
In general, then, the study has served to point up
a number of previously neglected aspects of state trading.
First, the investigation has suggested that governmental
exchange is subject to somewhat of a fluctuating pattern.
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Secondly, the notion of comparative costs was found to be
insufficient when applied to most state trading cases.
This was especially true when non-economic considerations
motivated trade.

Thirdly, it was shown to be analytically

possible (as in the case of wheat and oil) to apply various
game theory methods to the state trading phenomenon, and
glean important insights in the process.
As a result of these findings, it is possible to
form several conclusions about the nature, relevance, and
impact of government exchange.

Specifically, government

trade varying as economic and political conditions change
will give policy makers, "planning for" government com
merce and its consequences, many difficulties.

That is,

given its cyclical pattern, it will be possible to under
(or over) estimate its magnitude in some future time
period.

Moreover, errors are even possible in estimating

its present volume given current recording practices.
To illustrate this problem, as may be recalled
there is room for possible disagreement as to exactly what
state trading is and what it is not.
would be helpful.

Perhaps an example

In the wheat deal, two forms of state

trading were employed.

One involved the credit arrangements

provided to the Soviet Union by the Commodity Credit
Corporation.

Credit in many instances, however, is not

viewed as a commodity per se.

If the arrangements are
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viewed this way, the deal would not be classified as state
trading.

Taking an alternative view that money (credit)

can be treated as a commodity, state trading was practiced.
Of course, the significance lies in the possible under- (or
over) statement of the magnitude of government commerce and
hence the need for consistent recording practices.
Hand in hand with the recording practice difficul
ties, there also exists a data problem for the game theory
model itself.

As was revealed certain information about

the players was required.

Of course, much of it was sub

ject to interpretation in this study, because the necessary
data were often unknown, unpublished, or unavailable.
Perhaps the accounting or recording methods of governments
should be modified to further illuminate their trans
actions so that a more "quantitative” analysis can be made.
As things are, the analysis had to be, as with much of
economics, descriptive.

It is capable of interpretation

by economists, and policy suggestions can derive from it,
but its usefulness is still limited by the data available
for the model.

Its value lies primarily in the insights

it offers into the nature of power, the penalties, rewards,
strategies, and so forth which heretofore had not been
applied to state trading.
It follows from the above, that if difficulties
exist in the data, there may exist difficulties in
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assessing the importance of state trading.

However, it has

been seen that the planned economies of the i*orld (with
more than half the world's population) for the most part
are complete government traders.

The United States, along

with many European, African, South American and Far
Eastern nations practice some degree of their own special
brands of governmental exchange.

Moreover, the influence

and impact of even relatively small state traders can be
extremely significant.

The OPEC case and the present oil

embargo is ample evidence in itself.

It might even be said

that government commerce (or lack of it) is capable of
influencing national boundaries:

the final international

boundaries between Israel and its neighbors will surely be
influenced by the oil policies and oil "pressures" applied
by OPEC.

The growing volume of "0PEC0 dollars" will also

have an important impact on the monetary, fiscal, and in
vestment policies of many countries.

The International

Monetary Fund is presently having to reconsider its plans
for future world monetary arrangements in light of much
higher oil prices and their impact on payment balances for
the nations of the world.

The examples are virtually

endless.
As for the future importance of government commerce
(and of special significance to the United States), recent
events have made it quite obvious that renewed interest is
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again developing in the state trading process.

As the

world becomes more competitive, especially between trading
blocs, it is apparent that government exchange will play a
larger and larger role.

In many areas and with many com

modities there is a growing division of interests (both
political and economic) between those nations having the
goods for exchange and those seeking such items.

As in the

cases of wheat and crude oil, the nations of the world are
finding themselves more dependent upon foreign sources.
If such conditions continue to prevail, the United States
may paradoxically find itself increasing its state trading
practices while professing freer trade to the world.

Even

now, in the early 1970's, the U. S. is pressing for reduced
discrimination in order to increase the competitiveness of
its goods in foreign markets.

These efforts will surely

continue when consideration is given to this nation's
enormous and continuing payments deficit and the growing
production capabilities of other nations.
Thus, one of the many unanswered questions concern
ing the future of state trading will be the role of the
United States.

As was noted, government trade can be used

as a policy vehicle for assistance purposes or it may be
used against countries.

The latter aspect, as evidenced by

the activities of the OPEC, can be of crucial significance
to the practicing nations and its trading partners.
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Benefits (or costs) may be political, military, and/or
economic.

Usually, they (benefits and costs) are some

combination of the three possibilities for it is rare, if
not impossible, for a nation to limit its actions to those
of a strictly economic nature.
As for the United States, it may find itself com
pelled to use those means at its disposal to maintain and/
or increase its influence in the world.

However, as noted

at the beginning of this study:
When governments are also conductors of
economic enterprise in the international field,
what results is a pattern or intergovernmental
relationship in which economic, political, and
military bilateral monopoly plus duopoly are all
wrapped up in one package of international
dynamite.2
The conclusion is obvious.

If the U. S. or any

other nation(s) continues to use and/or expand their state
trading practices, much more attention should be given to
further inquiry and analysis of government exchange.

It

is puzzling— indeed, almost paradoxical— that so very little
in the profession literature is devoted to this area.

Only

through continued research can more of the causes, conse
quences, and theoretical explanations be found— which
hopefully, will enlighten governments to the enormous

2Viner, loc. cit.
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impact of their dealings and perhaps in time temper their
actions toward "commercial" standards of exchange.
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